

WASHINGTON STAR  
21 DEC 1972JAMES SCHLESINGERA New Look for the CIA

Late in 1971 James R. Schlesinger, his wife, Rachel, and two of their children made headlines by rearing around a barren, uninhabited island—Amchitka, in the Aleutian chain off Alaska's coast.

They were not there to pursue Schlesinger's hobby: bird-watching. Their mission was to prove to skeptics that it was safe to inhabit an area where the U.S. government had just exploded the largest underground nuclear blast, known as "Project Cannikin."

A determined man who acts out his convictions, the 43-year-old native of New York City now moves into another controversial area, but one that produces few headlines: intelligence network.

Chosen by President Nixon today to succeed Richard M. Helms as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Schlesinger will be giving up the post of chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

In taking the intelligence position, Schlesinger will have an opportunity to act out some of his own conclusions about the way that job should be run.

His first job in the Nixon administration — assistant director of the Budget Bureau (later during his tenure renamed the Office of Management and Budget)—led to primary responsibility for reorganization of the intelligence apparatus of the federal government.



JAMES R. SCHLESINGER

Accomplished in 1971 the changes streamlined budgeting procedures and, more importantly concentrated the process of coordinating and assessing intelligence data in the hands of presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger and his aides in the White House.

The reorganization gave the director of Central Intelligence full budgeting responsibility for all of the intelligence services—enhanced authority which Schlesinger himself presumably now inherits.

Created Post

Perhaps by coincidence, a former colleague of Schlesinger's at the Rand Corp. "think tank" in California—Andrew M. Marshall—is the member of Kissinger's National Security Council staff most concerned with coordinating intelligence matters.

Marshall's post, as head of the "Net Assessment Group," within the NSC staff, was created by Schlesinger's reorganization plan.

Schlesinger had joined the Nixon administration in February 1969, primarily as a budget-watcher. His main assignment was to oversee the Pentagon's budgeting procedures, during a period when military spending was easing the economic burden of the Vietnam war's peak years. He

is reputed to have shown the Pentagon in one year how to trim \$8 billion out of its budget.

Although much of his professional and governmental life seems to have involved national security in one way or another, he also has a reputation for being sensitive about environmental issues.

Ecology Stand Tested

His friends recall that, among his other activities within the government, he persuaded the administration to reverse itself and to allow the Taos Indians to keep their sacred Blue Lake lands in New Mexico.

The chairmanship of AEC tested his devotion to ecology. Although environmental organizations strongly criticized his full support for the Amchitka atomic blast, they have praised his stand on the so-called Calvert Cliffs case.

Pressed by the atomic energy industry to appeal a federal court decision ordering the AEC to act much more aggressively to protect the environment, Schlesinger refused, choosing to obey the court.

The chairman also has taken the position that it is not appropriate for the AEC to promote atomic energy, or to estimate how much nuclear power the nation will need. Instead, it has been his policy to have the agency develop energy options that the public may decide to use as it wishes.

Trained as an economist, Schlesinger was graduated summa cum laude from Harvard in 1950. After a year's travel in Europe on a fellowship, he returned to Harvard to take a doctorate in economics.

Taught at Virginia

After, that, he taught economics at the University of Virginia, and began concentrating on the budgetary side of national security and defense policy. He wrote a book titled "The Political Economy of National Security."

In part as a result of the book's favorable notice among experts in the national security field, Schlesinger was offered the job at Rand in Santa Monica which carried out much of the defense establishment's computer-based analysis of defense systems.

While at Rand, Schlesinger headed a study of nuclear arms proliferation, and worked on a study of the role of "systems analysis" in political decision-making. That work brought him to the attention of the Nixon administration's new budget staff in the early days after the President's inauguration.

During their time in Washington, the Schlesingers have avoided much of the city's social life. Schlesinger is said to dislike cocktail parties.

He is a Republican and a Lutheran.

Mrs. Schlesinger, the former Rachel Mellinger, is a graduate of Radcliffe. They have eight children—four daughters and four sons.

17 SEP 1972

## ...and Bombing Fiasco

How purely military judgment can miscarry even from a strategic standpoint is all too sharply illustrated by the bombing of North Vietnam that was authorized.

During his first week in office in January 1969, President Nixon asked the eight key military and civilian agencies of the Government concerned with the Indochina war what could be achieved by mining Haiphong and other ports and resuming the bombing of North Vietnam, which had been halted three months earlier.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the American military command in Saigon replied that the effect on the war would be decisive if previous restrictions were removed on the bombing of overland transport from China. But the C.I.A. and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (O.S.D.) challenged the military estimates.

As summarized by the Kissinger staff in the then-secret National Security Study Memorandum No. 1 (N.S.S.M.-1) in February 1969, the C.I.A. and O.S.D. said that "the overland routes from China alone could provide North Vietnam with enough material to carry on, even with an unlimited bombing campaign."

Three years later, on May 8, 1972, President Nixon disregarded the C.I.A.-O.S.D. judgment, which was supported by an impressive array of facts, and took the advice of the military, who evidently argued that "smart bombs" and other new techniques would make even more certain the success they predicted in 1969.

For four months now, the ports have been closed by mines and a massive bombing campaign has been under way. Indications that the Communists' war effort was not being impeded have been countered with the assertion that several months would be required before the interdiction campaign began to pinch. Petroleum supplies, which came by Soviet tanker overseas and had to be pumped ashore, were said to be particularly vulnerable.

These predictions now have been exploded by two separate intelligence studies. The C.I.A. and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency have both concluded that the blockade and bombing, after four months, have had relatively feeble results.

The Communists have built three four-inch petroleum pipelines—which are hard to hit and can be rapidly repaired—south from the Chinese border to the Hanoi area and another from Hanoi to the southern tip of North Vietnam and beyond, into the Ashau Valley of South Vietnam. Ant-like tactics of rapid repair of damaged railways and bridges have also kept adequate supplies of

other kinds moving from China. Though supplies have got through for new Communist offensives in the next six weeks—including one in the Mekong Delta south of Saigon—if Hanoi decides to launch them.

The mystery is why anything other than this should have been expected. As the N.S.S.M.-1 study pointed out, "almost four years of air war in North Vietnam have shown—as did the Korean war—that, although air strikes will destroy transport facilities, equipment and supplies, they cannot successfully interdict the [overland] flow of supplies because much of the damage can frequently be repaired within hours."

That these facts, known since 1969, were disregarded is bad enough. What would be even worse would be continuing illusions that the mining and bombing might force Hanoi to accept a negotiated defeat. A compromise political settlement, which involves a sharing or division of power in South Vietnam, is the one way to end a war that neither side can win on the battlefield.

STATINTL

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# Joint Chiefs: a Growing Influence in U.S. Policy

## Military Plays Stronger Role Under Nixon Administration

RUDY ABRAMSON

WASHINGTON

They are warriors transformed into technocrats.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, quasi-board of directors of the American military machine—influencing the use of billions of dollars each year, moving in circles where foreign policy is made, preparing for military threats a generation into the future, linking the President with men under arms.

The institution has been under fire ever since it was created 25 years ago. Dean Acheson, the late-secretary

*Times staff writer Abramson covers the Pentagon.*

ry of state, compared it to "my favorite old lady who could not say what she thought until she heard what she said."

To its critics, the JCS is a ponderous, ineffective anachronism described this way, "The courts meditate, Congress deliberates, and the Joint Chiefs bicker."

Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs are increasing their influence, playing a stronger role in U.S. policy than they have for years.

And paradoxically this is happening in an atmosphere of tarnished military image, disaffection over defense spending, and continued recommendations for reorganization of the JCS machinery.

For one thing, the Nixon Administration has greatly strengthened the role of the National Security Council and the crisis-managing Washington Special Action Group where military advice is fed into the White House decision-making process. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a member of both.

Furthermore, the Nixon Administration feels more strongly than recent past administrations that national security requires a distinct contribution from the military.

Said one JCS staff officer: "Sometimes the weight of a discussion is carried by people who didn't even have a seat at the table in past years." For such reasons, military men are persuaded they are at least being heard.

The JCS institution and the men who manage it have changed much more slowly than the times.

The chiefs themselves are still officers from a generation that served with the Eisenhowers, Bradleys, and MacArthurs, survivors of a pre-nuclear age when the men who commanded armies were bigger than life.

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They stayed in uniform when the United States mothballed its fleets, put its bombers in boneyards, and sent its conscripts home.

But mastery of the military system and years in prized command posts no more prepare a man for the JCS than a life in politics trains him for the Presidency.

At the top, they are asked to be master diplomats, politicians, and advisers to the President at the same time they are burdened with more narrow responsibilities as leaders of their individual services.

Bicker, they have. In the '50's the admirals and generals feuded over aircraft carriers versus bombers. The Army and Air Force fought over control of ballistic missiles, the Army contending the new weapons were a new generation of artillery, the Air Force viewing them as unmanned planes.

In the '60's, it was a conflict with Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and his civilian aides poaching in the preserve of military prerogative.

Not much leaks out of the gold-carpeted Pentagon conference room called "the tank" where the chiefs

sit down to hammer out decisions in top secrecy.

There was a story several years ago of the Air Force chief who reprimanded the Marine Corps commandant for joining a discussion on bombers. "This has nothing to do with the Marines," he was quoted. "Why are you getting into this?" To which the Marine snorted, "Because I am an American citizen, god-dammit."

Such bickering is said to be a thing of the past.

On paper, the harmony is indeed astounding. Of 1,000 to 1,200 official recommendations and positions personally endorsed by the chiefs each year, fewer than 1% fail to get unanimous support. Even during the '60s, when Vietnam was escalating, and McNamara was conducting a management revolution at the Pentagon, the split decision never rose above 3% in a year.

Therein lies the basis for charges that rather than basing decisions on what's best for the nation, JCS policy emerges from a logrolling exercise that rounds off the sharp corners of policy, enabling the chiefs to march shoulder-to-shoulder.

Said an officer who recently completed a tour of duty on the JCS staff: "They can be very good when they're dealing with single service issues, emergency situations.

"But ask them how the services should divide up an extra billion dollars in the defense budget, and they are completely incapable of dealing with that. They are just not able to address questions of resource allocation."

This is the so-called "two-hatted problem" that has hovered around the JCS organization since it was created 25 years ago.

The same men called upon to advise the President on how the military should be structured, how to provide the armed forces to meet the country's national security objectives are at the same time leaders of their individual services.

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"A chief of staff does not lead his service by being noble," said Rear Adm. Gene A. La Rocque, who has become an outspoken defense critic since retiring from the Navy. "He has to make deals, to win, his service doesn't care."

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## Editorial Opinion

# The Role Of National Security In U.S. Policy

Recent disclosures that an undercover agent of the U.S. security establishment, posing as an outsider and using obviously faked credentials, wandered unmolested for several hours in some of the security agency's most sensitive areas where he had almost unhindered access to some of the nation's top military secrets, has led many people to wonder just how the national security establishment works and what it is for.

The National Security Act, which became law 25 years ago, has been described as "perhaps the most far-reaching measure in its effect upon the role of the military in American life since the formation of the Navy Department in 1798."

By bringing the three branches of the armed services together in a single department, the act, signed into law July 26, 1947, by former President Harry S. Truman, aimed to eliminate inter-service duplication and rivalry. But it also had the unintended side-effect of profoundly altering the process of formulating U.S. foreign policy.

In addition to creating a national military establishment, later to become the Defense Department, the National Security Act set up three bodies that have grown in importance over the years. The Joint Chiefs of Staff was an outgrowth of the Combined Chiefs of Staff set up by the United States and Great Britain early in World War II. It was given the responsibility of preparing

military plans, reviewing over-all military requirements, and directing unified and specified combat commands.

Over and above the National Military Establishment, the act provided for a National Security Council "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security," with the specified duty to "assess and appraise the objectives, commitments and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power."

It is this same National Security Council from which presidential advisor Henry Kissinger operates. Kissinger's influence in arranging and guiding President Nixon through a complex round of international conversations on both sides of the Iron Curtain, all apparently being strongly related to the security of the United States, has provoked a measure of domestic debate, but most recent polls show that the president has a comfortable majority of citizens who approve policy changes stemming from the world wide journeys.

Kissinger, who is now in South Vietnam on a mission for President Nixon after several secret sessions with North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris, has become the target of some criticism in liberal media circle and in some discreet rumbling within the State Department, where some feel he

has usurped traditional State Department power.

Finally, the act established a Central Intelligence Agency. CIA was to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security," but was to "have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement . . . or internal security functions."

It remained for Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense under President's John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson from 1961 to 1968, to utilize to the full the powers inherent in the National Defense Act. While McNamara found the basic structure of the Defense Department to be "entirely sound," he nevertheless instituted a number of changes. In 1961 the Tactical Air Command and the Strategic Army Corps were placed under the direction of the U.S. Strike Command. The communications and intelligence branches of the three military services were merged, and plans for streamlining of procurement of arms and equipment were instituted.

"Despite its awesome power and the worldwide sweep of its activities, the basic mission of the Department of Defense is simply stated," McNamara wrote in 1968. "The mission is military security; or more broadly, to maintain a constant readiness the military forces necessary to protect the nation from attack, keep its commitments and support the foreign policy."

In the light of present political controversy over the relative position of President Nixon and his



Democratic challenger, Sen. George McGovern, McNamara's statement is of interest to many, because McGovern, in attacking the president's position, has promised sweeping Defense Department appropriation reductions which many critics contend will make the military unable to defend the country from attack, let alone back up commitments abroad in support of foreign policy.

Some critics argue that the Defense Department has a hand in shaping foreign policy, too. Discussion of contingency plans by Pentagon and military planners of foreign countries, C. Merton Tyrrell wrote in 1970, "have tended to diminish the role of the State Department, and place the Department of Defense in the quasi-official position of 'suggesting' foreign policy action." The CIA and the National Security Council likewise have chipped away at State Department policy-making powers. For better or worse, the National Security Act has had consequences that Congress could not foresee 25 years ago.

With the concentration of U.S. and foreign military data that must have been stored up during the past 25 years in an agency that reaches deep into both military and foreign policy decision making, and with both foreign and domestic interests trying through both legal and illegal means, to open up this mass of sensitive data, it is little wonder that the security agency has ordered a detailed overhauling of its own security.

20 AUG 1972

# Keep Your Eye on

## Gen. Alexander Haig, That Is. His Star Is Rising.

by Lloyd Shearer

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIF.

**W**ith the exception of the President, no one in the Nixon Administration has been more publicized than Henry Kissinger, Nixon's National Security Affairs adviser.

Yet Kissinger does not work alone. He heads a staff of 110 including messengers, secretaries, researchers, and braintrusts, all self-effacing, hard-working men and women, none of them known to the public.

Of late, however, one of Dr. Kissinger's loyal and intrepid band of devoted slaves has begun to surface.

Mark his name carefully: Maj. Gen. Alexander Meigs Haig Jr.

At 47, Al Haig is tall, blue-eyed, and more handsome and sex-appealing than secret agent Kissinger whose deputy he is.

Soft-speaking and tactful, subtly ambitious with just the right amount of ruthlessness, Al Haig is second in command at National Security Affairs. He is Henry's "gute rechte hand" (good right hand).

### Checks on Vietnam

It is he who holds together the dedicated "low profiles" who work for Kissinger while Henry cavorts in strange and foreign lands. It is through him that the mountain of position papers on Vietnam, the Middle East, the Soviet

Union, South Africa, and ad infinitum, is funneled. And it is he, without fanfare or publicity, who wings off to Vietnam every six months or so, to assess firsthand for the President how things are really going.

Last month Haig returned directly to San Clemente from his eighth trip to Southeast Asia and briefed the President on conditions in Vietnam and Cambodia. He was then trotted out on a non-attribution basis to the press, which described him as "an unidentified, high-ranking source."

Although Al Haig has spent the past 27 years in the Army, "my entire adult life," he neither looks nor behaves like a military prototype. He is not obdurate or parochial. There is no rigidity to his mind, which is open and inquiring, or to his speech, which is academic and articulate.

Haig could very well be taken for a college professor or a diplomat, which in a sense he is. For diplomacy is certainly a requisite in getting on with taskmaster Kissinger whose tolerance quotient is low and personnel turnover high.

Last month when Henry invited Haig to the swank Bistro restaurant, one of Kissinger's favorite restaurants in Beverly Hills, along with actress Sally Kellerman, Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin, and a flock of screen colony Republican fat-cats, several waiters mistook Haig—heaven help him, for an actor.

### Probable inheritor

Should anything happen to Henry, like being appointed Secretary of State, or being incapacitated by one of his scorned girlfriends, Haig most probably would inherit Kissinger's job.

Although philosophically Kissinger and Haig see eye to eye—both are conservatives—Haig as foreign affairs adviser to the President, would certainly avoid the spotlight Kissinger, by his nature, attracts.

To begin with, Haig is a happily-married, churchgoing Roman Catholic.

Son of a lawyer, he was born in Philadelphia, attended parochial grade school in Cynwyd on the Main Line, moved up to St. Joseph's Prep and studied two years at Notre Dame before his appointment to West Point came through in 1944.

His brother, a priest, is president of Wheeling College in West Virginia, and his sister, Regina Meredith, an attorney in Pennington, N.J.

Like many young men, Al Haig set his eye on a service academy appointment because it was a financial necessity. "My father died when I was 10," he explains, "and I had pretty much to fend for myself in terms of economics. I had newspaper routes, worked for the Post Office, the Atlantic Refining Company. I even worked as a floorwalker in the ladies' department of John Wanamaker's (a well-known department store in Philadelphia) to support myself."

1 July 1973

**SUPER-BISMARCK**

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger is officially designated as "Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs." And in this capacity he presides over the National Security Council staffs which are divided into 13 divisional staffs, such as NSC planning Group, Program Analysis Staff, Scientific Affairs, International Economic Affairs, African and U.N. Affairs, etc. In addition he is Chairman of the Washington Special Action Group, which directs the activities of all intelligence agencies, including the CIA and the FBI.

The White House Military Situation Room also operates under the aegis of Dr. Kissinger. It is here the military evaluations and strategies are formulated for the President's decision. The super-strategist Kissinger frequently overrides the recommendations of the four-star generals and admirals of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Where did Kissinger acquire all of his military expertise? Certainly his Army career in World War II was somewhat mediocre as a staff sergeant, and his brief career as a very junior reserve officer after the war. Since he never even commanded a squad, how could he acquire matured military judgment?

In 1959 he resigned his reserve commission as a captain in the Military Intelligence. In his resignation letter, Reserve Captain Kissinger had the audacity to say that he was quitting because of "pressure of other obligations and the conviction that I can be of greater service in a high rank in case an emergency necessitates this step." The U.S. Army was happy to get rid of him.

The following is an official memorandum, dated April 3, 1959 shortly before his discharge:

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF OF  
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger (U).

Dr. KISSINGER was born in Fuerth, Germany on 27 May 1923. He arrived in the United States on 5 September 1938 and was subsequently naturalized while in the military service by the U.S. District Court, Spartanburg, South Carolina on 25 June 1943. After attending high school in New York City for one year he worked as a shipping clerk until inducted into the Army on 26 February 1943.

Dr. KISSINGER received basic training at Camp Croft, S.C., and was enrolled in the Army Specialist Training Program at the University of North Carolina and Lafayette University. He served in the Rhineland, Ardennes and Central Europe campaigns as a rifleman in Company C, 335th Infantry Regiment, 84th Infantry Division and as an investigator in the Counter Intelligence Corps. He was discharged as a Staff Sergeant in 1946 to accept employment

as a Department of the Army civilian instructor at the European Theater Intelligence School, Oberammergau, Germany. He served in this capacity for one year.

Upon return to the United States in 1947 Dr. KISSINGER applied for a commission in the Officers' Reserve Corps. He was appointed a 2nd Lieutenant, MI (ORC) on 19 April 1948. He was promoted to the following grades on the dates shown: 1st Lt. MI (USAF), 11 May 1951; 1st Lt. MI (AUS), 5 Nov. 1952; Capt. MI (USAR), 15 Nov. 1955. Since 1948 he has completed annual tours of active duty of from fifteen to ninety days duration in his Department of the Army Mobilization Designation assignment in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Md. and has regularly attended meetings of reserve units to which he has been assigned. In a letter dated 6 Mar. 1959, addressed to The Adjutant General, Dr. KISSINGER has indicated a desire to resign his commission because of "... pressure of other obligations and the conviction that I can be of greater service in a high rank in case an emergency necessitates this step. ..." This action, which has been referred to The Commanding General, First United States Army, is still pending.

Upon his return to the United States in 1947, Dr. KISSINGER entered Harvard University as an undergraduate. He graduated in 1950 with the degree Bachelor of the Arts in Government. From 1950 to 1954 he was a teaching Fellow in the Department of Government at Harvard University. He has been a member of the Harvard faculty since he received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from that University in 1954. The Directory of Officers in the Official Register of Harvard University, Vol. IV, No. 24, General Catalog Issue, 1958-1959, contains the following entry concerning Dr. KISSINGER:

"Kissinger, Henry Alfred, PhD., Lecturer on Government, Associate Director of the Center for International Affairs, Executive Director of the Summer School International Seminar, Editor of CONFLUENCE and Member of the Faculty of Public Administration. ..."

Dr. KISSINGER was subject of an intensive investigation in 1955 because of allegations that the publication CONFLUENCE might contain items written from a Communist or pro-Communist point of view.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF  
FOR INTELLIGENCE

(signed) RICHARD COLLINS

Brigadier General, GS  
Director of Plans, Programs  
and Security

STATINTL

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## A SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT:

## Vietnam:

STATINTL

## How Government Became Wolves

Noam Chomsky

I

Reviewing the record of American intervention in Indochina in the Pentagon Papers, one cannot fail to be struck by the continuity of basic assumptions from one administration to the next. Never has there been the slightest deviation from the principle that a noncommunist regime must be imposed and defended, regardless of popular sentiment. The scope of the principle was narrowed when it was conceded, by about 1960, that North Vietnam was irretrievably "lost." Otherwise, the principle has been maintained without equivocation. Given this principle, as well as the strength of the Vietnamese resistance, the military power available to the United States, and the lack of effective constraints, one can deduce with precision the strategy of annihilation that was gradually undertaken.

On May 10, 1949, Dean Acheson cabled US officials in Saigon and Paris that "no effort [should] be spared" to assure the success of the Bao Dai government, since there appeared to be "no other alternative to establish [ment] Communist pattern Vietnam." He further urged that this government should be "truly representative even to extent including outstanding non-Commie leaders now supporting Ho."

A State Department policy statement of the preceding September had noted that the Communists under Ho Chi Minh had "captur[ed] control of the nationalist movement," thus impeding the "long-term objective" of the United States: "to eliminate so far as possible Communist influence in Indochina." We are unable to suggest any practicable solution to the French, the report continued, "as we are all too well aware of the unpleasant fact that Communist Ho Chi Minh is the strongest and perhaps the ablest figure in Indochina and that any suggested solution which excludes him is an expedient of uncertain outcome." But to Acheson, Ho's popularity and ability were of no greater moment than his nationalist credentials: "Question

whether Ho as much nationalist as Commie is irrelevant" (May 20, 1949).

In May, 1967, Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton presented a memorandum which the Pentagon historian takes to imply a significant modification of policy toward a more limited and conciliatory position. The Saigon government, McNaughton urged, should be moved "to reach an accommodation with the non-Communist South Vietnamese who are under the VC banner; to accept them as members of an opposition political party, and, if necessary, to accept their individual participation in the national government..." (Gravel Edition, *Pentagon Papers*, vol. IV, p. 489).<sup>1</sup> Exactly Acheson's proposal of eighteen years earlier, restricted now to South Vietnam.

In a summary of the situation after the Tet offensive of 1968, Leslie Gelb, director of the Pentagon study, asked whether the US can "overcome the apparent fact that the Viet Cong have 'captured' the Vietnamese nationalist movement while the GVN has become the refuge of Vietnamese who were allied with the French in the battle against the independence of their nation" (II, p. 414). His question expressed the dilemma of the State Department twenty years before, and properly so. The biographies of Thieu, Ky, and Khiem indicate the continuity of policy; all served with the French forces, as did most of the top ARVN officers. "Studies of peasant attitudes conducted in recent years," the Pentagon historian informs us, "have demonstrated that for many, the struggle which began in 1945 against colonialism continued uninterrupted throughout Diem's regime: in 1954, the foes of nationalists were transformed from France and Bao Dai, to Diem and the US... but the issues at stake 'never changed'" (I, p. 295).

Correspondingly, the Pentagon considered its problem to be to "deter the... (Ho Chi Minh)"—May, 1959. The Thieu regime, today has a power base remarkably

like Diem's,<sup>2</sup> and substantial segments of the urban intelligentsia—"the people who count," as Ambassador Lodge once put it (II, p. 738)—now speak out against US intervention.

A National Intelligence Estimate of June, 1953, discussed the gloomy prospects for the "Vietnamese government" given "the failure of Vietnamese to rally to [it]," the fact that the population assists the Viet Minh more than the French, the inability of "the Vietnam leadership" to mobilize popular energy and resources, and so on (I, p. 391f.). With hardly more than a change of names, this analysis might be interchanged with the despairing report from US pacification advisers (MACCORDS) on December 31, 1967, deploring the corruption and growing weakness of the GVN, the "ever widening gap of distrust, distaste and disillusionment between the people and the GVN." With these words, the record of US-GVN relations in the Pentagon Papers ends (II, pp. 406-7).

One may, perhaps, argue that the mood of the South Vietnamese counts for less in the war than it did in earlier years, now that the US has succeeded, partially at least, in "grinding the enemy down by sheer weight and mass" (Robert Komer, II, p. 575), and now that North Vietnamese forces have increasingly been drawn into the war, as a direct and always anticipated consequence of American escalation.

In November, 1964, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor argued that even if we could establish an effective regime in Saigon, to attain US objectives it would not suffice to "drive the DRV out of its reinforcing role." Rather, we will not succeed unless we also "obtain its cooperation in bringing an end to the Viet Cong insurgency." We must "persuade or force the DRV to stop its aid to the Viet Cong and to use its directive powers to make the Viet Cong desist from their efforts to overthrow the government of South

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CONTINUED

15 June 1972

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## HOOVER MYSTERY

Several present and former FBI agents are saying privately that they suspect that J. Edgar Hoover died from an overdose of sleeping tablets. But they add that the exact cause of his death can't be determined without an autopsy. And Dr. James Luke, D.C. Coroner, has adamantly refused to conduct an autopsy.

The FBI men say: "Regardless of whether Mr. Hoover committed suicide or died from a stroke induced by hypertension: there is one thing for sure: Jack Anderson drove Mr. Hoover to his death—the same as Drew Pearson drove Jim Forrestal to his death."

Jack Anderson, a legman for Pearson for 23 years became his successor as the Nation's foremost muckraker. For the past two years Anderson has conducted a continuous, unrelenting campaign of harassment and vilification against J. Edgar Hoover. Anderson's gumshoe operatives shadowed Hoover, snooped in the trash can at his home, checked on the food he ate and the medicines he was taking; Anderson also purloined investigative reports from the confidential files of the FBI and publicized them with critical commentary.

Hoover fumed and raged, but he seemed impotent to do anything about it. Anderson carried on his savage personal attack against Hoover with official impunity. Even when Anderson filched the super-secret reports on the brief Pakistani-Indian War from the files of White House's National Security Council and the FBI was ordered to investigate this flagrant breach of national security the culprits were not apprehended. Under a re-organization Executive order all Federal intelligence agencies—including the CIA and the FBI—must work directly under Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, White House Chief National Security Adviser.

Since then, the flow of classified documents to Anderson have increased in volume. He seems to enjoy complete immunity from prosecutive action.

Hoover was terribly frustrated with this brazen security breach but there was apparently nothing that he could do. Did Hoover become a prisoner in his own Bureau? Did the FBI that he had created in a 45-year strenuous effort turn into a Frankenstein? Some conservative-oriented former FBI men believe that this is true.

The FBI men's analogy between Drew Pearson's vicious personal campaign against Forrestal and Jack Anderson's virulent personal campaign against Hoover is significant. In 1948 James V. Forrestal, the first Secretary of the Department of Defense, incurred the wrath of the Zionists by opposing the American Government support of

the Jewish occupation of Palestine and the stirring up of the Arab world against the U.S.

Ironically, Forrestal had been the Vice President of the Jewish international banking firm, Dillon, Read & Co. And Forrestal was planning to soon return to the firm, but he put duty to his country above self-aggrandizement. Forrestal exerted every effort to persuade President Truman not to recognize Israel, but in vain—Truman succumbed to the temptation of political campaign gifts from American Zionists.

In their vengeance, the Zionists selected Drew Pearson to lead the vicious campaign to destroy Forrestal. The Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith assigned David Katz (alias Karr), former by-line writer for the Communist *Daily Worker*, and Andrew Older, member of the Washington, D.C. Communist newspaper cell, to the Pearson staff to assist in the vilification campaign against Forrestal.

The Zionists furnished Pearson cash funds to hire Gentile undercover gumshoe operatives to shadow Forrestal day and night, check on his personal life and the lives of his wife and son. Forrestal's personal correspondence and office files were stolen and published by Pearson in his syndicated column and in his news broadcasts. Pearson published not only half-truths but pure unadulterated falsehoods about Forrestal. When a Pearson aide remonstrated that an article that Pearson wrote about Forrestal was not true, Pearson replied: "The end justifies the means." Columnist Westbrook Pegler accused Pearson of writing "unequivocal lies" about Forrestal and when Forrestal committed suicide he castigated him for driving Forrestal to his death.

Shortly before his own death, Pearson wrote in his diary: "After Forrestal's death I suffered from insomnia. I was haunted with the thought that maybe Pegler was right—maybe I did drive Forrestal to his death. I felt an almost compulsive urge to join Forrestal in death."

At the time of Forrestal's death in 1949, some Washington insiders did not believe that Forrestal actually committed suicide. Forrestal was incarcerated as a patient under guard high in the tower of the Bethesda Naval Hospital. A Chief Naval Petty Officer was stationed outside the door of his room.

Forrestal tied several sheets together, fastened them to his bed and climbed out the window holding to the rope of sheets—he may have been trying to escape to a room below. Anyhow, he fell sixteen floors and died instantly. It was called "suicide."

Pearson had done nothing but drive Forrestal to become an anti-Semitic crackpot, was endangering

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STATINTL

I. F. Stone Reports:

# Nixon's War Gamble and Why It Won't Work

The Washington dispatch which follows had to be written and put into type before Nixon's speech the night of May 8, announcing his decision to mine North Vietnam's harbors and to smash its rail and road connections with China. But the disclosures to which the article calls attention provide the explanation of Nixon's long-range strategy, its weakness and its risks.

It is characteristic of Nixon's secretiveness that National Security Study Memorandum No. 1—which is discussed and partly reprinted below—though intended in 1969 to lay the groundwork for his policies on Vietnam, nowhere asked the advice of intelligence agencies and the bureaucracy, military and civilian, on the very policy of "Vietnamization" he adopted. But at two points in their responses, there were warnings against US troop withdrawal and doubts expressed about ARVN's ability to stand alone. Four military agencies (US MACV, CINCPAC, JCS, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense) warned against "a too hasty withdrawal of US forces." The CIA went further and said progress "has been slow, fragile and evolutionary," adding quietly, "It is difficult to see how the US can largely disengage over the next few years without jeopardizing this."

It is now clear that Nixon took the gamble on Vietnamization in the hope that if this failed, a bigger gamble would succeed. The bigger gamble, as the reader will see, was either to buy off Moscow and Peking or, if that didn't work, to use the threat of a nuclear confrontation to make them stand by while we destroyed North Vietnam from the air. In other words, if his gamble on South Vietnam's future failed, he was and is prepared to gamble America's future and the world's. This is the reality behind Nixon's proclaimed search for "a generation of peace."

The mining of North Vietnam's ports and its connections with the sea and air is potentially the gravest decision ever taken by an American

that could ignite World War III. A gamble of such magnitude, taken by one man without any real consultation with other branches of government, can only be described as an act of dictatorship and war. Nixon—one must assume—is as ready for the domestic as for the world consequences. The martial law imposed in Saigon may be a foretaste of the repression to be expected at home if the situation deteriorates.

In the literally terrible calculus of events, as I write a few hours after the deadline passed in Haiphong harbor, the question is whether Moscow and Peking will act with the same primitive irrationality that Nixon has, putting prestige, face, and *machismo* ahead of civilization's survival, or whether their leadership will take the blow at whatever cost to their own political future, hoping that Hanoi's armies will shortly have achieved their aim, which clearly is not territory but the destruction of Saigon's will to resist and an end of the Thieu regime. But even if the crisis is thereby resolved "peacefully" at the expense of the Vietnamese people North and South, it is difficult to see a successful summit, a SALT agreement as a sequel. It is easier to see a new era of heightened suspicion, tension, cold war, and escalating arms race.

In the tense moments at the White House just before press time Nixon was doing his best to pantomime a victory, calling in the photographers and giving them sixty feet of film instead of the usual forty to record a visit with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Soviet Trade Minister Patolichev. "The atmosphere of the session," said the pool report in the press room, "was extremely amiable, cordial, and pleasant. There were lots of smiles all around and the President seemed particularly buoyant." Dobrynin looked a bit uneasy, but Patolichev, when asked later whether there ever any doubt?

Was this cheerful idiocy merely marking time while waiting for the Kremlin to make up its collective mind or would we see an *opéra bouffe* cave-in instead of an apocalypse? If brinkmanship paid off, what new hair-raisers lie ahead? Just after dawn this morning at the Capitol vigil under a cloudless blue sky as the mines were activated 9,000 miles away, one listened to the clichés with which men comfort themselves in crisis and could only hope that by some miracle the American people might assert themselves and force a change of course.

Catch the Falling Flag  
by Richard J. Whalen.  
Houghton Mifflin, 308 pp., \$6.95

National Security Study  
Memorandum No. 1:  
The Situation in Vietnam  
Anonymous Xerox Publication,  
548 pp.

I. F. Stone

Four years ago Richard Nixon was just where he is now on Vietnam, i.e., on the brink of a wider conflict. He didn't think the war could be won, but didn't want to lose "leverage" by saying so in public. His one hope, his "secret plan" for "an honorable peace," i.e., for snatching political victory from military defeat, was to shut off Haiphong and bring about a confrontation with the Soviet Union. This is exactly where he—and we—are today. After all the years of costly losses, all he offers is a bigger gamble.

*Catch the Falling Flag*, Richard J. Whalen's memoir of his service as a speech writer for Nixon in the 1968 campaign, could not have appeared at a better moment. It provides the full text of the speech Nixon was about to give on his own plan to end the war when Johnson announced on March 31 that he would not run again. Two days before, conferring with his speech writers, Nixon startled them by an extraordinarily—and uncharacteristically—candid remark. "I've come to the conclusion," Whalen quotes him as saying, "that there's no way to win the war. But we can't say that, of course, the opposite, just to keep some degree of bargaining leverage."



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# CIA, State and Defense Had Doubt About Attacking Haiphong

## Documents from Nixon's Secret Study of the War: National Security Study Memorandum No. 1

STATINTL

### QUESTION 28d

*What are current views on the proportion of war-essential imports that could come into North Vietnam over the rail or road lines from China, even if all imports by sea were denied and a strong effort even made to interdict ground transport? What is the evidence?*

### The Defense Department's Answer

#### Land Import Capacity

In 1968, NVN imported an average of 6,800 STPD (short tons per day); 6,000 STPD by sea, and 800 STPD by land. Imports by land were higher in 1967, amounting to about 1,100 STPD. However, the land lines of communication from China were not used to capacity. It is estimated that the two rail lines from China have a theoretical uninterdicted capacity of about 8,000 STPD and the road network could provide an additional 7,000 STPD during the dry season (normally June-September) and about 2,000 STPD during the poor weather months. The combined capacity of the land routes (9,000-15,000 STPD) is more than enough to transport North Vietnam's total import requirements of about 7,000 STPD. If all seaborne imports were to come through China, considerable logistic problems would have to be solved by the Chinese regime.

#### Interdiction of Imports from China

If seaborne imports can be denied to NVN, her ability to successfully pursue the war in SVN would be dependent on land imports from China.

A strong effort to interdict road and rail transport from Communist China through North Vietnam would require a concerted and coordinated air interdiction campaign against all transportation: military support; petroleum oil, and lubricants power; industrial; air defense; and communications target systems. The interrelationship of the effects of destruction of targets in one category to the effectiveness of others is such that a cumulative impact is achieved. The air campaign would be conducted in such a manner as to be free of the militarily confining constraints which have characterized the conduct of the war in the north in the past. The concept would preclude attacks on population as a target but would accept high attrition of the transportation system to achieve destruction of war-

supporting targets.

An interdiction campaign as described above, when employed in conjunction with denial of sea imports, would, in large part, isolate Hanoi and Haiphong from each other and from the rest of the country. Isolation of Hanoi, the focal point of the road and rail system, would be highly effective in reducing North Vietnam's capability to reinforce aggression in South Vietnam. Importation of war-supporting material would be seriously reduced. Road capacities would be reduced by a factor well in excess of the estimated 50 percent believed to have been accomplished during the summer months of 1966 and 1967. Over time, North Vietnam's capability to cope with the cumulative effects of such an air campaign would be significantly curtailed.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that resumption of an interdiction campaign similar to that carried out in Route Package I between July and 1 November 1968 would assure almost total interdiction of truck and waterborne movement of supplies into the demilitarized zone and Laos. Naval blockade offshore and interdiction of Regional Package II to Thanh Hao would further enhance this effort.

Commitment of B-52 forces following heavy and unrestricted suppression of defenses by fighters, could reduce the amount of time to accomplish the above. Although the North Vietnamese have established a significant by-pass capability, the transportation nets remain vulnerable at many key points. The locomotive population could be attrited quickly if all buffer restrictions were removed near the Chinese border.

There is not sufficient data available at this time on either the cost or the effectiveness of an air campaign against these land lines to reach a firm conclusion as to the chances of isolating NVN from her neighbors. Past attempts to cut rail, road, and water networks in NVN have met with considerable difficulties. It has been estimated that a minimum of 6,000 attack sorties per month would be required against the two rail lines from China. Even at this level of effort, the North Vietnamese could continue to use the rail lines to shuttle supplies if they were willing to devote sufficient manpower to repair and transshipment operations. The road system would be still more difficult. Since the bombing halt north of 19° in April 1968,

North Vietnam has repaired all major road and railway bridges, constructed additional bypasses and alternative routes and expanded the railroad capacity by converting large segments from meter to dual gauge track. These improvements would make even more difficult prolonged interdiction of the overland lines of communication.

We currently fly approximately 7,000 sorties per month against two primary roads in Laos without preventing throughput truck traffic; the road network from China has 7-10 principal arteries and numerous bypasses. Finally, the monsoonal weather in NVN would make it difficult to sustain interdiction on the land lines of communication. Poor visibility would prevent air strikes during 25-30% of the time during good weather months and 50-65% of the time during poor weather months. Thus, it is not possible to give a definitive amount to the question of how much war-essential imports could come into NVN if sea imports are denied and a strong air campaign is initiated.

Attention would also have to be given to interdiction of supplies coming into SVN from Cambodia. Over the past 2 years, the enemy's use of Cambodia as a supply base and a place of refuge has become more pronounced. During the period October 1967 to September 1968, 10,000 tons of munitions transited Sihanoukville and are suspected of having been delivered to enemy forces in the Cambodia-Republic of Vietnam border regions. This amount represents more than enough ordnance to satisfy the arms and ammunition requirements for all enemy forces in South Vietnam during the same period. Thus, the act of sealing off the enemy's Cambodian supply lines must be considered as an integral part of any plan to prevent supplies from reaching enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam.

### The State Department's Answer

The crux of this question is the definition of "war-essential imports." There is room for considerable disagreement on this subject, but in our judgement, the category of war-essential imports should include most of the economic aid provided by the Soviets and Chinese, as well as nearly all of their purely military aid. It is equally if not more important than military aid in keeping North Viet-Nam a

June 1972

# *The Pentagon Papers—* A Discussion

STATINTL

The publication of "confidential" materials has inevitably given rise to a debate concerning a number of different but related problems: To what extent do the revelations contained in the documents throw light on events or policy decisions with which they deal? To what extent, if at all, does the publication of the information contained in the documents jeopardize the processes of executive decisionmaking? How can the conflict between the public's right to know and the executive's need for confidentiality be reconciled? The editors of the *Political Science Quarterly* have in the past published a number of articles dealing with the issue of access to governmental information and the terms on which that access is made available, notably, Adolf A. Berle's and Malcolm Moos's reviews of Emmet John Hughes, *The Ordeal of Power* (PSQ, LXXIX, June 1964) and Theodore Draper's review of Jerome Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution* (PSQ, LXXXVI, March 1971). The recent publication of the *Pentagon Papers* has given the controversy new urgency. U.S. Senator George McGovern of South Dakota, candidate for the Democratic party nomination for president, and Professor John P. Roche, from 1966-68 special consultant to President Lyndon Johnson, were asked by the editors of the *Political Science Quarterly* to review the *Pentagon Papers* and to debate in print the political and legal issues to which their publication has given rise.

## I

Publication of the *Pentagon Papers* has raised a storm concerning the right of the press to publish classified government documents. But the contents of the papers are so sweeping in their disclosures of official suppression of the realities in Vietnam, so revealing of the disastrous, secretly conceived policies and practices which led us into this tragic war, that it is impossible—in fact it misses their true significance—to discuss them in such abstract terms.

The integrity of our democracy is profoundly involved, not only in the constitutional sense with respect to the war-making power, but in the basic sense of the reality of government by popular rule. It is axiomatic with us that a free people can remain free only if it is enlightened and informed. It is axiomatic with us, as well, that a free press is essential to the creation and maintenance of an enlightened and informed people. A press which obtains access to a record revealing to the nation what our executive leadership knew and what it led the nation

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## Whose Intelligence Failed?

NOTHING beats hindsight when choosing where to kick for making a mistake—the mistake in this instance being wrong about where, when and with how much the North Vietnamese would attack.

The military intelligence community says that Washington's strategists—meaning the National Security Council led by Henry Kissinger—took the intelligence reports and decided an attack would come, if it came at all, west from Cambodia to cut South Vietnam in half.

U.S. intelligence flights were curtailed. The electronic surveillance devices employed on the ground couldn't tell a truck from a Soviet-built tank. But our intelligence knew that something was moving on the supply trails and that the North Vietnamese had strengthened their forces north of the demilitarized zone.

Intelligence reports predicted an attack in February or March. When it didn't come, some credibility was lost. When it did come—in April—from an unexpected direction with unexpected force, Washington was stunned.

It's difficult to run a war from the banks of the Potomac, 9,000 miles from the battlefield. But if intelligence reports are weighed in Washington and the decisions are made in Washington, the blame belongs in Washington. As the long-distance strategist, the NSC took responsibility for the conduct of the war.

If intelligence officials are correct in claiming that we were caught off guard because of NSC misinterpretation of their reports, it doesn't take much hindsight to know exactly where to kick.

## Candidate Critical Of Nixon Policy

STATINTL

## Jed Reveals His CIA Past

By STEVE DIMICK

Of The Journal Staff

U. S. senatorial hopeful Jed Johnson spent more than two years as an undercover agent for the Central Intelligence Agency during the early 1960s, he said Friday.

Johnson said he carried on CIA activities in more than a dozen Asian, African and Latin American countries while working for one of the front organizations exposed in the "CIA on campus" scandals in 1967.

The former Sixth District congressman Friday released a copy of a speech he will deliver to the Oklahoma Jaycees convention Saturday, in which he reveals his CIA involvement.

He said a controversial trip to Cuba he made while a student at Oklahoma University which was later thrown back at him during his 1964 congressional race, also was actually a government-sponsored "intelligence-gathering" trip.

In his speech to the Jaycees, Johnson will attack President Nixon's new interdiction policy against North Vietnamese supply routes. He bases his criticism largely on his knowledge of the CIA, which reportedly has claimed that the blockade will not work.

Johnson quotes from the "Kissinger Papers," a secret government study conducted by the CIA and other information gathering groups and made public by columnist Jack Anderson two weeks ago. The study reported the CIA's belief that no amount of interdiction will be successful in stopping the flow of war materiel to North Vietnam.

"I am personally acquainted in some depth with the degree of precision that the CIA operates within its intelligence activities, because I worked under contract as a covert agent for the CIA prior to my election to the Congress," Johnson said.

"At that time, the CIA had extremely detailed information on such things as which hand an obscure African provincial chief would eat with and the vintage of his favorite wines," he said.

"I am convinced after reading the Kissinger Papers that the CIA estimates of our capacity to interdict supplies was done with similar attention to precision and gave absolutely no reason for encouragement that this military action will successfully bring the war to a conclusion."

In an interview with The Oklahoma Journal before his announcement Saturday, Johnson said he worked for the CIA from 1962 to 1964. He said his experience as an agent has caused him to have faith in the CIA's assessments of various situations and in the agency's non-partisan position.

"I know that the CIA is very, very meticulous and careful in its evaluations and is accurate and precise," he said.

"The point is, if the CIA has given such an evaluation (of the Vietnam blockade), I know they've done a thorough assessment of the situation. They're very capable people and are not political; they're very apolitical.

"While I was never involved in CIA operations in Southeast Asia, I know personally that they literally can tell you the minutest details about minor African political figures and I'm sure they have done the same type of investigation in Vietnam," Johnson said.

Johnson said he was not at liberty to disclose his former CIA ties while he was a member of Congress because the Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs, the dummy foundation for which he worked, was still in business.

"For me to say anything would have literally endangered the lives of some of our people overseas," he said.

He came back to the U.S. early in 1964, on leave from the Foundation, and then resigned from the organization before he made his successful race for Congress.

Johnson served in Congress from 1964-66. He said the "whistle was blown" on the cover of the dummy foundation in 1967.

"I'm still not sure how much I'm at liberty to tell you," he said.

The former student leader at the University of Oklahoma said he was approached by the CIA (referred to among agents as "the firm") in 1962, a year after his graduation from college.

"They contacted you to see if you were interested and then did a very thorough security clearance," he said. "Later, you were taken to a hotel room where you had to sign an oath saying you would not divulge any secrets or critical information.

"After that, I was what they call 'under contract' to the CIA until I resigned," he said.

"It was fascinating work," he said. "If I hadn't run for Congress, I might have made a career out of the CIA."

Johnson said he actually worked for the U.S. Youth Council, which was funded by the Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs, which in turn was funded by the CIA.

His duties, about which he was never too specific, involved basically being a sort of goodwill ambassador-cum-spy.

"I led delegations of young Americans to developing nations and spoke before various legislative assemblies," he said. "We met with leaders of countries, presidents, prime ministers."

"Once at an Indian Youth Congress in Tirupathi, India, I debated a couple of older

Communist officials," he said.

"I also did get information on what the political ideology was of up-and-coming political leaders," he said.

Johnson balked at the word "propaganda" when asked whether his job entailed more gathering of information or disseminating propaganda.

"It involved a lot of both," he said. "But we were never told what to say by the CIA. We were never given any orders about what to say in a speech.

"I was simply a youth leader telling them what we believe, why our economic system is the most productive, why our political system is the best."

Johnson's undercover activity began when he was still in college, with a 1959 trip to Cuba which later returned to haunt him during his congressional race in 1964.

"There were charges made during the campaigning that I had taken this trip with other student leaders in defiance of the State Department," he said. "This was untrue. The trip was sponsored by the U.S. government.

"I was asked by people in the State Department to make the trip to get information about what was going on," he said.

At the time the group of young student leaders made the trip, shortly after the Cuban revolution, "we didn't know that things in Cuba would go the way they went," Johnson said.

He said another of his missions was to debate young Communist leaders in Cuba.

However, he was not able to reveal in 1964 that he had known in 1959 that the Cuban trip was a government-sponsored one.

"It was a very interesting experience, but it was frustrating that I couldn't rebut some of the charges made against me," he said.

"As a result of that trip and some other activities I was involved in, I was later asked to become an agent for the CIA."

During his years as an agent, under the code name "Mr. Page" ("I chose that name because I had been a page in the Senate and thought it would be easy to remember,"), he was at liberty to tell only his wife of his activities.

"There were a couple of agents before me who had just disappeared," he said.

Johnson says he still has faith in the persuasive and example type of diplomacy, the former the kind he said is practiced by the CIA.

Making Hanoi Dependent on Peking**Interdiction: The Last Big Bluff?**

By Allen S. Whiting

STATINTL

Having gone to the Chinese Wall, President Nixon is going to the brink. At least he so declared in his May 8 address ordering that "rail and all other communications [to North Vietnam] will be cut off to the maximum extent possible." If seriously implemented this threatens war with China. If not implemented the mining of North Vietnamese ports and interdiction of shipping will accomplish little except to make Hanoi wholly dependent upon Peking.

As the Pentagon Papers revealed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander in

*The writer, a former State Department official and expert on China, now teaches at the University of Michigan. This article first appeared in The New Republic magazine, with whose permission it is published here.*

Chief of the Pacific Forces (CINCPAC) urged the mining of Haiphong as early as 1965. However, its futility was revealed in the recent "leak" of national security study memorandum number one, provided January 21, 1969, at the request of Henry Kissinger for the new administration. The Central Intelligence Agency stressed Hanoi's ability to receive what it needed from China; were Soviet bloc forces to be cut off by sea: "all of the more essential imports could be brought into North Vietnam over rail lines or roads from China in the event that imports by sea were successfully denied . . . the uninterrupted capacities of the railroad, highway and river connections with China are about 16,000 tons per day."

At this point, the Joint Chiefs finally conceded the difficulty of interrupting the routes from China, noting "a minimum of 6,000 sorties, per month would be required against the two rail lines from China. Even at this level of effort, the North Vietnamese could continue to use the rail lines to shuttle supplies if they were willing to devote sufficient manpower to repair and transshipment operations."

The Joint Chiefs failed to add that China had supplied such manpower, beginning in 1965, when it sent 50,000 People's Liberation Army troops, primarily engineer and construction divisions, to keep supplies moving across the border. Defended against U.S. air attacks by Chinese antiaircraft units, these forces not only repaired rail and road facilities as soon as they were damaged, but built a huge storage area in the northwest, near the Chinese border. Additional access to this vicinity is provided by a newly built road across northern Laos from southern China, currently defended by up to 20,000 Chinese troops and antiaircraft.

trip to Peking, he cannot expect Mao Tse-tung to duck this challenge now, when it was met forcibly in 1965-68. Whenever U.S. aircraft strayed, Chinese radar tracked their movement, usually accompanied by MIG efforts at interdiction. Peking did not always announce the intrusions and even kept one of the shootdowns secret, but Washington knew that actions spoke louder than words. Neither side wanted a public confrontation. Fortunately President Johnson was determined to avoid the final escalation:

Few persons within government and none outside knew how close questions of "hot pursuit" and attacks on Chinese bases made war with China an issue in 1965 and again in 1967. Today similar secrecy insulates President Nixon and Henry Kissinger from the probing of Congress and the press. If the White House is to be believed, the risk of war with China is high. How else can we "keep the weapons of war out of the hands of the international outlaws of North Vietnam"? Since 1966, China has supplied most of the hand-held weapons to North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front (NLF). Eighty per cent of the ammunition and 60 per cent of the weapons seized in Cambodian caches during the 1970 invasion came from Chinese arsenals. All have since been replaced by Peking. Nothing Hanoi needs in the next six months is beyond China's capacity to supply.

Does the President think that by making Hanoi dependent on Peking he has better leverage on the battlefield or at the peace table? This runs counter to all evidence and logic. There is no known instance when the North Vietnamese deferred to Chinese advice contrary to their own judgment. If anything, Hanoi has defied Peking in its conduct of the war as well as in its willingness to talk in Paris. Nor is there the slightest incentive for Peking to play Washington's game, while the disincentives are vital to Chinese perceptions of their own role in Asia as well as to the credibility of commitments elsewhere, from North Korea to Albania.

Regardless of Peking's public pronouncements or its rumored reactions to the new escalation, its private support for Hanoi cannot be questioned. The U.S. mining and interdiction by sea of supplies to North Vietnam provides China with a virtual monopoly of influence in the Indochina war. Its influence will prolong the fighting toward the ultimate, perhaps imminent, defeat of the U.S. allies in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. This Chinese policy is dictated by ideology, by national interest, and by power politics. This policy risked war with the U.S. in 1965-68 when America had more than 500,000 troops on the Asian mainland, but Peking persisted. It will certainly accept that risk with only 60,000 troops remaining and the President seemingly backed against the peace wall by a hostile public. The question remains: does Nixon mean what he says? Or is he about to be called in his last big bluff?

## Secret Papers Put in Record

Washington, May 11 (AP) — The secret Nixon administration Vietnam policy papers that Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) has been blocked for more than two weeks from putting on the public record were quietly inserted in the Congressional Record today by Rep. Ronald V. Dellums (D-Calif.).

"Gravel gave me the papers, asked me to put them in the Record, and I agreed to do it because I think the American people have the right to know the basis on which the President's reckless decisions are being made," Dellums said.

He inserted in the Record without objections from any House member 239 pages of the memoranda. The material, sometimes referred to as the Kissinger papers for President Nixon's national security adviser Henry Kissinger, tells of opposing Pentagon and civilian agencies' recommendations on Vietnam war policy in 1969.

All of the memoranda appearing in the Congressional Record had already been disclosed in news media across the country.

STATINTL



## U.S. Intelligence Was Surprised By Enemy's Drive, Aides Assert

By BENJAMIN WELLES  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 10—Evidence has begun to emerge here that United States intelligence was caught by surprise by the direction, timing and power of the North Vietnamese offensive in South Vietnam.

The National Security Council's Intelligence Committee, headed by Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser, reportedly concluded that the main enemy thrust would come from west to east against Kontum in the Central Highlands and not, as happened, from north to south across the demilitarized zone to Quangtri.

Some senior intelligence analysts here insist that there has been no "intelligence failure" during the five-week offensive in Vietnam. They add that the enemy build-up had been observed and meticulously reported since it began early in the year.

"We've kept the policy-makers fully informed" said one source, who asked not to be identified. "There's been no disagreement about the enemy capability. We saw the build-up—though we couldn't tell just when or where he'd strike. What our policy-makers or the South Vietnamese did with our reports is out of our hands."

Nonetheless, there are other veteran United States intelligence officials who concede that the North Vietnamese gained a major tactical surprise—and four or five days of virtually unimpeded advance, which led to the seizure of Quangtri—by hitting where and when it was least expected.

"The intelligence people did not anticipate that the North Vietnamese would take the short route,"—one such source said. "The surprise was that for the first time in 18 years the Communists stopped the pretense of 'infiltration' and went down the coastal Highway 1. Frankly we were surprised that the claim of a 'people's civil

war was destroyed."

In addition, intelligence sources here acknowledge that they have been surprised by the vast quantities of bulky and often complex weapons moved as much as 600 to 700 miles south by trucks, river boats and even on bicycles pushed or ridden over jungle trails.

"We knew an offensive was coming," said one intelligence analyst, "but we didn't know the quantity, and the types of their supplies, the distribution into future battle areas; and especially the amount of their ammunition. They dropped more than 2,000 artillery rounds into Anloc a few days ago."

Some officials here concede that the United States, despite its array of electronic technology, infrared photography, acoustical "sensors" and aerial-surveillance techniques, appears to have been outwitted by the North Vietnamese.

"We've been listening in on their radio communications for years—and they know it," said one informant. "They're getting more sophisticated. They're beginning to use counter-measures."

The United States aerial flights that used infrared devices to pick up heat arising from large masses moving at night and the electronic "sensors" scattered by the thousands by United States aircraft over the Ho Chi Minh trail retrack are "imperfect,"

sources here say.

"We know when something's going along the trail," said one source, "but we don't always know whether it's a truck—or a tank."

The appearance of about 30 North Vietnamese tanks—half of them 40-ton T-54's and the rest 15-ton, amphibious PT-76's around Tay Ninh and Anloc surprised both the United States and South Vietnamese.

Whether they were disassembled and brought south by truck or river boat, or whether they were driven at night and camouflaged by day to avoid United States air attacks, is still unclear. But each trip must have taken two to three months, in the view of specialists here.

The steady reduction in United States ground combat in recent months and the cut-back—until the current offensive—of much American aerial surveillance are cited as reasons why the North managed to achieve these surprises.

"We've cut way back on our SLAR," an informant said, referring to Sideways-Looking Airborne Radar flights. "Even radar isn't much help when you're trying to peer through two or three canopies of jungle or through camouflage strung for miles over trails."

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Extension of Remarks

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ily-grams" are allowed only four times during each 60-day patrol, and there can be no replies from the radio-silent, prowling ship.

The night's realistic training exercise completed, the Carver surfaced shortly after midnight.

Clumps of tiny, phosphorescent sea-creatures glowed like fireflies, and even Roman candles, in the surf, racing across the bow as the Carver headed homeward to Norfolk.

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Wednesday, May 10, 1972

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Or by showing beyond even a fool's doubt the willingness to fight.

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In President Nixon's address to the nation last night was the implicit knowledge that there are two ways in which a great nation can fight. One is to win a victory. The other is to win a peace. The first seeks to humble and destroy the enemy. The second seeks only to bring the enemy to end the fighting.

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ESCALATION, AMERICAN OPTIONS AND PRESIDENT NIXON'S WAR MOVES

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May 10 1972 Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300390001-8

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10 MAY 1972

## 1969 ADVICE TO NIXON

## CIA Doubtful on Port Mining

By MORTON KONDRACKÉ  
and THOMAS B. ROSS

Chicago Sun-Times Service

ger said it had been "carefully President Nixon was advised by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1969 that the type of action he now has ordered to cut off supplies to North Vietnam would not work.

"Within two or three months," the CIA declared in a secret memo, "North Vietnam and its allies would be able to implement alternative procedures for maintaining the flow of essential economic and military imports."

The State Department and the Defense Department were less pessimistic. But both conceded that the effort to prevent resupply through alternative land routes from China would involve much heavier bombing and a much higher risk of civilian casualties.

The estimates of the three agencies are contained in National Security Memorandum 1 (NSSM-1), a secret study of the war compiled by the President's national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger.

## Gravel Reads Memo

This section of the memo was read into the Congressional Record on the Senate floor yesterday by Sen. Mike Gravel, D-Alaska, although two weeks ago he had been blocked by Republicans from doing so. Copies of the memo also have been obtained and their contents reported by some newspapers recently.

Asked about the CIA's gloomy forecast at a press conference yesterday, Kissinger said it had been "carefully considered" but that Nixon also had before him recent and "much more detailed studies," which he implied were more optimistic.

In the 1969 study, Kissinger asked: "What are current views on proportion of war-essential imports that could come into NVN (North Viet-

nam) over the rail or road lines from China, even if all imports by sea were denied and strong effort even made to interdict ground transport?"

The CIA replied: "All the war-essential imports could be brought into North Vietnam over rail lines or roads from China in the event that imports by sea were successfully denied..."

## Pessimistic View

"Almost four years of air war in North Vietnam have shown — as did the Korean war — that, although air strikes will destroy transport facilities, equipment and supplies, they cannot successfully interdict the flow of supplies because much of the damage can frequently be repaired within hours..."

"An intensive and sustained air interdiction program could have a good chance of reducing the northern rail capacity by at least half. However, roads are less vulnerable to interdiction, and waterways even less so..."

"In addition to the overland capacity, an airlift from Chinese airfields could potentially provide a means for importing a large volume of high-priority goods. Moreover, total interdiction of seaborne imports would be difficult because shallow-draft lighters could be used to unload cargo from oceangoing ships anchored in waters outside the mined major harbor areas."

The State Department commented: "we do not believe that the capacity of the DRV-PRC (North Vietnam-China) road and rail network is great enough to permit an adequate flow of supplies in the face of an intense day and night bombing campaign..."

"On the other hand, one important point should be kept in mind. The North Vietnamese surprised many observers, and confounded many predictions, by holding together and simultaneously sending ever-increasing amounts of supplies and personnel into the South during 3½ years of bombing."

"With this experience in mind, there is little reason to believe that new bombing will

accomplish what previous bombing failed to do, unless it is conducted with much greater intensity and readiness to defy criticism and risk of escalation."

The Defense Department declared: "An interdiction campaign... when employed in conjunction with denial of sea imports, would, in large part, isolate Hanoi and Haiphong from each other and from the rest of the country."

STATINTL

# Decision to Mine Harbors Was Made Long Ago

STATINTL

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY  
Star Staff Writer

The die had been cast for the decision to mine North Vietnam's ports and to smash her supply and communications facilities long before the orders were flashed to the fleet at 2 p.m. Monday or before President Nixon told the world that evening what he had done.

There is no way to fix the precise hour or the exact day precise time Nixon made his decision. Very likely the possi-

bility of having to decide to do something drastic began to close in on the President Easter Sunday when he first knew for sure that North Vietnam had launched a full-scale offensive across the Demilitarized Zone.

He ran out of time at some point last weekend when it became evident that the Russians had done nothing to restrain their ally and when the administration concluded that the all-out offensive had become a threat to the safety

of the 60,000 Americans still in South Vietnam.

Some of the timetable of the decision-making process was disclosed yesterday by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, the President's national security affairs adviser. Other details became known from other sources at the White House with the thump of the Pentagon.

The crisis did not descend on the White House with the thunderstorm speed of the Cuban missile confrontation.

Nixon's decision, on the other hand, was made after nearly a decade of war and after six months of trying to set up new meetings with the enemy to end the conflict.

"It was not sudden, and even weighed," a White House weighde," a White House Source said. "For several days, the process was one of constant thinking and talking."

Nixon ruled out the use of nuclear weapons. He also decided against the re-introduction of U.S. ground

forces although he has an entire Marine division poised on Okinawa and at sea off the Vietnam coast.

On Friday, May 5, at 4:10 p.m., Nixon boarded his helicopter and flew off to his Camp David retreat in Maryland's Catoctin Mountains to ponder the final decision.

The option of mining the harbors and sealing off North Vietnam from supplies by a naval cordon was not new and the means were ready to Nixon's hand. The idea had been advanced 10 years ago but never used.

The President spent a lot of time alone, walking the solitary Mountain paths and thinking deeply on the magnitude of what he had to do. At Camp David he wrote part of the 18-minute speech that eventually was delivered Monday night.

An inside source said the section he concentrated on over the weekend was the part in which he addressed special messages to the leaders of the nations most involved.

Portions of the decision were made in the mountains. There was to be a meeting of the National Security Council Monday morning. The participants had to be notified.

One of these was Secretary of State William P. Rogers, called back abruptly from an official European visit.

Rogers had made his stops in Reykjavik, London and Luxembourg and was about to spend a Sunday boating on the Rhine when word reached him in Bonn to come home.

Rogers canceled his meetings with the West Germans, the French, the Italians and the Spaniards and landed at Andrews Air Force Base, Sunday night at about the same time Nixon got back to the White House from Camp David.

At 9:10 a.m. Monday, the security council gathered in the Cabinet Room. There were no outsiders present. With Nixon were Vice President Spiro Agnew, Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and George A. Lincoln, director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Preparedness, all statutory members of the council.

As always at NSC meetings, also present were Kissinger, CIA Director Richard Helms and Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Treasury Secretary John B. Connally and press spokesman Ronald Ziegler also sat in.

## Basic Decision

It has not been divulged whether Nixon went into the security council with a decision made or whether he still kept options open and sought the council's help.

The most informed speculation, based on Nixon's style of conducting the presidency, is that he had his mind made up on the basic decision. This implies that the council had the role of refining his decision with suggestions, ideas, cautionary expressions. If there was dissent, it has not surfaced.

(The New York Times News Service reported today that Nixon followed that NSC session by meeting with Kissinger and Connally for some final thoughts. During the previous week, the Times said, Nixon had talked often with those two advisers—with Kissinger about strategy, with Connally about philosophy and America's role in the world.

By 2 p.m., Moorer and Laird had relayed the detailed orders to the sizable U.S. Navy force. The rules of engagement were set forth.

Nixon went back to his speech and worked on it through the afternoon. The White House said he wrote most of it himself as he does when he has something of im-

portance to announce.

His speech-writers hovered around and did some touching up but it was a Nixon speech, identifiable as such by simplicity of phrase and a disconcerting directness when the one-two-three of decision emerges.

## Ulcers Triggered

At 3 p.m., the White House press office contacted the radio-television networks to ask for air time and the late editions of newspapers informed Americans that the President would address the

nation at 9 p.m. This produced the standard scurrying of technicians and triggered the ulcers of program directors across the land.

At 5 p.m., the White House announced that the President had asked Congressional leaders to meet with him at 8 p.m., an hour before air time, so he could brief them on what he intended to say. The Democratic and Republican leaders of the Senate and House came as invited, heard from Nixon for a time and were turned over to Moorer, Laird and Rogers who answered questions. Nixon went to the Oval Room to get ready.

While he was speaking, the Navy was already at work sceding the waters of North Vietnam with mines. It was early in the day on the other side of the world and the decision-maker went to bed while his orders were being carried out.



9 MAY 1972

# Nixon Goes on TV in Vietnam Crisis

By STAN CARTER

Washington, May 8 (NEWS Bureau)—President Nixon, after an extraordinary three hour meeting with the National Security Council, scheduled a radio-TV address to the nation tonight to discuss the enemy offensive in Vietnam.

He was expected to announce a tough new course of action to thwart the 40-day-old North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam.

The White House would only say that the President had "something important to say" in the address, scheduled for 9 p.m.

Nixon asked for TV and radio time after holding the emergency session with his highest-level advisers to chart Vietnam strategy.

## Diplomatic Move, Too?

All the indications were that new military action was in the offing. There was speculation that it would be a blockade of Haiphong harbor, or a South Vietnamese commando raid into the North, and that the action would be coupled with some kind of new diplomatic move.

An attack today by U.S. Navy planes on storage depots, barracks, and training facilities 15 miles west of Hanoi was viewed here as the prelude to more intensive bombing of the North Vietnamese heartland. It was the first air strike in the Hanoi-Haiphong area since April 16, apparently ending a period of self-imposed restraint while Nixon attempted to determine if the

North Vietnamese were ready for serious peace negotiations.

Despite claim by the Hanoi radio, the best information is that American pilots still are under orders to avoid attacks on North Vietnamese irrigation dikes or other such civilian targets, and that no change is contemplated.

The Pentagon said there had been no reports from pilots of having hit dikes. The White House said there had been no change in policy since Nixon told a Texas audience eight days ago that bombing the dikes "is something we want to avoid."

## Keeping Them Home

There was a crisis atmosphere in Washington as the security council held its first formal meeting in nearly two months—and the longest in many months—in the White House Cabinet Room.

As usual, the content of the discussion between the President and his advisers on defense and foreign policy was secret.

Participating with the President were Vice President Agnew, Secretary of State Rogers, Defense Secretary Laird, Treasury Secretary Connally, presidential adviser Henry Kissinger, CIA Director Richard Helms, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, and Gen. George Lincoln, head of the Office of Emergency Preparedness.

The emergency nature of the session was underlined by Rogers being summoned home from a European tour and by Kissinger's postponement, for the second time, of a scheduled visit to Japan.

White House Deputy Press Secretary Gerald Warren said he understood that Rogers would return to Europe "shortly to resume his tour." The secretary was in Europe briefing allied leaders on Nixon's visit to Moscow.

There had been no change in plans for the Moscow summit meeting, scheduled to begin May 22.



UPI photo  
South Vietnamese refugees leave Hue en route south to Da Nang.



# news

STATINTL

ADVANCE  
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MAY 7, 1972

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## FULL PUBLIC ACCOUNTING BY FBI CALLED FOR IN DEMOCRATIC PLANNING GROUP REPORT TO 1972 DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM COMMITTEE

Washington, May 6 -- Charging that the "FBI has gone 50 years without a full public accounting, particularly of unjustified political surveillance," the Intelligence and Security Planning Group of the Democratic Policy Council called on responsible authorities in the Executive Branch "to re-examine the impact of the Bureau's archaic assumptions and practices on individual privacy and political liberty."

Courtney Evans, former Deputy Director of the FBI and planning group member, said: "A way must be found to maintain the integrity of the FBI at the same time providing policy guidance and direction in security and intelligence investigations particularly in areas where there is likely to be a legitimate difference between freedom for individual citizens and security for the government itself."

The planning group recommended:

- The appointment of a new Director of the FBI whose primary qualities are administrative skills and policy-setting capabilities;
- The same thoroughness in selecting the Director of the FBI that is required for a Supreme Court appointee;
- The establishment of a Congressional watchdog committee including members from Judiciary, Appropriations, and Foreign affairs committees as well as other committees and subcommittees concerned with citizen privacy, crime control and government efficiency.

Prepared under the chairmanship of Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson III (D-Ill.), the report is the eighth in a series of issue papers to be released by Democratic National Chairman Lawrence F. O'Brien, under the recommendations of the O'Hara Commission that documents outlining issues and alternative positions to the policies of the Nixon Administration be released for the Platform Committee.

Reviewing the issues centering on clandestine activities --- domestic and foreign

MAY 5 1972

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STATINTL

# CIA, Military Differed Over Mines

By Anthony Marro

Newsday Washington Bureau

Washington—Through both the Johnson and Nixon administrations, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have disagreed sharply on the benefits of mining the North Vietnamese port of Haiphong.

The joint chiefs have favored the action. They have long maintained that if all imports from sea were cut off—and if land routes through Laos and Cambodia and rail lines from China were vigorously bombed—the North Vietnamese could not obtain sufficient supplies to continue the war effort.

The CIA has opposed it. The agency has argued that even the combination of mining and unlimited bombing could not halt the flow of supplies, and that the results would not be worth the risk of provoking the Soviet Union.

A secret National Security Council staff study commissioned by presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger in 1969 showed the CIA and joint chiefs "in total disagreement" on the question. Unless the CIA position has changed since then, it appeared last night that President Nixon had cast his lot with the generals.

The dispute between the intelligence agency and the generals surfaces both in the so-called "Pentagon Papers," which are still classified top secret even though large segments have been published in paperback editions, and in the National Security Council study commissioned by Kissinger. Newsday was among a number of newspapers to obtain portions of the latter study, which was titled National Security Study Memorandum No. 1, or simply NSSM-1.

The Pentagon Papers show that, as early as May 23, 1967, the CIA opposed proposals by the military to mine the harbor as early as May 23, 1967. An agency memo then warned that such action "... would place Moscow in a particularly galling dilemma as to how to preserve the Soviet position and prestige in such a disadvantageous place."

It added that if this were done, the Soviets "should be expected to send volunteers, including pilots, to North Vietnam; to provide some new and better weapons and equipment... and to show across-the-board hostility toward the U.S. (interrupting any on-

going conversations on ABMs, non-proliferation, etc.)."

The Pentagon Papers also show that this CIA analysis was later buttressed by then-Ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn Thompson, who wrote on March 1, 1968:

"Mining of Haiphong harbor would certainly provoke strong Soviet reaction. As a minimum, I would expect them to provide minesweepers, possibly with Soviet naval crews..."

Two days later, on March 3, 1968, a Pentagon staff group working for then-secretary of Defense Clark Clifford also shot down the proposal, saying first that "it has become abundantly clear that no level of bombing can prevent the North Vietnamese from [carrying on the war in the South]," and then turning to the port.

"The remaining issue on interdiction of supplies has to do with the closing of the Port of Haiphong," it continued. "Although this is the route by which some 80 per cent of North Vietnamese imports come into the country, it is not the point of entry for most of the military supplies and ammunition. These materials predominantly enter via the rail routes from China..."

This was the argument the CIA returned to in the 1969 study, when it, the State Department, the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others all were asked to submit their evaluations of the merits of mining the port.

The NSSM-1 papers obtained by Newsday show that the CIA position in 1969 was this:

• Total interdiction of seaborne imports would be difficult because shall-

low-draft lighters could be used to unload cargo from oceangoing ships anchored outside the mined harbor areas.

• That even if all imports from sea were blocked, all of the war-essential imports could be brought into North Vietnam over rail lines from China.

• That while air strikes would destroy transport facilities, equipment and supplies, they could not successfully prevent supplies from reaching the North.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff position in NSSM-1 was that the flow of supplies could be stopped to the point where the North Vietnamese could not continue the war in the South, but only by preventing both seaborne imports and rail imports from China.

The joint chiefs estimated that "a minimum of 6,000 attack sorties per month" would be required against the two rail lines from China.

The bombing of the rail and road systems would have to be "free of the militarily confining constraints which have characterized the conduct of the war in the North in the past," they warned. "The concept would preclude attacks on population as a target, but would accept high risks of civilian casualties in order to achieve destruction of war-supporting targets..."

2 MAY 1972

# U.S. reports gains in arms accord

By ARNOLD R. ISAACS

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The White House reported yesterday there have been "major advances" toward agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on limiting production of offensive and defensive strategic weapons.

The advances came, the White House said, through "confidential exchanges" in recent weeks between President Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev, secretary general of the Soviet Communist party.

Ronald I. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, would not discuss details of any possible arms agreement beyond saying that Mr. Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev had moved toward "broadening the scope of the offensive freeze"—that is, the proposed agreements under which both nations would not add to present stockpiles of certain missile systems and other arms.

Arms limitation is the top agenda item for Mr. Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union, which is scheduled to begin in just 20 days. Mr. Ziegler would not predict whether the arms control negotiations now under way in Helsinki will produce agreement before then.

The White House statement came late yesterday afternoon after Mr. Nixon met for more than an hour with his chief foreign policy advisers and Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, the chief U.S. negotiator in Helsinki.

It was treated as a major announcement. Reporters who regularly cover the White House were telephoned and cautioned not to skip the afternoon press briefing. No formal written statement as issued, but Mr. Ziegler read carefully from prepared notes.

"Over the past several weeks," he read, "the President has had a number of confidential exchanges with Mr. Brezhnev concerning SALT (the strategic arms limitation talks) to see whether the major remaining issues in these negotiations could be resolved so an agreement covering both defensive and offensive weapons could be completed by an early date."

## New Soviet instruction hope

"On the basis of those exchanges the President had concluded that the possibilities of reaching agreement have substantially increased . . .

"The President has today directed Ambassador Smith to return to Helsinki with new instructions which, together with the new instructions he is confident the Soviet representative will receive from his government, can lead to an agreement which is mutually acceptable."

The major issue over which Soviet and U.S. negotiators have disagreed up to now has been the U.S. desire to include missile-launching submarines in the "freeze" on offensive weapons. The Soviet Union, which is far behind the U.S. in missile subs, has refused, agreeing to freeze only land-based missiles.

It had been reported widely after the last round of arms talks in Vienna that the submarine issue probably would be left for later negotiation.

Conceivably, Mr. Ziegler's reference to a "broadening of the offensive freeze" could mean the Soviet position on submarines had changed. He refused to answer any questions, however, on the outlines of agreement reached in the Nixon-Brezhnev messages.

## Means not revealed

As is customary, the White House would not disclose the means by which Mr. Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev communicated. Mr. Ziegler did say, however, that arms limitation was one of the topics discussed when Henry A. Kissinger, the President's chief foreign affairs adviser, was in Moscow last month.

Dr. Kissinger and his deputy, Maj. Gen. Alexander M. Haig, sat in at yesterday's meeting, along with William P. Rogers, the Secretary of State; Melvin R. Laird, the Secretary of Defense; Admiral Thomas H. Moore, the chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Richard Helms, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Helsinki meetings are the seventh and crucial round of the strategic arms limitation meetings, which began in 1969. This round began March 28. Both the Soviet Union and the U.S. are reported anxious to reach some agreement on stopping the arms race by the time Mr. Nixon arrives in Moscow.

STATINTL

# „Bomben stärken die Moral“

Amerikas Bombenoffensive in Vietnam dient eher politischen und psychologischen als militärischen Zwecken. Denn Präsident Nixon weiß aus einer geheimen Expertise, daß die unmittelbare Wirkung seiner Bomber gering ist. Die 1969 erarbeitete 548-Sei-

ten-Untersuchung (NSSM 1 = National Security Study Memorandum 1), die das US-Nachrichtenmagazin „Newsweek“ jetzt veröffentlichte, zeigt außerdem, daß Außenministerium, CIA und Pentagon den Erfolg des Bombens unterschiedlich beurteilten.

**FRAGE:** Gibt es Beweise, in welchem Umfang die Luftangriffe mit B-52-Bombern dem Vietcong und der nordvietnamesischen Armee Verluste zugefügt haben? Inwiefern wurden Einsätze des Vietcong und der nordvietnamesischen Armee gestört? Welchen Aussagewert haben Schätzungen des Gesamterfolgs?

**AUSSENMINISTERIUM:** Obwohl aus Erklärungen von Kriegsgefangenen und Überläufern und aus erbeuteten Dokumenten hervorgeht, bestimmte Einsätze hätten zu erheblichen Verlusten geführt, reicht das vorliegende Beweismaterial für eine zuverlässige Schätzung des gesamten Umfangs dieser Verluste nicht aus. Es besteht wenig Grund zu der Annahme, diese Einsätze hätten den Vietcong und die nordvietnamesische Armee so sehr geschwächt, daß taktische Operationen in erheblichem Maße unterbunden oder die Kommunisten gezwungen wurden, ihre grundlegende Strategie in Südvietnam zu ändern...

**CIA:** Aus den wenigen vorhandenen Untersuchungen und dem verfügbaren Nachrichtenrohmaterial ist erkennbar, daß Angriffe mit der B-52 erhebliche Verluste verursacht, daß sie erfolgreich Operationen des Vietcong und der nordvietnamesischen Armee unterbunden und einen starken, ungünstigen psychologischen Einfluß auf die feindlichen Truppen ausgeübt haben. In kürzlich angestellten Untersuchungen der Vereinigten Stabschefs wird eine Todesquote von 74 Mann pro Angriff oder eine indirekte Quote von 1300 pro Monat angegeben...

**PENTAGON:** Gewiß sind manche Angriffe sehr wirkungsvoll. Manche verfehlen eindeutig das Ziel. Die meisten haben eine unbestimmte Wirkung... Die Schätzungen des Verteidigungsministeriums der Verluste des Feindes bei Angriffen durch die B-52 liegen weit unter denen der Vereinigten Stabschefs.

**FRAGE:** In welchem Umfang führen die Abriegelungs-Bombenangriffe in Laos a) zu einer Verringerung der logistischen Leistungsfähigkeit des Feindes? b) zur Zerstörung des Materials auf den Versorgungswegen?

**AUSSENMINISTERIUM:** Während augenblicklich die nachdrücklichen Bombardierungen an engen Stellen weiterhin den Feind am Transport von Versorgungsgütern hindern, ist im Korridor von Laos im Januar dieses Jahres (1969) ein ebenso starker Lastwagenverkehr wie im Januar vergangenen Jahres (als weniger intensiv bombardiert wurde) zu verzeichnen. Das deutet darauf hin... daß die Alliierten dem Materialtransport der Kommunisten nur geringfügigen Schaden zufügen.

**CIA:** Aus den Erfahrungen anhand vierjähriger Beobachtungen der Bombenauswirkungen geht deutlich hervor, daß die Brauchbarkeit der laotischen Zufahrtswege durch Bombenangriffe nicht soweit vermindert werden kann, daß der Feind ernsthaft daran gehindert wird, seine Streitkräfte in Südvietnam mit Nachschub zu versorgen.

**PENTAGON:** Trotz der Beweise, daß die Versorgungszufuhr des Feindes durch Luftangriffe weitgehend reduziert wurde... geht aus Geheimdienstberichten hervor, daß der Feind... genügend Material transportieren konnte, um den Hauptbedarf zu decken.

**FRAGE:** Welche Beweise gibt es für das Maß der Belastungen, denen

Nordvietnam durch die Bombenangriffe ausgesetzt war?

**AUSSENMINISTERIUM:** Theoretisch gab es eine obere Grenze für die Leistungsfähigkeit Nordvietnams, gleichzeitig die Verteidigung des Nordens und den Krieg im Süden fortzusetzen. Durch die Bombenangriffe ist Hanoi dieser Grenze zweifellos nähergekommen, aber es war nicht möglich, genau festzustellen, 1) wo die Grenze lag und 2) wie weit Hanoi zu einer bestimmten Zeit davon entfernt war... Im Laufe der Bombenangriffe wurde klar, daß Nordvietnam nicht gelähmt wurde... Dennoch hat es in der Retrospektive den Anschein, daß... Friedensverhandlungen für Hanoi lebensnotwendig waren, zumindest wegen einer „Ruhepause“, wenn nicht sogar für eine ständige Friedensregelung.

**CIA:** Umfangreiche Beschädigungen des Transportnetzes, eine weitgehend zerrüttete Wirtschaft, ein stark gesteigerter Bedarf an Arbeitskräften und das Problem, die Moral des Volkes aufrechtzuerhalten... waren die Hauptauswirkungen der Bombenangriffe in Nordvietnam. Hanoi war in der Lage, all diese Belastungen erfolgreich zu überwinden, so daß der Luftkrieg den Nachschub an Soldaten und Versorgungsgütern für die kommunistischen Streitkräfte in Laos und Südvietnam nicht ernsthaft beeinträchtigte...

**PENTAGON:** Die Bombenangriffe hatten zweifellos nachteilige Folgen für das Volk in Nordvietnam... Lebensmittel wurden rationiert, und Konsumgüter waren knapp; der Fliegeralarm unterbrach den Tagesablauf der Bevölkerung und zwang viele, ihre Häuser zu verlassen. Darüber hinaus wird geschätzt, daß ungefähr 52 000 Zivilisten bei amerikanischen Luftangriffen in Nordvietnam getötet wurden. Dennoch gibt es keinen Grund zu der Annahme, daß diese schwierigen Verhältnisse Nordvietnams Kampfbereitschaft auf ein kritisches Niveau reduziert hätten... Im Gegenteil, die Bombenangriffe haben vielleicht sogar die Haltung des Volkes gefestigt und es enger an das Programm der Regierung gebunden.



Chicago Sun Times

„Das wollte ich nicht im Wahljahr“

# How We Sank into Vietnam

Joseph Buttinger

One of the most puzzling questions future historians will have to deal with is why the United States ever got involved in the contemporary struggle for Indochina that has been going on since 1945. Did the considerations that determined the course of American foreign policy after World War II make this involvement inevitable or could it have been avoided in spite of the tensions that arose after 1945 between the West and the so-called Communist bloc? On this point, opinions will probably always remain divided, but those who believe that no other course could have been chosen without damage to the West or the United States would do well to consider the following:

(1) no Indochina war would have taken place if France had not insisted on reestablishing its control over Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos after these countries had gained independence following the Japanese surrender in 1945;

(2) it is questionable that the United States would ever have reached the point of even considering intervention in Vietnamese affairs if it had refused from the beginning to support the reestablishment of French rule in Indochina.

It is indeed one of the important conclusions of the Pentagon Papers "that the Truman Administration's decision to give military aid to France in her colonial war against the Communist-led Vietminh 'directly involved' the United States in Vietnam and 'set' the course of American policy."<sup>1</sup>

Yet this decision was made only in 1950, after the victory of Communism in China and the recognition of Ho Chi Minh's regime by the Soviet Union and Communist China. It would never have come about had it not been preceded by the decision made by the victorious Allies at the Potsdam Conference of July 17 to August 2, 1945, which gave the French not only a free hand but also Allied support for the reconquest of Indochina. This Potsdam decision, supported only by the British under both Churchill and Attlee, might not have been taken if President

Roosevelt had still been alive. It was opposed by Nationalist China under Chiang Kai-shek and certainly not favored by Stalin. Vigorous American opposition to it would probably have led to the acceptance of Roosevelt's concept of a United Nations Trusteeship for French Indochina as a first step toward full independence.

Surprisingly on this crucial point the conclusion of the Pentagon Papers is that Roosevelt "never made up his mind whether to support the French desire to reclaim their Indochinese colonies from the Japanese at the end of the war."<sup>2</sup> In view of the forceful statements Roosevelt made against the return of the French to Indochina to his Secretary of State Cordell Hull and to his son Elliot, as reported in their memoirs,<sup>3</sup> this conclusion must be regarded as erroneous.

There has been much speculation about the question whether American massive military intervention in Vietnam might not have been avoided if President Kennedy had been alive. It is unlikely that this question will ever be answered with any degree of certainty. But it is probable that Vietnam after 1945 would have experienced a period of peaceful evolution toward independence, under a regime not unlike that of Tito's Yugoslavia, if Roosevelt had lived and succeeded in imposing his anticolonial solution for Indochina. Nor is it far-fetched to assume that Roosevelt would not have disregarded the appeals of Ho Chi Minh, in at least eight letters to Washington in 1945-46 for United States and United Nations intervention against French colonialism.<sup>4</sup> "There is no record . . . that any of these appeals were answered."<sup>5</sup> Not until publication of the Pentagon Papers did the American public hear of the existence of these letters.

Yet the Truman administration's policy toward Vietnam remained ambivalent for at least the first three years of the Indochina war. On the one hand, the U.S. "fully recognized France's sovereign position," as Secretary of State George Marshall said in a still secret State Department cablegram sent to the U.S. Embassy in Paris; on the other hand,

STATINTL

## NIXON'S SECRET BOMBING SURVEY

Even some of Richard Nixon's closest aides were puzzled by his sudden resumption of massive bombing of North Vietnam. For the dubious effectiveness of bombing as a strategic policy in Indochina was indicated to Mr. Nixon in the early days of his Presidency. Immediately after his Inauguration, the President instructed his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, to undertake a thorough review of U.S. military policy in Vietnam. The result was National Security Study Memorandum No. 1, a 548-page document that, like all such reports, is classified "Secret." This week, Sen. Mike Gravel of Alaska, who last year helped make the Pentagon papers public, plans to read NSSM 1 into the Congressional Record. Below, Newsweek publishes for the first time excerpts from NSSM 1's appraisal of the effectiveness of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam during the Johnson Administration.

The study is a prime example of Kissinger's exhaustive attention to detail. Calling on the resources of the State Department, the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, he posed more than two dozen searching, even scholarly, questions about the conduct of the war. And, like the stern professor he once was, Kissinger often tossed back the answers for more rigorous thought. But despite the monumental investment of time and energy, the resulting paper seemed curiously ill-suited to the Administration's policy purposes. Indeed, as high White House officials have privately admitted, NSSM 1 revealed a disturbing number of differences in how the various agencies saw the U.S. role in Indochina.

On the question of bombing, the disagreements were clear. While admitting that the bombing had plainly not "paralyzed" Hanoi, the State Department under William Rogers emphasized the cumulative strain on North Vietnam of the long aerial bombardment. Melvin Laird's Pentagon analysts pointed out that, despite all the adverse effects on the North Vietnamese people—including an estimated 52,000 civilian casualties—the bombing only seemed to have rallied the people behind Hanoi. CIA Director Richard Helms and his staff took the most unequivocal stand of all, asserting that "the air war did not seriously affect the flow of men and supplies to Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam. Nor did it significantly erode North Vietnam's military defense capability or Hanoi's determination to persist in the war."

On one point, however, opinion was unanimous: Soviet and Chinese aid had been crucial in helping Hanoi weather the bombing. And in that respect, NSSM



Kissinger, Rogers (left): Probing

1 may have had a significant impact on Mr. Nixon's thinking when, two weeks ago, he ordered resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam. Given the strong evidence that bombing had been of limited military value in Vietnam, the President presumably did not cherish the belief that he could defeat the North Vietnamese with his Air Force. Instead, his current aerial assault on North Vietnam seems designed primarily to serve diplomatic and psychological purposes.

NSSM 1, which reached Mr. Nixon's desk early in 1969, read, in part, as follows:

**What is the evidence on the scale of effect of B-52 attacks in producing Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army casualties? In disrupting VC/NVA operations? How valid are estimates of over-all effect?**

**STATE DEPARTMENT:** Although POW and [defector] statements and captured documents attest to significant casualties resulting from specific missions, the available evidence is insufficient for a confident estimate of the over-all scale of these casualties. There is little evidence to suggest that these [missions] have succeeded in inflicting a scale of losses on the VC/NVA sufficient to significantly disrupt tactical operations or to force the Communists to alter their basic strategy for South Vietnam... [However,] MACV operational reports have repeatedly noted that tactical air support air strikes in South Vietnam have disrupted Communist combat plans...

**CIA:** The few existing studies and the available raw intelligence make it clear that B-52 strikes do account for a substantial number of casualties, have effectively disrupted VC/NVA operations, and have a strong adverse psychological impact on enemy troops. Unfortunately, [it is] impossible to arrive at any quantitative measurement of the effect of B-52 strikes that can be regarded with confidence. Recent [studies by the Joint Chiefs of Staff] would indicate a kill ratio of .74 per sortie, or an implied [kill] rate of 1,300 per month during 1968. Thus B-52 attacks in South Vietnam may have accounted for... 19,000 enemy

STATINTL



[dead] and a like number of wounded during 1968 ... B-52 strikes undoubtedly disrupt VC/NVA operations ... These losses may be critical in regard to specific military operations but do not represent a significant burden in terms of the enemy's over-all resupply capabilities.

**DEFENSE:** Hard evidence on the effectiveness of the ARC LIGHT (B-52 bombing) program is difficult to find. Certainly some strikes are highly effective. Some are clearly wasted. The majority have an undetermined impact ... [The] Office of the Secretary of Defense estimates of enemy killed by ARC LIGHT are much lower than those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**What effect is the Laotian interdiction bombing having (a) in reducing the capacity of the enemy logistic system? (b) in destroying matériel in transit?**

**STATE:** While the present emphasis on [bombing] choke points continues to hamper the enemy's ability to move supplies, truck movement in the Laotian panhandle is at the same high level this January [1969] as it was last January [when the bombing was less intense], suggesting ... the Allied effort is only taxing the Communist flow of matériel. As long as the Communists wish to pay this price, they can continue to move matériel south.

**CIA:** The experience of four years of observing the effects of bombing make it clear that the capacity of [the Laotian supply] routes cannot be reduced by bombing to a level that imposes a meaningful restraint to the enemy's ability to resupply his forces in South Vietnam.

**DEFENSE:** In spite of evidence that aerial attacks reduced the flow of enemy supplies to very low levels ... intelligence reports indicate that the enemy ... has pushed through sufficient tonnage to provide the bulk of his external supply requirements.

**With regard to the bombing of North Vietnam, what evidence was there on the significance of the principal strains imposed on [North Vietnam]?**

**STATE:** In theory, there was an upper limit to North Vietnam's capacity simultaneously to continue the defense of the north and the big-unit war in the south. The bombing undoubtedly pushed Hanoi closer to that limit, but it was not possible to determine precisely (1) where the

limit lay, and (2) how far from it Hanoi was at any given time ... What did become clear during the course of the bombing was that the North Vietnamese had not been paralyzed ... Nevertheless, in retrospect, it appears that by late 1967 and early 1968, the strains caused by the bombing were having a cumulative effect [and] ... peace negotiations were essential to Hanoi, at least for a "pause of calm," if not a permanent peace settlement.

**CIA:** The major effects of the bombing of North Vietnam were extensive damage to the transport network, widespread economic disruption, greatly increased manpower requirements and the problems of maintaining the morale of the people in the face of personal hardships and deprivation. Hanoi was able to cope effectively with each of these strains, so that the air war did not seriously affect the flow of men and supplies to Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam. Nor did it significantly erode North Vietnam's military defense capability or [its] determination to persist in the war.

**DEFENSE:** The bombing undoubtedly had adverse effects on the people of North Vietnam ... Food was rationed and consumer goods were scarce; and air-raid warnings disrupted the lives of the populace and forced many to leave their homes. Moreover, it has been estimated that approximately 52,000 civilians were killed in North Vietnam by U.S. airstrikes. Still, there is no evidence to suggest that these hardships reduced to a critical level North Vietnam's willingness or resolve to continue the conflict. On the contrary, the bombing actually may have hardened the attitude of the people and rallied them behind the government's programs.

**To what extent did Chinese and Soviet aid relieve pressure on Hanoi?**

**STATE:** The degree of relief provided by Soviet and Chinese aid cannot be quantified, but its importance is suggested by the fact that, whereas the bombing destroyed capital stock, military facilities and current production in North Vietnam worth nearly \$500 million, Soviet and Chinese aid during this period was nearly \$2.9 billion, nearly six times as much. This high rate of foreign aid, coupled with the relatively low requirements of North Vietnam itself and of NVA/VC forces in the South, goes a long way toward explaining Hanoi's ability to withstand the bombing.

**CIA:** Without Communist aid ... the Vietnamese Communists would have been unable to sustain the war in both South and North Vietnam on anything like the levels actually engaged in during the past three years.

**DEFENSE:** Soviet and Chinese aid to North Vietnam has provided nearly all of the matériel required to carry on the war



Helms

Laird


tion has been chiefly the over-all direction of the war and the input of troops to do the fighting ... Without such aid, North Vietnam long since would have been forced to reduce the scope of fighting in South Vietnam to the guerrilla-warfare level.

**What are current views on the proportion of war-essential imports that could come into North Vietnam over the rail or road lines from China, even if all imports by sea were denied and a strong effort even made to interdict ground transport?**

**STATE:** We ... believe that interdiction of Haiphong and heavy attacks on the rail lines from China would over time prevent North Vietnam from receiving sufficient economic and military aid to continue the war effort ... On the other hand, one important point should be kept in mind. The North Vietnamese surprised many observers, and confounded many predictions, by holding the north together and simultaneously sending ever-increasing amounts of supplies and personnel into the south during three and one-half years of bombing ... With this experience in mind, there is little reason to believe that new bombing will accomplish what previous bombings failed to do, unless it is conducted with much greater intensity and readiness to defy criticism and risk of escalation.

**CIA:** All of the war-essential imports could be brought into North Vietnam over rail lines or roads from China in the event that imports by sea were successfully denied ... Almost four years of air war in North Vietnam have shown—as did the Korean War—that, although air strikes will destroy transport facilities, equipment, and supplies, they cannot successfully interdict the flow of supplies because much of the damage can frequently be repaired within hours.

**DEFENSE:** [In order to interdict road and rail transport from China] the air campaign would be conducted in such a manner as to be free of the militarily confining constraints which have characterized the conduct of the war in the north in the past. The concept would preclude attacks on population as a target but would accept high risks of civilian casualties in order to achieve de-



# Secret Memo Shows Bureaucracy In Conflict Over Viet War Policy

By Stanley Karnow

Washington Post Staff Writer

Assign several government agencies to survey Vietnam and, like the six blind men describing the elephant, they produce a report filled with conflicting observations. Give the report to the President, and he largely ignores it as he shapes his policies.

That is essentially the story of National Security Study Memorandum 1, a set of documents on Vietnam prepared by White House adviser Henry Kissinger's staff for Mr. Nixon soon after the President entered office in early 1969.

The memorandum, composed of contributions from eight U.S. agencies, indicates that military and civilian officials directly engaged in war operations were inclined to be optimistic about the current and future prospects in Vietnam while those primarily involved in analyzing the conflict from afar took a more pessimistic view.

Predictably, then, the hawkish "optimists" were the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Pacific command in Honolulu and the U.S. military and diplomatic missions in Saigon. The "pessimists," a more detached group, were the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Department's International Security Affairs office, and two State Department offices, Intelligence and Research and the East Asia bureau.

An ex-member of Kissinger's staff, who participated in compiling the documents, now explains that the divergencies among the contributing agencies were deliberately emphasized in order to dramatize to the President the extent to which perceptions of the Vietnam situation differed.

## Balance Bureaucracies

"We wanted to show him how little anyone really knows about Vietnam," the former White House official said.

Judging from his subsequent actions, moreover, Mr. Nixon apparently disregarded many of the assessments and recommendations contained in the memorandum, and instead initiated strategies based on a variety of other considerations.

This suggests, as students of presidential behavior point out, that Mr. Nixon was and still is less concerned with Vietnam itself than with the effects of the war on domestic politics and international relationships. The President's decisions also stem from his efforts to balance rival Washington bureaucracies, all of which are striving to assert their own interests.

Evaluating the global importance of Vietnam, for example, contributors to the National Security Study Memorandum were sharply divided on whether there was any validity to various versions of the so-called "domino theory."

The hawkish military agencies contended that an "unfavorable settlement" in Vietnam would prompt "swift" Communist takeovers elsewhere in Asia. The Washington intelligence community calculated, in contrast, that a Communist victory in Vietnam might push Cambodia and Laos into Hanoi's orbit "at a fairly early stage" but "these developments would not necessarily unhinge the rest of Asia."

## Seeking Accommodations

In April 1970, however, Mr. Nixon affirmed that "the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world" should the United States act like "a pitiful helpless giant" in Indochina. The President reiterated that thesis last Wednesday, saying that "the risks of war in other parts of the world would be enormously increased" if the Communists "win militarily in Vietnam."

But despite these warnings, many nations in Asia

and elsewhere have been seeking accommodations with Communist China. Some have also edged closer to North Vietnam.

Thus new international alignments in Asia and in other parts of the world seem to be evolving mainly for reasons unrelated to the U.S. position in Vietnam.

The contributors to the memorandum generally appeared unable to reach either firm or unanimous conclusions on the effectiveness of B-52 strikes, called "harassment, interdiction and strategic missions" in official bureaucratic terminology.

The Joint Chiefs estimated that the B-52 raids inside South Vietnam during 1968 killed 41,250 Communists, an average of 2.5 enemy per sortie, while the Defense Department's office of International Security Affairs put the total figure for the period at 9,000, or 0.43 enemy killed per sortie. The CIA placed the average number of enemy killed by B-52s at 3.5 per sortie, but added that its evaluation methods were open to question.

## Protection Against Raids

With all this, however, the agencies tended to be doubtful about the decisiveness of the B-52 attacks in either halting or discouraging the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong.

The State Department reported, for instance, that "there is little evidence to suggest" that the B-52 missions "have succeeded in inflicting a scale of losses on the Vietcong and North Vietnamese sufficient to significantly disrupt tactical operations or to force the Communists to alter their basic strategy for South Vietnam."

The same State Department report added, moreover, that the effectiveness of the B-52 operations diminishes "as the enemy develops tactics to adjust to their destructive potential."

port said, the Communists had constructed shelters and early warning systems to protect themselves against "recurring patterns in B-52 strikes."

While asserting that the bombing above the 17th parallel had "adverse effects" on the North Vietnamese people by creating hardships, the Pentagon contribution to the memorandum nevertheless concluded that these difficulties had not reduced "to a critical level" Hanoi's "willingness or resolve to continue the conflict."

Indeed, said the Pentagon report, the bombing "may have hardened the attitude of the people" in North Vietnam. Conversely, the study pointed out, "there is some evidence . . . indicating that morale and support for the war in North Vietnam has declined significantly since the bombing halt" in November 1968.

## Ho Chi Minh Trail

Further questioning the value of the air operations, the Pentagon study estimated that the U.S. bombings had destroyed about \$770 million worth of enemy installations while North Vietnam received some \$3 billion in military and economic aid principally from the Soviet Union and China. Therefore, the study said, North Vietnam is "better off today than it was in 1963."

Similarly, the Pentagon contribution referred to U.S. bombings of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos as "impressive" in its destruction of enemy supplies, but added that this "is not really what counts." Said the study:

"The critical factor is the amount that reaches South Vietnam . . . and since we have no control over imports to North Vietnam or inputs to Laos, it appears that the enemy can push sufficient supplies through Laos to

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# Nixon's Link to World

By GAYLORD SHAW

Associated Press

STATINT

War's prologue in Nazi Germany forced Henry A. Kissinger across the Atlantic to a new home.

World War II plucked him from a herd of would-be accountants and suggested a career in international politics.

Nations at war, or preparing for it, or living in fear of new encounters never have been far

First of Four Articles

from Kissinger's life as refugee, student, soldier, professor, author and presidential adviser.

On this particular day in Washington there was a new crisis in the war in Vietnam, and Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser for national security affairs, was in the middle of attempts to resolve it.

On this day, he has been on the run since early morning, bouncing in and out of the President's office, presiding at meetings of crisis committees, conferring with top members of his National Security Council staff, talking with Cabinet officials and Vietnam specialists and continually grabbing the buzzing telephone.

Nixon wanted information on the new North Vietnamese invasion and options on what to do. How, for example, would the invasion affect plans for the presidential trip to Moscow starting May 22.

Kissinger may have received some clues to Soviet thinking during a four-day, secret trip to Moscow last in April. He met with top Russian officials to discuss important international problems and pave the way for the presidential visit.

The President would make the decisions on the North Vietnamese invasion, but the fodder would come from Henry Albert Kissinger, sometimes described as the world's second most power-

ful person by virtue of his control of the nation's foreign machinery.

Physically, the description seems at odds with the man. At 5-foot-9, 175-pounds with wavy brown hair and horn-rim glasses, Kissinger looks more the accountant he once wanted to be or the college professor he once was.

So in the late afternoon, after the President walked to his White House living quarters with his arm draped over Kissinger's shoulder, he was asked the question:

"Does Henry Kissinger like his job on days of crisis?"

"Days like today are really not that bad."

He speaks in a deep voice softened by the accent of the Germany he fled as a teenager when Hitler rose to power in the 1930s.

## The Big Issues

"You are dealing with fundamentals. You are concerned with big issues. People think responsibility is hard to bear. It's not. I think that sometimes it is the absence of responsibility that is harder to bear. You have a great feeling of impotence," he says.

"So days like today are really better than the ones when you spend all of your time dealing with petty bureaucratic problems. Those are the worst days."

As he begins to talk, there is no sign of the considerable Kissinger wit, a wit usually turned inward or focused on his image as a Dr. Strange-love.

During a conversation in his office in the northwest corner of the White House, what emerges about Kissinger is the

orderly way his mind operates. A big problem is divided into smaller ones. A broad question is dissected so that the answers are specific.

Kissinger separates his job into three parts:

"First, I try to place before the President the widest range of choices for action on foreign policy issues. Second, I see to it that once he has made a decision, it is implemented, and implemented in the spirit the President intended. And third, I act as a sort of adviser when he asks my advice."

The toughest role, perhaps, is acting as the link between the President and the many tentacles of the foreign policy establishment.

"The outside believes a presidential order is consistently followed out. Nonsense. I have to spend considerable time seeing that it is carried out in the spirit the President intended."

"Inevitably, in the nature of bureaucracy, departments become pressure groups for a point of view. If the President decides against them, they are convinced some evil influence worked on the President; if only he knew all the facts, he would have decided their way."

## The Bureaucrat's Dream

Kissinger paused to answer the phone, then adds: "The secret dream of most bureaucrats is to present a paper to the President where he can say only yes or no, which in practice means yes. I give him a wide range of choices."

"The bureaucrats concentrate on pushing their preferred solutions."

But doesn't Kissinger, as some bureaucrats charge, also push his own preferred solutions?

"Probably yes," he says. But he adds that the structure of the government's foreign policy machinery, a maze of committees, panels and groups, is such that every involved department or agency is represented on every policy panel.

"If I started loading the dice, they would be bound to notice it."

At National Security Council meetings, for example, he pre-

sents views and recommendations collected from such departments as State and Defense. The secretaries of State and Defense are sitting right there, flanking the President. "I've got a tough audience."

"Now, when the President puts his feet up at the end of the day and says, 'O.K. Henry, you've presented all the options, now what do you think?', of course I tell him what I think."

"But I try not to beat at him with my views. Anyway, he is not a man who encourages being beaten at."

Implicit in their relationship, which goes back barely five years, is Nixon's absolute confidence in Kissinger.

The President picked Kissinger for the secret trip to Peking last summer to arrange his own China visit, the President had Kissinger at his side in the meeting with Mao Tse-tung; the President sent Kissinger shuttling across the Atlantic for the unsuccessful secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese in Paris; the President sent him on a secret trip to Moscow.

And the President again will have Kissinger at his side during his upcoming trip to the Soviet Union.

## Administration Superstar

This presidential trust had helped propel Kissinger into a role as administration super-

star. It also had plunged State Department morale to its lowest point in years, and had fed reports that William P. Rogers will soon be quitting as secretary of State.

Kissinger says that he and Rogers are on the best of terms, and dismisses as absurd any contention that he is out to gut the State Department.

He has his own operation to handle, the National Security Council with a staff of about 100. Of the original senior team, only about half the members remain after three years.

Some quit in exhaustion from the 13-hour days and six- and seven-day weeks. Some quit because they didn't like Kissinger.

# Secret 1969 War Study Shaped 1972 Strategy

By John Maclean

Mr. Maclean is a member of The Tribune's Washington Bureau.

WASHINGTON — It was a confusing week. The war in Viet Nam was being carried on in the air, on the ground, at the negotiating table, and probably in secret talks. And each of these situations continued to change almost daily.

Injected into all of this has been the disclosure of a secret National Security Council memorandum prepared when President Nixon took office in 1969 to apprise him of the situation in Viet Nam.

Henry Kissinger, Nixon's chief adviser on national security, set 28 questions on the war to the State and Defense Departments, the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], and the United States embassy in Saigon.

## What Does It Mean?

What does this study mean to us today, three years later? THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE obtained a copy of the report, as did several other news organizations.

The study concluded that Hanoi's leadership was independent of Moscow and Peking, altho the tendency had been toward the Soviet direction. Moscow, for its part, favored an early negotiated settlement, with the best possible terms for Hanoi.

The intervening years appear to have changed this assessment little, and events of the past few days appear to underscore its correctness.

Kissinger made a secret hop to Moscow, not Paris or Peking, when the going got really tough as a result of the recent Communist offensive. Altho part of his reason for going was to see that there were no hitches in Nixon's visit to Moscow in May, a Soviet diplomat boarded a plane for Hanoi within hours of his visit.

Two days later the White House announced that the suspended Paris peace talks were being reactivated.

## Effect of Air War

The 1969 report, a National Security Study Memorandum No. 1 (NSSM 1), provides a searching back-

ward look at the effectiveness of massive American bombing of North Viet Nam and Laos.

The reporting agencies agreed the bombing punished the North Vietnamese. Lives were lost, materiel destroyed, and supply routes battered.

But the agencies agreed also that the bombing had failed to break the enemy's spirit, kill more troops than could be replaced, or cut off supplies. Russia and the People's Republic of China could move in more supplies than the B-52s could knock out.

"During four years of intensive combat in South Viet Nam and unprecedented bombing of North Viet Nam and Laos," a Defense Department analyst wrote in frustration, "the enemy has more than doubled his combat forces, successfully sustained high casualty rates, doubled the level of infiltration, and increased the scale and intensity of the main-force war."

The report shows that President Nixon was being advised almost from his first day in office that Communist sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia were an essential reason for the enemy's ability to control the rate at which Americans were killed.

On the controversial subject of a residual force of American military men in South Viet Nam, the report disclosed that the Defense Department recommended that 19,000 military advisers would be a "continuing requirement" of the war.

However, in his appearance on television and radio last week, Nixon said, "We can now see the day when no more Americans will be involved there [Viet Nam] at all." In his only other public response to the residual force question, Nixon on Jan. 2 in a televised interview said all American forces would not be withdrawn "as long as the enemy holds one American prisoner of war."

The report also covered the political situation in South Viet Nam, the negotiations as they were then in Paris, and many technical matters of the U. S. presence and programs in South Viet Nam. The study is more than 500 pages.

## Two Schools of Thought

A summary written by the White House identified two schools of interpretation within the government. The summary said there were "some divergencies on the facts, [but] the sharpest differences arise in the interpretation of those facts, the relative weight to be given them, and the implications to be drawn."

One school was the military and the U. S. embassy in Saigon. They took a more hopeful view of current and future prospects in Viet Nam, the summary said.

The other included the more policy-minded agencies, namely the CIA, the office of Secretary of Defense, and to a lesser extent [the summary's qualification] the State Department.

The study probably reached Nixon's desk in February, 1969. Here, in part, is what it said:

Question: Is it clear that either Moscow or Peking believe they have, or are willing to use, significant leverage on Hanoi's policies?

State: Peking has been against a negotiated settlement of the Viet Nam war from the outset. We believe that Peking has brought pressures to bear upon Hanoi . . . but that the pressures have fallen short of major threats.

The Soviets have experienced the full degree of Hanoi's ideological rigidity and distrust of the West, and on occasion they have privately deplored excessive North Vietnamese stubbornness. With the beginning of the Paris talks, the Soviets began a new and decidedly more assertive phase of their diplomacy. At several points [they] intervened constructively.

Saigon embassy: We in Saigon have no evidence that Hanoi is under active and heavy pressure with respect to the Paris negotiations from either the U. S. S. R. or Communist China. In fact, we believe that the North Vietnamese make their own decisions on the negotiations. . . . The need for economic reconstruction and development of the North should also tend to heighten the Soviet

## Credibility is lost

Kissinger did not have an adequate reply. The fact is that the credibility of the Nixon Administration was lost long ago, just as the Johnson Administration lost its, and the Kennedy Administration is beginning to lose its as a harder look is taken at its policies.

Another blow came this week. Tuesday the Washington Post published large sections of a study prepared by Kissinger for the new President, Richard Nixon, in 1969, dealing with Indochina policy and perspectives.

Newsweek also published excerpts. Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) tried to read the document into the Congressional Record but was blocked by Sen. Robert Griffin (D-Mich), co-author of the anti-labor Landrum-Griffin bill, and a supporter of Nixon's war policies.

Like the Pentagon Papers, this study, National Security Study Memorandum No. 1, reveals Administration double-dealing.

This study showed that so-called "pacification" of South Vietnam could not be accomplished in less than from 8½ to 13.4 years, that the DRV could not be eliminated without the use of much greater forces than had so far been employed, and, in the view of the State Department and Defense Secretary's office, "only a compromise settlement is possible."

The Defense Secretary's office also said that "at least 50 percent of the total rural population is subject to significant VC (liberation forces) pressure and influence."

The Central Intelligence Agency agreed with this, and the State Department boosted the ante, estimating that "the VC have a significant effect on at least two-thirds of the rural population."

In line with the official reasoning, the document refuses to regard the national liberation forces of South Vietnam as a major factor but maintains the fiction that the fighting and direction of the war is in the hands of the DRV. This serves to further confound the situation and increase the element of deception.

The main deception, however, was that Nixon refused to acknowledge the real situation in Indochina and continued to destroy lives and wealth in a futile and inhuman, genocidal war, gambling with escalation, such as the invasion of Cambodia and Laos, and the intensified bombing of the DRV.

For almost four years, the Nixon Administration has woven a tissue of lies about every aspect of its war policies and activities.

The most recent move was Nixon's national address Wednesday night, which offered no basis for negotiation and demanded surrender of what Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh said Thursday at the resumed session (the 148th) of the Paris talks on Vietnam is the basic issue of the struggle — "respect for the national rights of the Vietnamese people," and primarily, the right of the South Vietnamese population to self-determination. This, she said, is an indispensable prerequisite for attaining a peaceful settlement.

In brief, this means ending U.S. aggression, and letting the people of Vietnam, North and South, settle their problems among themselves, by themselves and for themselves.

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# Secret Viet study for Nixon stirs furor

By S. J. Micciche  
Globe Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—President Nixon's war policy in Vietnam might be construed as "malfeasance in office" for ignoring National Security Council (NSC) advice given to him three years ago, Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) declared yesterday.

Thwarted in his effort to make public all of a 500-page NSC memorandum in his possession since last December, Gravel said that from his study of the documents he believes the United States is pursuing an Indochina policy of a "pitiful giant acting petulantly . . . committing murder and genocide."

Gravel's memorandum is a copy of a study made for President Nixon a month after his inauguration in 1969, and contains high-level government opinions on the situation in Indochina at that time and prospects for the future.

Gravel said in effect that the memorandum showed the Nixon policy of Vietnamization would not work without the continued presence of American forces in Vietnam. The document itself contained estimates of the time required for completion of Vietnamization as from 8.3 to 14.4 years, dating from 1969.

Published excerpts regarding the memorandum requested by Mr. Nixon on the day after his inaugural are "very accurate . . . but the only way for objective analysis is to read it all," said Gravel.

The NSC report contains the responses of the State and Defense departments and the Central Intelligence Agency to 28 questions prepared by Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger on the effect of bombing in Vietnam and the overall Indochina policy.

The advice reflected sharp differences between the military and civilian bureaucracy, dividing optimists from pessimists in assessing what had

happened in Vietnam up to early 1969 (when the survey was completed).

While some of these differences have become public knowledge—especially with the publication last year of the Pentagon Papers, which carried the war history up to 1968—the newly revealed study reveals how these diverging viewpoints were extended from the Johnson into the Nixon Administration.

Two broad schools of assessments emerged among the policy planners. In the first group, more optimistic and "hawkish," were the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US military command in Vietnam, the commander in chief of Pacific forces and the American Embassy in Vietnam, headed by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker.

Often conflicting with the judgment of those advisers was a second group, composed of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The first group, the summary of the study says, generally took "a hopeful view of current and future prospects in Vietnam," with State, Defense and the CIA "decidedly more skeptical about the present and pessimistic about the future."

These are some of the major disclosures in the summary:

—"Sound analysis" of the effectiveness of American B52 bomber strikes against enemy forces was rated "impossible" to achieve; but, "the consensus is that some strikes are very effective, some clearly wasted, and a majority with indeterminate outcome." B52s had been used against targets in South Vietnam during the Johnson Administration; they are currently being conducted for the first time against the heartland of North Vietnam, and under a different strategic rationale.

—In early 1969, the optimists concluded that on the basis of programs then in existence, it would take "8.3 years" more to pacify the remaining contested and Viet Cong-controlled population of South Vietnam. The pessimists estimated it would take "13.4 years" more to

achieve that goal.

—In sharp debate over the validity of the "domino theory"—the consequences of a communist takeover in Vietnam—military strategists generally accepted that principle, but most civilian experts concluded that while Cambodia and Laos might be endangered fairly quickly, the loss of Vietnam "would not necessarily unhinge the rest of Asia."

—On Soviet and Chinese military aid to North Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs and the US military command in Saigon said that "if all imports by sea were denied and land routes through Laos and Cambodia attacked vigorously," North Vietnam "could not obtain enough war supplies to continue." But the CIA and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, "in total disagreement," concluded that "overland routes from China alone" could supply North Vietnam with sustaining war material, "even with an unlimited bombing campaign."

President Nixon's subsequent actions in Vietnam have been more in accord with the assessments reached by the pessimists in this study, although his public explanations of his actions have reflected more of what the optimists were claiming in 1969.

In the process, the President has cut US forces in South Vietnam from over a half million at the time he took office to about 80,000 today.

While the National Security Council memorandum discloses sharp disagreements three years ago on the effectiveness of US bombing of North Vietnam, the current battlefield situation in Vietnam is much different from the situation in early 1969 and US airpower is being applied in different ways.

In contrast to the guerrilla attacks or hit-and-run actions by larger units which have dominated the enemy's strategy in the past, the current communist offensive is much more like a conventional battle, with tanks, artillery and massed troops concentrations standing and fighting.

Thus, it is reasoned officially, bombing now is more important.

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# Gravel Tells New Secrets

BY PHILIP WARDEN

[Chicago Tribune Press Service]

WASHINGTON, April 25 — Sen. Mike Gravel (D., Alaska) today accused President Nixon of possible "malfeasance in office" for not conducting the Viet Nam war the way some advisers recommended.

Gravel defied federal classified document laws and Senate rules to divulge, partly on the Senate floor and partly at a press conference, some of the contents of a 1969 National Security Council study memorandum on Viet Nam.

There were no tears in Gravel's eyes today. On the night last summer when he read portions of the secret Pentagon papers on Viet Nam, Gravel cried.

## Senate OK Denied

Gravel first attempted today to induce the Senate to allow him to publish the near-500-page memorandum in the Congressional Record. He asked the unanimous consent of the four senators in the chamber. Sen. Robert P. Griffin (R., Mich.), the acting minority leader, objected.

Gravel then asked unanimous consent to make a speech quoting portions of the secret memorandum. Again Griffin objected. Gravel proceeded to read his speech, including quotations direct from the memorandum. Griffin listened but did not voice new objections.

Gravel told newsmen he obtained the secret document in December. He said it was "classified secret."

## Fear of Damage

Asked why he thought Griffin objected to his reading it into the Congressional Record, Gravel replied:

"I think he blocked for very partisan reasons. I think they know—and they've been told by the White House—that this is probably the most damaging piece of evidence and information and facts against Richard Nixon since he's taken office.

"And it shows in my mind—and I think that will be the judgment of the American people to make, but I won't use the word—but I think some could construe this as malfeasance in office."

Gravel charged that the President refused to accept the opinion of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Department that daily bombing of North Vietnamese targets would fail to achieve its objective.

## A Strategic Error

The new bombing of the North ordered by the President to stop the current Communist drive into South Viet Nam and breaking off of peace negotiations in Paris, Gravel said, "has forced the offensive now taking place."

"The President had only one concern," Gravel told the Senate. "The one, foremost concern of all was to save face."

Gravel said hundreds of thousands of men have died as a result of the President's desire to save face.

"It is reminiscent of some of the dictators and monarchs of the past," he said.

Gravel has reserved 15 minutes of time in the Senate for Thursday in a new attempt to print the complete text of the 1969 memorandum in the Congressional Record.

Gravel asked Sen. William Fulbright (D., Ark.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, to call a meeting of his committee so Gravel could get the committee to print the document and thereby circumvent Griffin. Fulbright reportedly rejected Gravel's proposal.

Gravel said he would not call his subcommittee on public buildings and grounds into extraordinary session, as he did when he wanted congressional

immunity so he could declassify the Pentagon papers and make them public last summer.

## Only Course Open

"I have legal problems," he explained, saying these were mostly his case before the United States Supreme Court connected with the release of the Pentagon papers and his claim to immunity.

Gravel told the press conference that once the President renewed the bombing of North Viet Nam and terminated the Paris peace talks, North Viet Nam had to start a new offensive.

"They could only undertake the offensive because they had nothing to lose," Gravel said. "It would take a fool not to come to the same conclusion."

Altho there was talk of possible censure of Gravel for violating both the classified documents laws and Senate rules, Sen. William B. Saxbe (R., Ohio), an advocate of censure, said he doubted whether such a move would be attempted. He speculated that a censure move would be defeated on a straight party-line vote.

"Gravel is not the most important thing, even tho he might disagree," Saxbe said in an interview. "The most important thing is to get the Senate to police its membership."

At the State Department today, a spokesman said Gravel's criticism of the renewed bombing in North Viet Nam was not valid because the present military situation differs substantially from the situation three years ago when the National Security Council memorandum was prepared.

"What the North Vietnamese Army has faced us with is something quite different from what was essentially small-scale, guerrilla warfare," Charles W. Bray, a State Department press officer said.

Bray also noted that judgments regarding the effectiveness of air bombing in the past have been "mixed and not categorical."

By using more conventional combat devices, including tanks, heavy artillery and ground-to-air anti-aircraft

rockets, the North Vietnamese are now presenting "individual targets which were rarely available in earlier years," Bray said.

The North Vietnamese, he commented, are much more heavily dependent on logistic and re-supply operations, "which by their very nature are accessible to retaliation from the air."

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# Memo shows Nixon had no peace plan

By TIM WHEELER

WASHINGTON, April 25—Senator Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) defied President Nixon today and read on the U.S. Senate floor portions of a secret White House memo which explodes as a hoax Nixon's so-called "peace plan" that won him election in 1968.

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However, Senate minority whip, Robert Griffin (R-Mich) frantically maneuvered to gag Gravel from inserting the full text of the memo in the Congressional Record.

The memo, written by Nixon's adviser, Henry Kissinger, and titled "Responses to National Security Study Memorandum 1" (NSSM-1) was completed in February, 1969.

The memo told Nixon that it would take 8.5 to 13.4 years to complete "pacification" of South Vietnam and that liberation forces were capable of outlasting U.S. aggression indefinitely.

## No U.S. victory seen

The report said, in no uncertain terms, that the U.S. could not win a military victory, nor could it win a political victory.

It said that South Vietnamese armed forces "could not either now or even when fully modernized handle both the VC and a sizeable level of NVA (North Vietnamese Army) forces without U.S. combat support in the form of air, helicopters, artillery logistics and some ground forces."

The South Vietnamese faced "severe motivation, leadership and desertion problems" and had an annual desertion rate of 54 percent of their strength, the memo declared.

## Press shown memo

Gravel displayed the book length memo to reporters at a Senate press conference but he refrained from releasing the full document, explaining that Nixon supporters are threatening to censure him for his bold action.

He vowed, nevertheless, to release "every stitch of paper I have" so that the American people can judge the facts for themselves.

The memo says that the CIA and Defense Department had told Nixon in 1969 that his Vietnamization policy would never work, that U.S. saturation bombings of civilian populations was futile, that the South Vietnamese population would never be pacified, short of total annihilation carried out over more than a decade, and that the South Vietnamese puppet government is "chancy at best."

The Washington Post devoted two full pages and two columns on its front page to reprinting vast portions of the memo, in defiance of an executive order which establishes the system of government classification of documents.

The Senate floor was all but deserted but the galleries were jammed with citizens, including reporters, as Sen. Griffin, his voice cold with fury, threatened to call the Senate into closed session to keep the American people from learning the contents of the memo.

But Gravel read portions of the document anyway. The people, he charged, "now know that he, President Nixon, never had a plan to end the war. Instead he adopted a policy that would indefinitely maintain the American military presence in Vietnam... and the result is now clear for all to see, with the war raging at a level as intense and as destructive as any time before."

Gravel accused Nixon of "committing genocide in Vietnam."

"The consequences of his policy will be the killing and maiming of hundreds of thousands of human beings," he told reporters.

Nixon intention exposed

Gravel said that a study of the Kissinger memo proved that

no time after taking office did Richard Nixon consider seriously getting out of Vietnam or of negotiating with the North Vietnamese for an end to the war.

Instead of accepting the "pessimistic" conclusions of the CIA reported in the memo, Nixon, he said, "ignored NSSM-1's evaluation and persisted in the fundamental policies of his predecessor—propping up our client regime in Saigon."

"In spite of the heaviest bombing campaign in history conducted upon Laos and the Ho Chi Minh trail, the Communist side has been able to mount a massive new offensive..."

## Bombing held vain

Gravel quoted a section of the memo in which civilian experts in the Pentagon informed Nixon that "the external supply requirements VC/NVA (Vietcong/North Vietnam Army) forces in South Vietnam are so small... that it is unlikely any air interdiction campaign can reduce it below the required levels... the enemy can continue to push sufficient supplies through."

The State Department intelligence wing is recorded as stating, "Our interdiction efforts in Laos do not appear to have weakened in any major way Communist capabilities to wage an aggressive and protracted campaign in South Vietnam..."

And the CIA added glumly, "Almost four years of air war

in North Vietnam have shown—as did the Korean war—that although air strikes will destroy... they cannot successfully interdict the flow of supplies."

The portions of the memo reprinted by the Washington Post reveal that Nixon was told by the CIA and the Defense

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# 1969 STUDY SHOWS WAR POLICY SPLIT

Joint Chiefs Urged Renewed  
Bombing but Other Units  
Doubted Effectiveness

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 25 — Ellsworth Bunker, United States Ambassador in Saigon, predicted in a White House study on Vietnam policy at the outset of the Nixon Administration that North Vietnam's military prospects were so bleak that Hanoi would "make significant concessions" at the Paris peace negotiations.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the same study, unsuccessfully urged the President to resume at once the bombing campaign against the southern part of North Vietnam, which had been halted late in 1968 by the Johnson Administration.

The full text of the study, known as National Security Study Memorandum No. 1 and classified "secret," was obtained by The New York Times today. Its disclosure came as the North Vietnamese were pressing a large-scale offensive in South Vietnam and after the President had ordered a renewed bombing effort against North Vietnam.

In the study, which was compiled early in 1969, the Joint Chiefs said they believed that a determined and immediate resumption of the bombing "would assure almost total interdiction of truck and water-borne movement of supplies into the demilitarized zone and Laos." They contended that the bombing had been effective.

But most of the other Government agencies contributing to the study warned Mr. Nixon that the record of strategic and tactical bombing in Indochina over previous years showed that an air strategy had failed to achieve conclusive results.

Excerpts from the full study, pertaining to the effectiveness of the earlier bombing of North Vietnam, were made public this morning by a spokesman for Hanoi in measured, highly selective and carefully timed session.

The Republican leadership, however, blocked an attempt by Senator Gravel to place 50 pages of the secret study in the Congressional Record. Mr. Gravel said these documents demonstrated that President Nixon "is today pursuing a reckless, futile, and immoral policy which he knows will not work, but which is intended solely to enable him to save face."

The recommendations and conclusions by military, intelligence and foreign affairs agencies and bureaus of the Government contained in the study were in response to 23 questions submitted to them Jan. 21, 1969, the day after President Nixon's inauguration, by Henry A. Kissinger, the White House adviser for national security.

Mr. Nixon had asked Mr. Kissinger for the study, ranging from the effects of the bombing to Hanoi's motives in agreeing to the Paris peace negotiations the previous year. The detailed responses, received within 10 days, became the basis for National Security Study Memorandum No. 1.

## Summary Published

A summary of the memorandum relating the agreements and disagreements within the Administration, was published this morning in The Washington Post. Details of the study were also published in this week's issue of Newsweek magazine.

The full text emphasized the depth and the extent of the dissension among the agencies. One such disclosure was that the Joint Chiefs made a strong plea for new bombings in the face of criticism of the earlier air operations by the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the civilian office of the Secretary of Defense.

The text of the study also showed the following:

There was general agreement among the Government agencies on the gradual improvement in the South Vietnamese armed forces. They concurred that Saigon's troops probably could cope with an offensive mounted by Vietcong forces, but not if they were substantially reinforced by North Vietnamese army troops.

There was general agreement that it was not out of "weakness" that Hanoi agreed to negotiate with the United States in Paris. The State Department emphasized Soviet efforts to facilitate the negotiations, which began in May, 1968, and said that "the Russian position is measured, highly selective and carefully timed

fashion."

The C.I.A. cited the differences in estimates of total enemy strength between itself and the Defense intelligence agency, on the one hand, and the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Adm. John F. McCain Jr., and the United States command in Saigon on the other. The C.I.A. warned that these differences "may become of major political importance if developments in Paris should lead to an agreement on the phased withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops, which intelligence might be required to confirm or monitor."

The United States Embassy in Saigon, in a report signed by Ambassador Bunker, predicted that "once Hanoi is convinced that the new Administration is not going to 'quit' in Vietnam or give the game away for free" at the Paris talks, "we would expect renewal of 'serious' talks."

The embassy report said that, while North Vietnam would try to obtain the best conditions, "we think the prospects on the ground are bleak enough for them so that they will, in the end, make significant concessions (in terms of their own withdrawal) to get us out."

The National Security Study Memorandum No. 1, which consists of 548 pages, was the first of nearly 150 studies that have been conducted during the Nixon Administration under the direction of Mr. Kissinger. Each of the huge memorandums has examined the implications of a major foreign-policy question, such as the relations of the United States with the Communist Market, or with the white regimes of Southern Africa.

## Accord and Discord

Although all the memorandums are classified as secret, the nature of the first study, as an exhaustive review of the Vietnam situation, has been previously published.

The summary section of the Vietnam-policy study, reportedly drafted by Mr. Kissinger, said that the responses "show agreement on some matters as well as very substantial differences of opinion within the U.S. Government," including "sharpest differences" in interpreting available data.

The summary said that the disagreements "are reflected in two schools in the Government with generally consistent membership."

The first school, it said, usually includes the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Command, Vietnam; Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Embassy in Saigon, "and takes a

hopeful view of current and future prospects in Vietnam."

The second school, it added usually includes the office of the Secretary of Defense, the C.I.A. and, to a lesser extent, the State Department and "is decidedly more skeptical about the present and pessimistic about the future."

On the question of bombing effectiveness over the Laos infiltration trails and North Vietnam, the summary said that the United States command in Saigon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the one hand and the State Department, the C.I.A. and the office of the Secretary of Defense on the other, "fundamentally disagree over whether our bombing campaign either prior to or after November (1968) has reduced the enemy's throughput of supplies so that the enemy in South Vietnam receives less than he needs there."

It said that the Saigon command and the chiefs "feel the bombing has succeeded, while the State Department, the C.I.A. and the Secretary of Defense's office 'think it has failed.'"

The office of the Secretary of Defense is a term used to describe Melvin R. Laird, the Secretary, and his personal staff. The study thus suggested a conflict between Secretary Laird and the uniformed Joint Chiefs of Staff.

While the systematic bombing of North Vietnam was halted in November, 1968, under the "understanding" that led to the new phase of the Paris peace talks, United States aircraft, including B-52 bombers, continued raiding the Laos infiltration trails.

This is why critics of the current bombing of North Vietnam, related to Hanoi's new offensive, believe that the conclusions reached by a majority of the Government agencies in 1969 remain timely.

The State Department, replying to Senator Gravel's remarks, rejected today any attempts to equate the pre-1969 bombings with the present situation.

The department's spokesman, Charles W. Bray 3d, said that "the analysis of the effect of bombings covers a situation at a different time and different circumstances."

"What the North Vietnamese Army has now faced us with," he said, "is something quite different from what was essentially a small-scale and guerrilla warfare. In adopting much

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# Excerpts From 1969 National Security Study of Vietnam War Requested by Nixon

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 25—Following are excerpts from National Security Study Memorandum 1, the 548-page study of the Vietnam war ordered by Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser on national security, at the request of the President on Jan. 21, 1969. The document was made available to The New York Times, which supplied the headings that appear on the excerpts.

## Bombing of North Vietnam

### C.I.A.

Almost four years of air war in North Vietnam have shown—as did the Korean war—that, although air strikes will destroy transport facilities, equipment and supplies, they cannot successfully interdict the flow of supplies because much of the damage can frequently be repaired within hours.

The major effects of the bombing of North Vietnam were extensive damage to the transport network, widespread economic disruption, greatly increased manpower requirements and the problems of maintaining the morale of the people in the face of personal hardships and deprivation. Hanoi was able to cope effectively with each of these strains, so that the air war did not seriously affect the flow of men and supplies to Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam. Nor did it significantly erode North Vietnam's military defense capability or Hanoi's determination to persist in the war. Material losses resulting from the bombing were, for the most part, offset by increased imports from Communist countries.

Communist military and economic aid to North Vietnam to a large extent offset the physical destruction and the disruptive effects of the U.S. bombing and were instrumental in maintaining the morale of the people. Communist countries provided all of the weapons; enough food, consumer goods and materials to compensate for the domestic output, and most of the equipment and materials to maintain the transport system. Without Communist aid, most of it from the Soviet Union and China—particularly given the pressures generated by the bombing—the Vietnamese Communists would have been unable to sustain the war in both South and North Vietnam on anything like the levels actually engaged in during the past three years.

The amount of Communist economic aid delivered annually has grown from a yearly average of less than \$100-million through 1964, to \$150-million in 1965, \$275-million in 1966, \$370-million in 1967 and \$460-million in 1968. The value of Communist military aid increased from an average of less than \$15-million a year during 1954-64 to

\$270-million in 1965, \$455-million in 1966 and \$650-million in 1967. With the restricted bombings of the heavily defended northern part of the country in 1968, military aid deliveries were reduced. At least 75 per cent of total military aid since 1965 has been for air defense.

North Vietnam's air defenses significantly reduced the effectiveness of the U. S. bombing, resulted directly or indirectly in the loss of almost 1,100 U. S. aircraft and provided a psychological boost to morale. Before 1965, the Soviet Union had provided North Vietnam with only ground forces equipment, transport and trainer aircraft and small naval patrol craft, while China had provided MIG-15/17 jet fighters, motor gunboats and ground forces equipment. Since early 1965, the U.S.S.R. has provided North Vietnam with most of its air defense systems, including surface-to-air missiles, jet fighters, a radar network and antiaircraft artillery. Chinese military aid since 1965, much smaller than that from the U.S.S.R., has been important primarily in building up North Vietnam's ground forces including equipping Communist ground forces in South Vietnam with the AK-47 assault rifle, the 107-mm. rocket and other new weapons.

All of the war-essential imports could be brought into North Vietnam over rail lines or roads from China in the event that imports by sea were successfully denied. The disruption to imports, if sea-borne imports were cut off, would be widespread but temporary. Within two or three months North Vietnam and its allies would be able to implement alternative procedures for maintaining the flow of essential economic and military imports. The uninterrupted capacities of the railroad, highway and river connections with China are about 16,000 tons per day, more than two and a half times the 6,300 tons per day of total imports overland and by sea in 1963, when the volume reached an all-time high.

Two principal rail lines connect Hanoi with Communist China, with a combined capacity of over 9,000 tons a day. Eight primary highway routes cross the China border, having a combined capacity of about 5,000 tons per day. In addition, the Red River flows out of China, and has a capacity of about 1,500 tons per

It is generally agreed that a feasible method for analyzing Arc Light effectiveness has not yet been devised. Field commanders are lavish in their praise. COMUSMACV recently stated that Arc Light was his strategic reserve and had the equivalent combat punch of two divisions. No one has been able to quantitatively support such claims (or disprove them). Hard evidence on the effectiveness of the Arc Light program is difficult to find. Certainly some strikes are highly effective. Some are clearly wasted. The majority have an undetermined impact.

The J.C.S. estimate that 41,250 enemy were killed in 1968 by all in-country B-52 strikes. This is an average of 2.5 enemy killed per sortie.

Office of the Secretary of Defense estimates of enemy killed by Arc Light are much lower than those of the J.C.S.

If this average enemy casualty rate is extrapolated to include all B-52 strikes, Arc Light apparently has killed day.

### Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that resumption of an interdiction campaign similar to that carried out in Route Package I between July and 1 November 1968 would assure almost total interdiction of truck and waterborne movement of supplies into the demilitarized zone and Laos. Naval blockade offshore and interdiction of Region Package II to Thanhhoa would further enhance this effort.

Commitment of B-52 forces following heavy and unrestricted suppression of defenses by fighters, could reduce the amount of time to accomplish the above.

There is not sufficient data available at this time on either the cost or the effectiveness of an air campaign against these land lines to reach a firm conclusion as to the chances of isolating NVN from her neighbors. Past attempts to cut rail, road and water networks in NVN have met with considerable difficulties. It has been estimated that a minimum of 6,000 attack sorties per month would be required against the two rail lines from China. Even at this level of effort, the North Vietnamese could continue to use the rail lines to shuttle supplies if they were willing to devote sufficient manpower to repair and transshipment operations.

It is not possible to give a definitive amount to the question of how much war-essential imports could come into NVN if sea imports are denied and a strong air campaign is initiated.

The act of sealing off the enemy's Cambodian supply lines is considered as an integral part of any plan to prevent supplies from reaching enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam.

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# Fulbright Unit Got Memo, Few Saw It

By Marilyn Berger  
Washington Post Staff Writer

National Security Study Memorandum No. 1, which became a basis for the Nixon administration's Vietnam policy, was covertly passed on to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee some time in 1969.

The availability of the document, however, remained a secret even to committee members, apparently only a few of the committee's staff men got to see it. Other persons who learned that it was in a special double-locked safe heard about it through the Senate grapevine.

NSSM 1 was, in effect, "leaked" to the committee, it was learned, and not provided by the administration. The way it was acquired, it was suggested, was one of the reasons that senators on the committee were not officially informed about it.

Whether even Sen. J. W. Fulbright, the committee chairman, knew about it at the time was unclear yesterday. The Arkansas Democrat, told that the document was in committee hands since 1969, said: "Is that so? I didn't know we had it." Then he added "I'll inquire and see. This is ancient history."

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), a leading critic of U.S. involvement in the war who has co-sponsored three end-the-war amendments, said yesterday that he had

not known the document was in committee hands. "I think there is a failure in the mechanism," he said when told about it. "The staff is not informing members of what is available."

Church added: "The committee might want to keep it undisclosed because of the way it was acquired... but there is no justification for not letting the members... know about it."

The senator said it might have been helpful to have seen the document before formulating legislation, but he was not very disturbed. "It hasn't been the lack of information concerning this war that has handicapped or manacled us. We've known enough for years to know that it's been a mistake."

Fulbright, in a separate telephone interview, also said that there has been "no dearth of information" about what was happening in Vietnam.

Members of the Foreign Relations Committee have frequently urged the administration to be more willing to provide documents on which policy is based.

But a committee source said that when they ask for documents the administration goes on the assumption that they will declassify or leak them. "We're just as tight and secure as the administration," this source said.

"I don't believe you can



SEN. J. W. FULBRIGHT  
... didn't see memo

find any cases where we leak papers that are classified. We have fairly tight rules as to how classified documents are handled in the committee... double-locked safes and all."

The handling of NSSM 1 would appear to bear out this assertion. It was understood that the committee received the document at about the time it received a copy of the Pentagon Papers. The committee sought to get the Defense Department to declassify the papers, but no one yesterday seemed to remember whether anyone tried to do the same with NSSM 1.

James G. Lowenstein, a committee staff consultant who with Richard M. Moose was sent to Vietnam to report on the progress of pacification, the prospects for Vietnamization, the domestic political situation and the outlook for negotiations, said he and his colleague head NSSM1 before leaving in December, 1969.



**The Washington Merry-Go-Round**

# '69 Study Told of Saigon Weakness

**By Jack Anderson**

Government strategists in 1969 delivered a unanimous warning to incoming President Nixon that South Vietnam's armed forces would be no match for North Vietnamese-Viet Cong forces "in the foreseeable future," that the pacification program showed no promise of "complete success" for "several years," and that the Saigon government might not "survive a peaceful competition with the (Communists) for political power in South Vietnam."

This gloomy outlook, contained in a secret, two-inch-thick review known as National Security Study Memorandum 1, has changed only in degree during the past three years.

The President's response has been to do his best to bolster Saigon while extricating the U.S. from the tragic Vietnam war. He has been determined, however, to end the American involvement with dignity. In his private conversations, he has repeated that he won't let the U.S. be "pushed around," "degraded" or "humiliated."

This was the reason he struck back with such fury from the air after the North Vietnamese assault across the Demilitarized Zone.

The secret 1969 study, known simply as NSSM-1 inside the White House, was

compiled by foreign policy czar Henry Kissinger. He sent eight pages of pointed, penetrating questions to all the government agencies involved in the war effort.

Their answers showed considerable confusion over what was happening in Vietnam. The U.S. embassy and military command in Saigon, joined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, generally took a rosy view. The Defense Secretariat, Central Intelligence Agency and State Department were more skeptical.

## Saigon Doomed

Here are highlights from the exhaustive study:

All the experts agreed that the South Vietnamese armed forces, "in the foreseeable future," couldn't fight off the Vietcong and North Vietnamese "without U.S. combat support in the form of air, helicopters, artillery, logistics and some ground forces."

The toughest estimate, surprisingly, came from the Defense Secretary's office, which predicted bluntly: "It is unlikely that the (South Vietnamese, as presently organized and led, will ever constitute an effective political or military counter to the Vietcong."

The South Vietnamese forces, with an annual desertion rate of 34 per cent, were said to be facing "severe motivation, leadership and deser-

tion problems." The total desertions, alleged the study, were "equivalent to losing one ARVN division per month."

Nevertheless, the majority view was that Saigon was making "reasonable progress" toward building a force "able to hold its own against an internal VC threat."

Disagreeing, the Defense Secretary's office doubted "that current expansion and re-equipment programs are sufficient to make (the South Vietnamese) into an effective fighting force."

Although the pacification program couldn't "promise anything close to complete success within several years," the U.S. high command found that Saigon controlled "three-fourths of the population." The Joint Chiefs expected this to rise to 90 per cent by the end of 1969.

Their figures were disputed, however, by the Defense Secretary's office, which suggested "at least 50 per cent of the total rural population is subject to significant VC pressure and influence."

## No Victory

South Vietnamese politics, according to the study, were plagued with "pragmatism, expediency, war weariness, a desire to remain unaligned and end up on the winning side," compounded by "family loyalty, corruption, social immo-

bility and clandestine activities."

No U.S. agency would forecast a "victory" over the Communists, but the military still stressed "the need for continued U.S. support."

There was general agreement that "the enemy has been able during the last four years to double his combat forces, double the level of infiltration and increase the scale and intensity of the main force war even while bearing heavy casualties."

It was also agreed that the Communists were recruiting, and infiltrating troops faster, than they could be killed off. The enemy expansion of 300,000 new men each year, the study noted, "requires that the allies inflict losses of 25,000 KIA (killed in action) per month, or 7,000 more than the current rate."

The Saigon embassy's evaluators suggested that "the VC are husbanding their resources to give themselves the option of a 'climaxing' offensive."

The State Department foresaw in 1969 what has now happened. "The Communists," said State, "may feel that a demonstrably strong blow against the pacification program would have wide repercussions particularly at a time of optimistic allied claims about pacification successes."

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# Kissinger's 1969 National Security Study Memo: The Questions

Following is the text of a draft summary of responses to National Security Study Memorandum 1. It was prepared in early 1969 by various government agencies in answer to questions submitted by presidential adviser Henry Kissinger and his staff (guide to abbreviations at end of text):

## VIETNAM QUESTIONS

### Environment of Negotiations

1. Why is the DRV in Paris? What is the evidence?

Among the hypotheses:

- Out of weakness, to accept a face-saving formula for defeat.
- To negotiate the withdrawal of U.S. (and NVA) forces, and/or a compromise political settlement, giving a chance for NLF victory in the South.
- To give the U.S. a face-saving way to withdraw.
- To undermine the GVN and U.S./GVN relations, and to relieve U.S. military pressure on both North and South Vietnam.
- Out of desire to end the losses and costs of war on the best terms attainable?

2. What is the nature of evidence, and how adequate is it, underlying competing views (as in the most recent NIE on this subject, with its dissenting footnotes) of the impact of various outcomes in Vietnam within Southeast Asia?

3. How soundly-based is the common belief that Hanoi is under active pressure with respect to the Paris negotiations from Moscow (for) and Peking (against)? Is it clear that either Moscow or Peking believe they have, or are willing to use, significant leverage on Hanoi's policies? What is the nature of evidence, other than public or private official statements?

4. How sound is our knowledge of the existence and significance of stable "Moscow" and "Peking" factions, as distinct, for

example, from shifting factions, all of whom recognize the need to balance off both allies? How much do we know, in general, of intraparty disputes and personalities within Hanoi?

## NVA/VC

5. What is the evidence supporting various hypotheses, and the overall adequacy of evidence, relating to the following questions:

- Why did NVA units leave South Vietnam last summer and fall?
- Did the predicted "third-wave offensive" by the NVA/VC actually take place? If so, why did it not achieve success?
- Why are VC guerrillas and local forces now relatively dormant? (Among the hypotheses: 1) response to VC/NVA battle losses, forcing withdrawal or passivity; 2) to put diplomatic pressure on U.S. to move to substantive talks in Paris; 3) to prepare for future operations; and/or 4) pressure of U.S. and allied operations.)

6. What rate of NVA/VC attrition would outrun their ability to replenish by infiltration and recruitment, as currently calculated? Do present operations achieve this? If not, what force levels and other conditions would be necessary? Is there any evidence they are concerned about continuing heavy losses?

7. To what relative extent do the U.S./RVNAF and the NVA/VC share in the control and the rate of VC/NVA attrition; i.e., to what extent, in terms of our tactical experience, can heavy losses persistently be imposed on VC/NVA forces, despite their possible intention to limit casualties by avoiding contact?

(Among the hypotheses:

- Contact is predominantly at VC tactical initiative, and we cannot reverse this; VC need suffer high casualties only so long as they are willing to accept them, in seeking contact; or

b. Current VC/NVA losses can be maintained by present forces—as in-

creased X% by Y additional forces—whatever the DRV/VC choose to do, short of further major withdrawal.)

8. What controversies persist on the estimate of VC Order of Battle; in particular, on the various categories of guerrilla forces and infrastructure? On VC recruiting, and manpower pool? What is the evidence for different estimates, and what is the overall adequacy of evidence?

9. What are NVA/VC capabilities for launching a large-scale offensive, with "dramatic" results (even if taking high casualties and without holding objectives long), in the next six months? (e.g., an offensive against one or more cities, or against most newly "pacified" hamlets.) How adequate is the evidence?

10. What are the main channels for military supplies for the NVA/VC forces in SVN, (e.g., Cambodia and/or the Laotian panhandle)? What portion of these supplies come in through Sihanoukville?

A. What differences of opinion exist concerning extent of RVNAF improvement and what is evidence underlying different views? (e.g., compare recent CIA memo with MACV views.) For example:

- Which is the level of effective, mobile, offensive operations? What results are they achieving?
- What is the actual level of "genuine" small-unit action in ARVN, RF and PF: i.e., actions that would typically be classed as such within the U.S. Army, and in particular, offensive ambushes and patrols? How much has this changed?

c. How much has the officer selection and promotion system, and the quality of leadership, actually changed over the years (as distinct from changes in paper "programs")? How many junior officers hold commissions (in particular, battlefield commissions from NCO rank) despite

d. What known disciplinary action has resulted from ARVN looting of civilians in the past year (for example, the widespread looting that took place last spring)?

e. To what extent have past "anti-desertion" decrees and efforts lessened rate of desertion; why has the rate recently been increasing to new highs?

f. What success are the RF and PF having in providing local security and reducing VC control and influence in rural populations?

11. To what extent could RVNAF—as it is now—handle the VC (Main Force, local forces, guerrillas), with or without U.S. combat support to fill RVNAF deficiencies, if all NVA units were withdrawn:

- If VC still had Northern fillers.
- If All Northerners (but not regroupes) were withdrawn.

12. To what extent could RVNAF—as it is now—also handle a sizeable level of NVA forces:

- With U.S. air and artillery support.
- With above and also U.S. ground forces in reserve.
- Without U.S. direct support, but with increased RVNAF artillery and air capacity?

13. What, in various views, are the required changes—in RVNAF command, organization, equipment, training and incentives, in political environment, in logistical support, in U.S. modes of influence—for making RVNAF adequate to the tasks cited in questions 9 and 10 above? How long would this take? What are the practical obstacles to these changes, and what new U.S. moves would be needed to overcome these?

## PACIFICATION

14. How much, and where, has the security situation and the balance of influence between the VC and NLF actually changed in the countryside over time, contrasting the present to such benchmarks as end-61, end-63, end-65, and 67?

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are the best... such change, or lack of it? What factors have been mainly responsible for such change as has occurred? Why has there not been more?

15. What are the reasons for expecting more change in the countryside in the next two years than in past intervals? What are the reasons for not expecting more? What changes in RVNAF, GVN, U.S., and VC practices and adaptiveness would be needed to increase favorable change in security and control? How likely are such changes, individually and together; what are the obstacles?

16. What proportion of the rural population must be regarded as "subject to significant VC presence and influence"? (How should hamlets rated as "C" in the Hamlet Evaluation System -- the largest category -- be regarded in this respect?) In particular, what proportion in the provinces surrounding Saigon? How much has this changed?

17. What number or verified numbers of the Communist political apparatus (i.e. People's Revolutionary Party members, the hard-core "infrastructure") have been arrested or killed in the past year? How many of these were cadre or higher than village level? What proportion do these represent of total PRP membership, and how much -- and how long -- had the apparatus been disrupted?

18. What are the reasons for believing that current and future efforts at "rooting out" hard-core infrastructure will be -- or will not be -- more successful than past efforts? For example, for believing that collaboration among the numerous Vietnamese intelligence agencies will be markedly more thorough than in the past? What are the side-effects, e.g., on Vietnamese opinion, of anti-infrastructure campaigns such as the current "accelerated effort," along with their lasting effect on hard-core apparatus?

19. How adequate is our information on the overall scale and incidence of damage to civilians by air and artillery, and looting and misbehavior by RVNAF?

20. To what extent do recent changes in command and administration affecting the countryside represent moves to improve competence, as distance from re-

placement of one clique by another? What is the basis of judgment? What is the impact of the recent removal of minority-group province and district officials (Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Montagnard) in their respective areas.

### POLITICS

21. How adequate is our information, and what is it based upon, concerning:

a. Attitudes of Vietnamese elites not now closely aligned with the GVN (e.g., religious leaders, professors, youth leaders, professionals, union leaders, village notables) towards: Participation -- if offered -- in the GVN; the current legitimacy and acceptability of the GVN; like-wise (given "peace") for the NLF or various "neutralist" coalitions; towards U.S. intent, as they interpret it (e.g., U.S. plans for ending the war, perceived U.S. alignments with particular individuals and forces within Vietnam, U.S. concern for various Vietnamese interests).

b. Patterns of existent political alignments within GVN/RVNAF and outside it -- reflecting family ties, corruption, officers' class, secret organizations and parties, religious and regional background -- as these bear upon behavior with respect to the war, the NLF, reform and broadening of the GVN, and responses to U.S. influence and intervention.

22. What is the evidence on the prospects -- and on what changes in conditions and U.S. policies would increase or decrease them -- for changes in the GVN towards: (a) broadening of the government to include participation of all significant non-Communist regional and religious groupings (at province and district levels, as well as cabinet); (b) stronger emphasis, in selections and promotion of officers and officials, on competence and performance (as in the Communist Vietnamese system) as distinct from considerations of family, corruption, and social (e.g., educational) background, and support of the GVN, as evidenced, e.g., by reduced desertion, by willing alignment of religious, provincial and other leaders with the GVN, by wide cooperation with the GVN, and pro-efficiency

23. How critical, in various views, is each of the changes in question 22 above to prospects of attaining -- at current, reduced or increased levels of U.S. military effort -- either "victory," or a strong non-Communist political role after a compromise settlement of hostilities? What are views of the risks attendant to making these changes, or attempting them; and, to the extent that U.S. influence is required, on U.S. practical ability to move prudently and effectively in this direction? What is the evidence?

### U.S. OPERATIONS

24. How do military development and tactics today differ from those of 6-12 months ago? What are reasons for changes, and what has this impact been?

25. In what different ways (including innovations in organization) might U.S. force-levels be reduced to various levels, while minimizing impact on combat capability?

26. What is the evidence on the scale of effect of B-52 attacks in producing VC/NVA casualties? In disrupting VC/NVA operations? How valid are estimates of overall effect?

27. What effect is the Laotian interdiction bombing having:

a. In reducing the capacity of the enemy logistic system?  
b. In destroying material in transit?

28. With regard to the bombing of North Vietnam:  
a. What evidence was there on the significance of the principal strains imposed on the DRV (e.g., in economic disruption, extra manpower demands, transportation blockages, population morale)?

b. What was the level of logistical throughput through the southern province of NVN just prior to the November bombing halt? To what extent did this level reflect the results of the U.S. bombing campaign?

c. To what extent did Chinese and Soviet aid relieve pressure on Hanoi?

d. What are current views on the proportion of war-essential imports that could come into NVN overland from China, even if all imports by sea were denied and a

strong effort even made to interdict ground transport? What is the evidence?

e. What action has the DRV taken to reduce the vulnerability and importance of Hanoi as a population and economic center (e.g., through population evacuation and economic dispersal)?

### SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO NSSM 1

#### THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

The responses to the questions posed regarding Vietnam show agreement on some matters as well as very substantial differences of opinion within the U.S. government on many aspects of the Vietnam situation. While there are some divergencies on the facts, the sharpest differences arise in the interpretation of those facts, the relative weight to be given them, and the implications to be drawn. In addition, there remain certain areas where our information remains inadequate.

There is general agreement, assuming we follow our current strategy, on the following:

(1) The GVN and allied position in Vietnam has been strengthened recently in many respects.

(2) The GVN has improved its political position, but it is not certain that the GVN and other non-Communist groups will be able to survive a peaceful competition with the NLF for political power in South Vietnam.

(3) The RVNAF alone cannot now, or in the foreseeable future, stand up to the current North Vietnamese-Vietcong forces.

(4) The enemy have suffered some reverses but they have not changed their essential objectives and they have sufficient strength to pursue these objectives. We are not attriting his forces faster than he can recruit or infiltrate.

(5) The enemy is not in Paris primarily out of weakness.

The disagreements within these parameters are reflected in two schools in the government with generally consistent membership. The first school, which we will call Group A, usually includes MACV, CINCPAC, JCS and Embassy Saigon, and represents the view of current and future prospects in Vietnam within the

parameters. In the second school, Group B, there is agreement that the usually includes OSD, CIA and (to a lesser extent) State, and is decidedly more skeptical about the present and pessimistic about the future. There are, of course, disagreements within agencies across the board or on specific issues.

As illustration, these schools line up as follows on some of the broader questions.

- In explaining reduced enemy military presence and activities, Group A gives greater relative weight to allied military pressure, than does Group B.

- The improvements in RVNAF are considered much more significant by Group A than Group B.

- Group A underlines advancements in the pacification program, while Group B is skeptical both of the evaluation system used to measure progress and of the solidity of recent advances.

- In looking at the political scene, Group A accents recent improvements while Group B highlights remaining obstacles and the relative strength of the NLF.

- Group A assigns much greater effectiveness to bombing in Vietnam and Laos than Group B.

Following is a summary of the major conclusions and disagreement about each of six broad areas with regard to Vietnam the negotiating environment, enemy capabilities, RVNAF capabilities, pacification, South Vietnamese politics, and U.S. military operations. Attached (at Tabs A-F) are summaries of the individual questions asked of the various agencies.

## 1. NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENT

### (Questions 1-4)

There is general U.S. government agreement that Hanoi is in Paris for a variety of motives but not primarily out of weakness; that Hanoi is charting a course independent of Moscow, which favors negotiations, and of Peking, which opposes them; and that our knowledge of possible political factions among North Vietnamese leaders is extremely imprecise. There continues wide disagreement about the impact on Southeast Asia of various outcomes in Vietnam.

### WHY IS THE DRV IN PARIS?

Various possible North Vietnamese motives for negoti-

ated in Paris for mixed reasons. No U.S. agency responding to the questions believes that the primary reason the DRV is in Paris is weakness. All consider it unlikely that Hanoi came to Paris either to accept a face-saving formula for defeat or to give the U.S. a face-saving way to withdraw. There is agreement that Hanoi has been subject to heavy military pressure and that a desire to end the losses and costs of war was an element in Hanoi's decision. The consensus is that Hanoi believes that it can persist long enough to obtain a relatively favorable negotiated compromise. The respondents agree that the DRV is in Paris to negotiate withdrawal of U.S. forces, to undermine GVN and USG relations and to provide a better chance for FV victory in the South. State believes that increased doubt about winning the war through continued military and international political pressure also played a major role. Hanoi's ultimate goal of a unified Vietnam under its control has not changed.

## VIETNAM IMPACT ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

There continues to be a sharp debate between and within agencies about the effect of the outcome in Vietnam on other nations. The most recent NIE on this subject (NIE 50-68) tended to downgrade the so-called "domino theory." It states that a settlement which would permit the Communists to take control of the Government in South Vietnam, not immediately but within a year or two, would be likely to bring Cambodia and Laos into Hanoi's orbit at a fairly early state, but that these developments would not necessarily unhinge the rest of Asia.

The NIE dissenters believe that an unfavorable settlement would stimulate the Communists to become more active elsewhere and that it will be difficult to resist making some accommodation to the pressure then generated. They believe, in contrast to the Estimate, these adjustments would be relatively small and insensitive to subsequent U.S. policy.

Factors entering into the judgments are estimates of

(2) CIA-RDP80-01601R001300390001-8  
gions; (3) Asian leaders' estimates of future U.S. policy; (4) the reactions of the area's non-Communist leaders to the outcome in Vietnam; (5) vulnerabilities of the various governments to insurgency or subversion; and (6) the strengths of opposition groups within each state.

The assessments rest more on judgments and assumptions than on tangible and convincing evidence, and there are major disagreements within the same department. Within the Defense Department, OSD and DIA support the conclusions of the NIE, while Army, Navy, and Air Force Intelligence dissent. Within State, the Bureau of Intelligence supports the NIE while the East Asian Bureau dissents.

Both the majority and the dissenters reject the view that an unfavorable settlement in Vietnam will inevitably be followed by Communist takeovers outside Indo China.

Indeed, even the dissenters, by phrasing the adverse results in terms such as "pragmatic adjustments" by the Thais and "some means of accommodation" leave it unclear how injurious the adverse effects would be to U.S. security.

## MOSCOW AND PEKING INFLUENCE

There is general governmental agreement on this question. Peking opposes negotiations while Moscow prefers an early negotiated settlement on terms as favorable as possible to Hanoi. Neither Peking nor Moscow have exerted heavy pressure on Hanoi and for various reasons they are unlikely to do so, although their military and economic assistance give them important leverage. CIA notes that "in competing for influence Peking and Moscow tend to cancel out each other." For its own reasons Hanoi's tendency in the last year has been in the Soviet direction. However, the Hanoi leadership is charting its own independent course.

## HANOI LEADERSHIP FACTIONS

There is agreement that knowledge of the existence and significance of possible factions within the Hanoi leadership is imprecise. There are differences of opinion within the leadership on tactics as opposed to

low and Peking factions. The Hanoi leadership will form different alignments on different issues. The attempts by the agencies to ascertain the position of various North Vietnamese leaders on specific issues shows the imprecision of our information and analysis. For example, different agencies set forth sharply conflicting identifications of the position of individual leaders such as Giap on particular questions.

## 2. THE ENEMY

### (Questions 5-10)

Analyses of various enemy tactics and capabilities reveal both significant agreements and sharp controversies within the Government. Among the major points of consensus:

- A combination of military pressures and political tactics explains recent enemy withdrawals and lower levels of activity.

- Under current rules of engagement, the enemy's manpower pool and infiltration capabilities can outlast allied attrition efforts indefinitely.

- The enemy basically controls both sides' casualty rates.

- The enemy can still launch major offensives, although not at Tet levels, or, probably, with equally dramatic effect.

Major controversies include:

- CIA and State assign much higher figures to the VC Order of Battle than MACV, and they include additional categories of VC/NLF organization.

- MACV/JCS and Saigon consider Cambodia (and specifically Sihanoukville) an important enemy supply channel while CIA disagrees strongly.

## RECENT ENEMY ACTIVITIES

Military pressures and political considerations are viewed as responsible for the withdrawal of some North Vietnamese units into Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries during the summer and fall of 1968. Military factors included heavy enemy losses, effective allied tactics, material shortages, and bad weather. Political factors centered on enemy efforts to make a political virtue out of a military necessity in a talk-fight strategy to influence the Paris negotiations, and the enemy's emphasis on the establishment of "Liberation

Committees throughout the South Vietnamese countryside.

The enemy undertook a third-wave offensive during the week of August 17. At a cost of 5,500 enemy KIA, the enemy tripled the number of his attacks to 300 per week and his assaults during the second half of August nearly equalled the level of his "second-wave" offensive in May. Prisoners and captured documents reported the goal of achieving a general uprising and overthrow of the GVN. The lack of greater success was attributed to: the enemy's economy-of-forces tactics; his desire to demonstrate initiative but at reduced risk; effective U.S. spoiling actions and increased intelligence; and the continuing deterioration of enemy Post-Tet capabilities in terms of quality of men and officers and lack of training.

All evaluators except the Department of State and Embassy Saigon state that VC guerrillas and local forces are not relatively dormant and that levels of harassment and terror remain high. However, the Embassy notes "the current low level of guerrilla and local forces activity," and State agrees there has been a "relative decline." Both agree that among the reasons are the heavy casualty rates, manpower problems and loss of cadres. But according to Embassy evaluators the main factor is that "The VC are husbanding their resources to give themselves the option of a 'climaxing' offensive." State notes that to support the VC counter-pacification campaign and their "Liberation Committees," "the Communists may feel that a demonstrably strong blow against the pacification program would have wide repercussions particularly at a time of optimistic Allied claims about pacification successes."

#### NVN/VC MANPOWER

It is generally agreed that the NVN/VC manpower pool is sufficiently large to meet the enemy's replenishment needs over an extended period of time within the framework of current rules of engagement. According to the JCS, "The North Vietnamese and Vietcong have access to sufficient manpower to meet their replenishment needs—even at the high 1968 loss

... some 20,000—for at least the next several years ... Present operations are not outrunning the enemy's ability to replenish by recruitment or infiltration." Enemy losses of 291,000 in 1968 were roughly balanced by infiltration and recruitment of 298,000. North Vietnamese manpower assets include 1.8 million physically fit males aged 15 to 34 of whom 45 per cent are in the regular forces (475,000) and paramilitary (400,000) forces. 120,000 physically fit males reach draft age each year and 200,000 military and labor personnel have been freed by the bombing half from defensive work. The potential manpower pool in SVN is estimated at half a million men and recruitment, while down, is running at approximately 3,500 per month. Enemy maintenance of the current commitment of 300,000 new men per year requires that the Allies inflict losses of 25,000 KIA per month, or 7,000 more than the current rate. MACV considers current Allied force levels adequate to inflict such casualties if the enemy chooses to engage.

The enemy's employment of economy of forces tactics since the fall of 1968 and intelligence evidence reflect the enemy's concern about his 1968 level of losses, which if continued another year would mean nearly 100 per cent yearly attrition of his full-time fighters and nearly total North-Vietnamization of local fighting forces in South Vietnam. He is judged unlikely to undertake the heavy losses of a major offensive unless he believes he could thereby achieve a breakthrough in Allied willpower in Vietnam or Paris. Yet, without a VC/NVA offensive on the scale of Tet 1968, the JCS believe "it will be exceedingly difficult in 1969 for allied forces to attrite the enemy at 1968 levels."

#### CONTROL OF NVA/VC ATTRITION

There is general agreement with the JCS statement: "The enemy, by the type action he adopts, has the predominant share in determining enemy attrition rates." Three-fourths of the battles are at the enemy's choice of time, place, type and duration. CIA notes that the enemy has nearly two million allied

small unit operations conducted in the last two years resulted in contact with the enemy and, when ARVN is surveyed, the percentage drops to one-tenth of 1 per cent. With his safe havens in Laos and Cambodia, and with carefully chosen tactics, the enemy has been able during the last four years to double his combat forces, double the level of infiltration and increase the scale and intensity of the main-force war even while bearing heavy casualties.

#### VC ORDER OF BATTLE

Considerable disagreement is evidenced concerning the estimates of Vietcong order of battle, the categories of guerrilla forces, recruiting manpower pool and quality of the data. MACV includes only enemy personnel engaged in offensive military actions and estimates enemy strength at 327,000. Moreover, CIA and State consider categories of paramilitary and administrative service to be indispensable to the enemy's military effort and population control and extrapolate a total range of 435,000 to 595,000 men. State, noting that the MACV estimate results from adding up so-called "hard" field intelligence figures for main-force, local and guerrilla forces, believes CIA's extrapolation is developed more realistically from the totality of evidence. OSD presents both MACV and CIA estimates, pointing out that the differences in overall strength presented by the two are not sufficient to cause a change in overall strength presented by the two are not sufficient to cause a change in overall strategy (though, as CIA notes, they could have a bearing on peace terms).

Recruiting figures vary for reasons similar to the divergencies on strength. Monthly VC recruitment is estimated at 8,500 in 1966, 7,500 in 1967, double the 1967 rate during the first quarter of 1968 and dropping sharply after the Tet offensive to approximately 3,500 per month. CIA estimates a smaller drop than MACV. Saigon reports that the last six months reflect a reduced level of recruitment, citing as evidence GVN expansion, reduction in VC standards, VC attempts to improve existing cadres, and the use of fillers in VC units, and GVN

mobilization effectiveness.

#### NVA/VC Capabilities for a Large-Scale Offensive

All agree that (as recent events have borne out) the enemy has a capability for a large scale offensive against cities, bases and/or villages in the accelerated pacification program if he wishes to bear the heavy casualties that would result. Allied countermeasures and preemptive capabilities make it highly unlikely that such an attack would have an impact on the scale of the Tet offensive of 1968. Further, the enemy would have to weigh the effect of such an offensive on the Paris talks and on the risk of touching off a resumption of bombing in North Vietnam.

#### NVA/VC Supply Channels

There is general agreement that the main channels for military supplies reaching enemy forces in the northern areas of South Vietnam (I, II, and a part of III Corps) are the Laos Panhandle and the DMZ. Considerable disagreement exists as to the channel of supplies for the southern part of South Vietnam (part of III and all of IV Corps). MACV, CINCPAC, JCS and Embassy point to Cambodia. MACV believes that no large shipments of ordnance are coming into IV Corps via Laos and that Cambodia has during the last two years become a major source of supplies for this region, with 10,000 tons of arms going through Sihanoukville to the border between October, 1967, and September, 1968. CIA disagrees strongly, especially with regard to the importance of Sihanoukville. It estimates that the external resupply requirement of IV Corps is three tons of combat-related material a day and that this comes across two Cambodian border points and the South China sea coast of South Vietnam. CIA notes numerous factors which it believes cast doubt on the importance of the Sihanoukville channel.

OSD summarizes without comment the national level CIA/DIA estimates for total enemy external daily supply requirements of 80 tons: 34 tons come from Laos, 14 tons across the DMZ, and 32 tons from Cambodia (of which 29 tons involve mainly food and other non-combatant goods).



### 3. THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES (Questions 10A-13)

The emphatic differences between U.S. agencies on the RVNAF outweigh the points of agreement. There is consensus that the RVNAF is getting larger, better equipped and somewhat more effective. And all agree that it could not now, or in the foreseeable future, handle both the VC and sizeable NVA forces without U.S. combat support. On other major points there is vivid controversy. The military community gives much greater weight to RVNAF statistical improvements while OSD and CIA highlight remaining obstacles, with OSD being the most pessimistic. Paradoxically, MACV/CINCPAC/JCS see RVNAF as being less capable against the VC alone than does CIA.

#### RVNAF CAPABILITIES AGAINST THE ENEMY

The Vietnamese Armed Forces (RVNAF) are being increased in size and re-equipped to improve their ground combat capability. The best measure of this improvement is the RVNAF's expected performance against a given enemy threat. However, there is a paradoxical divergence in agency views on the RVNAF ability to handle the internal VC that without U.S. assistance. State (both EA and INR) and CIA — who generally rate RVNAF improvement and effectiveness lowest among the respondents, and who accept the highest estimates of overall VC strength — believe that, "Without any U.S. support ... ARVN would at least be able to hold its own and make some progress against the VC unsupported by the NVA" (i.e. the VC without NVA fillers, though with regroupes).

In contrast is the view of MACV/CINCPAC/JCS, who rate RVNAF improvement and effectiveness highest who accept the lowest estimates of VC armed strength and who (unlike CIA and State) do not consider VC irregular forces to be part of the VC military threat. But the military community believes that without U.S. combat support in opposing VC main and local forces without any NVA units or fillers, RVNAF "would have to reduce the number of offensive operations and adopt more of a defensive posture," resulting in "loss of

control by the government of Vietnam over substantial areas of the country." CINCPAC/JCS believe that RVNAF would not be able to cope with purely indigenous VC forces without U.S. combat support until the completion of the modernization in 1972.

OSD, however, believes that a number of major reforms are required, in addition to the current modernization program, if this goal is to be met. "It is unlikely that the RVNAF, as presently organized and led, will ever constitute an effective political or military counter to the Vietcong."

All agencies agree that RVNAF could not, either now or even when fully modernized, handle both the VC and a sizeable level of NVA forces without U.S. combat support in the form of air, helicopters, artillery, logistics and some ground forces.

#### RVNAF IMPROVEMENTS

There is consensus that RVNAF forces are now much larger (826,000) than in December, 1967 (743,000), and will be further increased to 876,000, with the greatest increases in manpower given to the popular and regional forces needed for local security. The RVNAF is also better equipped. All regular combat units have M-16 rifles and are beginning to receive increases in their own artillery and helicopter support. Militia (393,000 of the total RVNAF strength in December, 1968) have 100,000 M-16 rifles and are scheduled to receive 150,000 more in 1969. MACV has stepped up its training efforts by forming 353 mobile teams in 1968 to train and advise the militia.

Moreover, all agencies agree that overall RVNAF capabilities, number of operations and effectiveness increased during 1968. Data presents a mixed picture in some areas, but it is clear that the larger number of enemy killed by RVNAF resulted from better effectiveness (more kills per 1,000 troops), along with higher kill ratios, as well as increased force size. In spite of these statistical improvements (which CIA in particular finds unreliable indicators), RVNAF is best thought of as a force which enlarged its contribution in 1968 within a total allied effort which also expanded. The modernization program, just beginning to have a high impact on the field,

promises that results will continue to increase so long as RVNAF receives the bone in the form of a U.S. ground combat presence.

#### RVNAF PROBLEMS

RVNAF faces severe motivation, leadership and desertion problems. The officer problem is mixed in politics and little has been done to correct it. Poor leadership and motivation contributes to regular ground combat forces deserting (net) at an annual rate of 34 per cent of their strength (gross rate one-third of the divisions is more than 50 per cent). Total RVNAF desertions (net) are equivalent to losing one ARVN division per month.

Thus, OSD does not believe that current expansion and re-equipment programs are sufficient to make RVNAF into an effective fighting force because major political and military actions are required that are not now emphasized. OSD considers essential action to recognize and reward combat leadership and development of a favorable attitude by the military towards their own people which will result in acceptance and support of the government by its citizens.

JCS, CINCPAC, MACV and State feel that, without such changes, RVNAF is making reasonable progress toward development as a self-sufficient force able to hold its own against an internal VC threat. OSD and CIA feel that RVNAF is making limited progress and many of RVNAF's weaknesses are uncorrected.

OSD suggests the possibility of cutting costs and U.S. losses by reducing U.S. forces as RVNAF reaches milestones in the modernization program. This plan is contingent on the enemy force stabilizing at a reduced level of threat. A plan to withdraw one U.S. division during mid-1969 has been discussed with President Thieu, who responded favorably. Allied troop reductions are dependent on progress in RVNAF improvement, changes in enemy forces and a manageable battlefield and pacification situation in South Vietnam.

#### 4. PACIFICATION

(Questions 14-20)

Two well-defined and divergent views emerged from the agencies on the pacification situation in South Vietnam. One view is held by MACV and JCS, and endorsed by CINCPAC,

and JCS. The other view is that of OSD, CIA and State. The two views are profoundly different in terms of factual interpretation and policy implications. Both views agree on the nature of the problem, that is, the obstacles to improvement and complete success. What distinguishes one view from the other is each's assessment of the magnitude of the problem, and the likelihood that obstacles will be overcome.

#### The Two Views

The first group, consisting of MACV/JCS/Saigon, maintains that "at the present time, the security situation is better than any time during period in question," i.e., 1961 to 1968. MACV cites a "dramatic change in the security situation," and finds that the GVN controls three-fourths of the population. JCS suggests that the GVN will control 90 per cent of the population in 1969. The second group, OSD/CIA/State, on the other hand, is more cautious and pessimistic; their view is not inconsistent with another Tet offensive-like shock in the countryside, for example, wiping out the much-touted gains of the 1968 accelerated pacification program, or with more gradual erosion. Representing the latter view, OSD arrives at the following conclusions:

- (1) "The portions of the SVN rural population aligned with the VC and aligned with the GVN are apparently the same today as in 1962 (a discouraging year): 5,000,000 GVN aligned and nearly 3,000,000 VC aligned."
- (2) "At the present, it appears that at least 50 per cent of the total rural population is subject to significant VC presence and influence." today as in 1962 (a discouraging year) goes even further, "Our best estimate is that the VC have a significant effect on at least two-thirds of the rural population."

#### THE MAJOR ISSUES

After removing population control changes attributable to urban migration (which has brought more people under GVN control than pacification), the two views differ by the magnitude of up to about one-sixth of the South Vietnamese people, i.e., 2-3 million. The second group places the VC in a more contested category, yet to be secured

by the GVN, while the first group maintains that these 2-3 million people are already under GVN control.

The substance of the argument is evident on the next page. Using HES data for 1967-68, the chart [not reproduced] shows that the optimistic interpretation leaves only 26.7 per cent of SVN's population to be pacified as of November, 1968. The conservatives think 41.3 per cent of the population has yet to be pacified. More importantly, the second view shows little pacification progress over the period except for the gains of the accelerated pacification campaign (APC) program, and they dispute these gains. State, OSD, and CIA maintain that the October-December APC acquisition of 9.4 per cent of the population is an exaggerated claim because these gains were achieved by cutting minimal force levels to one-third of previously accepted levels. These agencies, therefore, argue that the APC gains have stood only because the NLF has not challenged them, and they believe it is "quite likely" the gains will be contested in the coming months.

If the APC gains are removed, the substance of the long-term debate emerges clearly. The chart then shows that according to the second view, pacification programs have registered no progress over 1967-68 and before. The first view records only slight progress over the 1966-68 period. It is further seen that the second view places the chart's pacification line much lower. For example, in August, 1968, the first group says 65.8 per cent of the population was under GVN control; the second group places only 49.9 per cent in the GVN category. The source of this difference is a dispute over the value of the HES composite indicator which is really an average of 18 indicators, few of which have anything to do with security. (There is a strong case for abolishing an over-

all composite indicator from HES and either utilizing the subindicators on a category basis, e.g., security, political, and economic development, or using the category data within a newly devised system. Despite all its shortcomings, HES has provided useful data and the small amount of analysis available is very helpful, although

large areas of analysis ground remain to be covered.)

The second group arrives at their estimate by allocating the contested population on the basis of security criteria alone. According to their view, in the fall of 1968 at least one-half of South Vietnam's population was subject to a significant NLF presence; for the first group, this figure was one-third.

By neither view can pacification be said to have progressed much in the last three years (at least, prior to the last few months). Nor does either view promise anything close to complete success within several years. If the 1967-1968 pacification rate (including the debated APC gains) is sustained, the first interpretation implies that it will take 8.3 years to pacify the 4.15 million contested and VC population of December, 1968; the second view implies pacification success in 13.4 years.

It is noteworthy that the gap in views that does exist is largely one between the policy makers, the analysts, and the intelligence community on the one hand, and the civilian and military operators on the other.

The policy implications of the disagreement could hardly be more divergent. One view sees a high probability of GVN success and generally applauds the GVN's performance. It finds that the GVN has been ineffective at times, but that it has not been negligent, and overall progress has been most satisfactory. The policy implications of this view are more of the same, gradual U.S. pressure and wholehearted U.S. support.

The other view leads to a radically different policy. The GVN has failed in the countryside. The rural population situation has not changed significantly and certainly not at a rate which will free us of noticeable burdens within 2 to 5 years. We may even be overextended in the rural areas and open to a damaging VC counterattack. The implied policy recommendations would call for voicing considerable displeasure at the GVN's rural performance; establishing realistic rural goals for the GVN; penalizing the GVN if these goals are not achieved, and devoting a greater effort to political accommodation on,

for example, a district or village basis.

#### LESSER ISSUES

In 1968, 15,776 members of the Vietcong infrastructure (VCI) were neutralized, 87.1 per cent of whom were low-level functionaries. Anti-VCI operations showed major improvements but did not seriously harm the VCI.

All agencies agreed that the Phoenix program was long overdue and potentially very valuable. The respondents agreed that it is too early for a thorough assessment of the Phoenix program, and they predict it is unlikely to cause the NLF major problems in 1969. Embassy, Saigon noted that Phoenix bears close watching with respect to the attitudes of rural population, attitudes toward the American sponsors and a potentially deleterious effect on the possibilities for a rural accommodation.

Every agency except MACV/JCS agrees that the available data on war damage to the civilian population is inadequate. Using limited data which showed that 7 per cent of the reporting hamlets were affected by friendly caused war damages, CIA concluded "the rural hamlets take a tremendous beating." The responses received suggest that this is a very serious problem in need of further U.S. government attention and analysis.

Recent GVN personnel changes were found by all agencies to have brought a significant upgrading in the average quality of GVN officials. Nonetheless, corruption, favoritism and neglect of the populace's problems were still seen as major GVN shortcomings. There was no conclusive evidence that the 1968 personnel changes harmed the GVN's relations with minority groups.

#### 5. THE POLITICAL SCENE (Questions 21-23)

This section on the political situation can be boiled down to three fundamental questions: (1) How strong is the GVN today? (2) What is being done to strengthen it for the coming political struggle with the NLF? (3) What are the prospects for continued noncommunist government in South Vietnam?

The essence of the replies from U.S. agencies is as follows: The GVN has been stronger than for many years but still

very weak in certain areas and among various elites. (2) Some steps are being taken but these are inadequate. (3) Impossible to predict but chancy at best.

Within these broad thrusts of the responses there are decided differences of emphasis among the agencies. Thus MACV/JCS and Saigon, while acknowledging the problems, accent more the increasing stability of the Thieu regime and the overall political system; the significance of the moves being made by the GVN to bolster its strength, and the possibility of continued noncommunist rule in South Vietnam given sufficient U.S. support. CIA and OSD on the other hand, while acknowledging certain progress, are decidedly more skeptical and pessimistic. They note recent political improvements and GVN measures but they tend to deflate their relative impact and highlight the remaining obstacles. State's position, while not so consistent or clear-cut, generally steers closer to the bearishness of OSD and CIA.

#### THE PRESENT SITUATION

We have a great quantity of information on Vietnamese politics but the quality is suspect. It varies greatly by elite and level and is usually sounder for broad groups than factions or individuals. In addition, we are dealing with a nascent constitutional system and public opinion is often manipulated.

Noncommunist elements rally in times of common danger from the communist threat, but otherwise generally engage in a perpetual struggle for power. Most elites may be willing to participate in the GVN but their motives are often more self-serving than nationalistic. In their view toward the military struggle, Northerners are most insistent on military victory, central Vietnamese the most war-weary, Southerners the most ambiguous. Firm support for GVN comes from most military elements, Catholics and the bureaucratic and merchant classes. The major problem for the GVN remains in the rural villages where the VC are strongest. Opposition also comes from uncertain Buddhist, youth, and other groups.



Various ethnic minorities, while often anti-communist, are not strongly tied to the GCN.

In reading the Vietnamese political scene, one must keep in mind that pragmatism, expediency, war weariness, a desire to remain unaligned and end up on the winning side are all common features. So are family loyalty, corruption, social immobility and clandestine activities.

OSD points out (and a recent Saigon cable corroborates this view) that there has been a noticeable shift recently by many noncommunists towards acceptance of the NFL in some capacity as part of an eventual political settlement. Most elites would want to minimize the communist influence in the government.

South Vietnamese attitudes toward the U.S. are varied and ambivalent. Our presence is seen as a necessary evil to forestall a communist takeover. Our involvement is viewed with a mixture of gratitude, shame and suspicion. In any event, recent events, especially the Paris talks, have made it clear to the Vietnamese that the U.S. commitment is not open-minded and that some withdrawals will probably come soon.

#### GVN Political Actions

All agencies agree that there has been substantial progress in broadening the government: all except OSD see significant movement against corruption; and all agree that political mobilization is both the (material missing) advancement based on merit, and there are many other political steps needed. In general, all these factors will be increasingly important as the U.S. reduces its military effort. Such a reduction might stimulate political progress but it will also entail risks. As noted earlier, there is some ambiguity as well as differences of view about the proper U.S. role in SVN politics. State and Saigon caution against undue U.S. involvement and pressure, while MACV/JCS place greater emphasis on the use of our leverage in effecting needed reforms.

No agency clearly forecasts a "victory" over the communists, and all acknowledge the manifold problems facing the NFL as we withdraw. However,

MACV/JCS stress the need for continued U.S. support. OSD and State believe that only a compromise settlement is possible and emphasize GVN self-reliance. CIA states that progress in SVN has been sufficiently slow and fragile that substantial U.S. disengagement in the next few years could jeopardize all recent gains.

JCS and OSD each list their essential conditions for cessation of hostilities. While they agree on certain elements, the JCS look toward continued U.S. support to assure the sovereignty of the GVN while OSD requires only that the South Vietnamese be free to choose their political future without external influence.

#### 6. U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS

##### (Questions 24-28)

The only major points of agreement with the U.S. government on these subjects are:

- The description of recent U.S. deployments and tactics.
- The difficulties of assessing the results of B-52 strikes, but their known effectiveness against known troop concentrations and in close support operations.
- The fact that the Soviets and Chinese supply almost all war material to Hanoi and have enabled the North Vietnamese to carry on despite all our operations.

Otherwise there are fundamental disagreements running throughout this section, including the following:

- OSD believes, and MACV/JCS deny, that there is a certain amount of "fat" in our current force levels that could be cut back without significant reduction in combat capability.
- MACV/JCS and, somewhat more cautiously, CIA ascribe much higher casualty estimates to our B-52 strikes.
- MACV/JCS assign very much greater effectiveness to our past and current Laos and North Vietnam bombing campaigns that do OSD and CIA.
- MACV/JCS believe that a vigorous bombing campaign could choke off enough supplies to Hanoi to make her stop fighting, while OSD and CIA see North Vietnam continuing to receive supplies.

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#### U.S. DEPLOYMENTS AND TACTICS

In early 1968, MACV moved the equivalent of two divisions from II and III Corps to northern I Corps. This deployment was a defensive reaction to the threat of a major NVA siege of Khe Sanh and the coastal lowlands. With the further enemy offensives in February and May, U.S. forces throughout the country (except for I Corps) were pulled back into screening positions around SVN's major cities and used to push the VC forces out. Since then, the two U.S. divisions redeployed to I Corps have been returned to III and IV Corps. MACV now gives top priority to the control of Saigon, the approaches to it in III and northern IV Corps, and the heavily populated upper Delta.

Until late 1968, allied (particularly U.S.) efforts were directed largely against enemy main forces through large (1,000 men or more) unit operations. With the recent withdrawal of NVA main force units from SVN, U.S. units have been able to operate in smaller units and with more emphasis on the enemy's infrastructure and support apparatus. Though no U.S. units are currently in direct support of pacification, the deployment of U.S. units in SVN's populated areas and the change in tactics has, MACV asserts, helped improve pacification progress.

#### U.S. FORCE REDUCTIONS

MACV/JCS and OSD agree that there is no way of reducing U.S. force levels in Vietnam without some reduction in combat capability. However, OSD argues that withdrawing some U.S. logistics headquarters, construction or tactical air personnel may not have any significant effect on U.S. combat capability or effectiveness. For instance, OSD concludes that because of the halt in bombing North Vietnam, the U.S. needs neither as many interdiction aircraft as we now have nor our full force of three Navy carriers off North Vietnam. OSD also believes certain tactical innovations might make some troop cutbacks possible. MACV/JCS feel that while some of the above changes might help to minimize loss of combat

capability, in general, significant reductions in our force levels will proportionately reduce our combat capability.

OSD also thinks that U.S. forces could be reduced as the RVNAF improves and expands. By their estimates, the ongoing RVNAF improvement plan might free up to about 15 U.S. battalions and their support units by mid-1969 without a decrease in total allied force capability. This projection assumes that RVNAF combat effectiveness increases along with their combat capability. In their responses, MACV/JCS do not consider this question.

#### B-52 EFFECTIVENESS

All agencies acknowledge that sound analysis of the effectiveness of B-52 strikes is currently impossible for several reasons. The consensus is that some strikes are very effective, some clearly wasted and a majority with indeterminate outcome.

There is agreement that B-52 strikes are very effective when directed against known enemy troop concentrations or in close support of tactical operations, and have served to disrupt VC/NVA operations.

There are sharp differences on casualty estimates. While the JCS estimate that about 41,000 enemy were killed in 1968 by the B-52s, OSD believes that perhaps as few as 9,000 were. The difference is that OSD, unlike MACV/JCS, find that B-52 strikes against suspected enemy infiltration routes or base camps (50 percent of 1968's sorties) are much less effective than close-support strikes. CIA cites a variety of casualty estimates and considers it impossible to select one, but believes it is apparent that B-52 strikes have become a significant factor in the attrition of enemy forces.

#### THE LAOS AND NORTH VIETNAM INTERDICTION CAMPAIGN

The MACV/JCS and State/CIA/OSD fundamentally disagree over whether our bombing campaign either prior to or after November has reduced the enemy's throughput of supplies so that the enemy in South Vietnam receives less than he needs there. The MACV/OSD think it has succeeded; State/CIA/OSD think it has not.

**POST-NOVEMBER CAMPAIGN**

Since early November, MACV has attempted to reduce the logistic capacity of the enemy by blocking the two key roads near the passes from NVN into Laos. MACV finds it has effectively blocked these roads 80 per cent of the time and therefore caused less traffic to get through. OSD/CIA/State agree that enemy traffic on the roads attacked has been disrupted. However, they point out that the enemy uses less than 15 per cent of the available road capacity, is constantly expanding that capacity through new roads and bypasses, and our air strikes do not block but only delay traffic.

Besides blocking the roads, our bombing destroys material in transit on them. JCS/MACV and OSD/CIA agree that we destroy 12 per cent to 14 per cent of the trucks observed moving through Laos and 20 per cent to 35 per cent of the total flow of supplies in Laos. To MACV/JCS, the material destroyed cannot be replaced so that our air effort denies it to the VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam. In complete disagreement, OSD and CIA find that the enemy needs in SVN (10 to 15 trucks of supplies per day) are so small and his supply of war material so large that the enemy can replace his losses easily, increase his traffic flows slightly, and get through as much supplies to SVN as he wants to in spite of the bombing.

#### PRE-NOVEMBER CAMPAIGN

Prior to November, 1968, we bombed in southern North Vietnam as well as Laos. The MACV/JCS find that this campaign reduced the flow of supplies into Laos greatly and that this flow increased greatly after the bombing halt. The OSD/CIA agree that traffic followed this pattern, but argue that it was caused by normal seasonal weather changes, not our bombing policy. Comparing 1967 traffic to 1968 traffic, they find that prior to the bombing halt, 1968's supply throughout was higher than 1967's and that, after the halt, it followed its normal seasonal patterns.

**PRE-NOVEMBER CAMPAIGN**

All agencies agree that Chinese and Soviet aid has provided almost all the war material used by Hanoi. However, OSD/CIA and MACV/JCS disagree over whether the flow of aid could be reduced enough to make a difference in South Vietnam. If all imports by sea were denied and land routes through Laos and Cambodia attacked vigorously, the MACV/JCS find that NVN could not obtain enough war supplies to continue. In total disagreement, OSD and CIA believe that the overland routes from China alone could provide NVN enough material to carry on, even with an unlimited bombing campaign.

*A guide to the abbreviations and terms in the text follows, in their order of appearance:*

DRV--Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).

NVA--North Vietnamese Army.

GVN--Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam).

VC--Vietcong.

RVNAF--Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (South Vietnamese forces).

SVN--South Vietnam.

MACV--Military Assistance Command Vietnam (U.S. headquarters).

RF and PF--Regional Forces and Popular Forces (South Vietnamese local defense militia).

NLF--National Liberation Front (The Vietcong political organization).

Hamlet rating C--Moderately secure.

Hea Hao--South Vietnamese religious sect.

Cao Dai--Another religious sect.

CINCPAC--Commander-in-Chief Pacific.

JCS--Joint Chiefs of Staff.

OSD--Office of the Secretary of Defense.

USG--U.S. government.

NIE--National Intelligence Estimate.

DIA--Defense Intelligence Agency.

KIA--Killed in action.

ARVN--Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnamese army).

DMZ--Demilitarized zone.

EA--East Asia (desk of State Department).

INR--Intelligence and Research (division of State Department).

HES--Hamlet Evaluation System (a computer program).

NVN--North Vietnam.



BY STEWART ALSOP

## THE RUSSIAN ROLE

WASHINGTON—This is one of those peculiar times when both President Nixon and his severest critics among the liberal Democrats share a mutual interest in downplaying or ignoring an obvious truth. The obvious truth is that the President's prospective hosts in Moscow not only made possible the massive North Vietnamese offensive against South Vietnam—they must have actively encouraged it.

If the offensive is successful—or seems to be successful—it will be a disaster for President Nixon. His domestic political strategy will be undermined, and his Vietnamization program in particular and his foreign policy in general will be a sad mess. Yet partly because next month's Moscow meeting is so important to him politically he has confined himself to a polite slap on the wrist for the Russians. Significantly, a directive from WSAG (Washington Special Action Group) to play up the Soviet role in the attack was reversed 180 degrees by the White House.

Yet there is no mystery about the Soviet role. To launch their all-out ground assault the North Vietnamese had to have a tank force well up in the hundreds; very long-range artillery to serve as a substitute for air power; and mobile anti-aircraft missiles to counter American air power. Ohligingly, the Russians have supplied all three, and in generous quantities.

### MISSILES

The supply has been especially generous since the President's trip to Peking—since the trip, for example, some 60 new SA-2 anti-aircraft missiles have arrived in North Vietnam. To button up all the details, a high-level Soviet military mission, headed by a marshal of the Soviet Union, visited Hanoi, leaving less than a week before the first North Vietnamese divisions crossed the DMZ.

Obviously, the Russians knew what was coming, and when, and obviously they approved it. If they had not, they would not have made it possible. There was never any likelihood the Russians would cut off logistic support for North Vietnam (as the dove-Democrats propose to do for South Vietnam). But the Russians were under no compulsion to supply the North Vietnamese with the sophisticated heavy equipment they had to have for their invasion of the south.

Some of their reasons for approving and encouraging the North Vietnamese

invasion are obvious, some not so obvious. Consider the pluses and minuses, from Moscow's point of view.

In the Administration, much is made of the "grave risks" that the Soviets will run if they "go too far" in support of the North Vietnamese. But are these risks all that grave?

If by mid-May the Communists are visibly winning, the President seems likely to call off his Moscow trip, however reluctantly. But are the Russians really all that desperate for a summit?

### FREEZE

They are now passing the word that the meeting was Mr. Nixon's idea, not theirs. No doubt they would like U.S. commercial credits, but, as they point out, they have lived without them for years, and can go on doing so. As for SALT, it is worth bearing in mind that it is the Russians, not us Americans, who are turning out intercontinental missiles and nuclear submarines like sausages—we haven't built a new ICBM or a new nuclear missile submarine since 1967. So who stands to gain most from a freeze on strategic weapons?

Much has been made of the risk that a cancellation of the Moscow meeting might cause the Germans to refuse to ratify Willy Brandt's treaty. But if the Communist side is clearly winning in Vietnam, the United States will indeed begin to look like a "pitiful, helpless giant." And the Germans seem quite likely in that case to snuggle up to a neighboring giant who is neither pitiful nor helpless.

There is, of course, the risk that the offensive will fail—but although the North Vietnamese would pay heavily for failure, the Russians would pay very little. It is a good bet that Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin cabled Moscow from Washington what all Washington knows. This is that Mr. Nixon is very unlikely to escalate the war in such a way as to risk involving Russia or China, because to do so would create dissension more violent than the Cambodian uproar, and threaten his re-election.

Thus from a Russian point of view, the risks involved in the Vietnamese assault are not very great. The prizes to be won if the assault succeeds are very great. For success would gravely weaken the world position of the United States, the Soviet Union's only real rival as a great power. It would serve also as a reminder to the world, notably including Russia's ideological rival, China,

of where Communism's real power lies.

With Hanoi deeply dependent on Soviet logistic support, success would make the Soviet Union the dominant power in Southeast Asia, as it already is on the Indian subcontinent. (It is significant that the same Marshal Batitsky who visited Hanoi just before the North Vietnamese crossed the DMZ visited New Delhi just before the Indian invasion of East Pakistan.) And there is perhaps still another and greater prize to be won, if the North Vietnamese defeat—or even seem to defeat—the South Vietnamese.

Nikita Khrushchev once boasted to John Kennedy that he had helped him beat Richard Nixon in 1960. There is little doubt that the Russians pushed the North Vietnamese into negotiations in the fall of 1968 primarily to help Hubert Humphrey against Richard Nixon. There is no good reason to believe that Richard Nixon has become their favorite candidate in 1972.

### POSITIONS

All the "viable" Democratic candidates are in basic agreement on the abandonment of South Vietnam, on heavy cutbacks in American defense spending and foreign aid, and on reductions in U.S. commitments in Europe and elsewhere in the world. These are not positions liable to displease Mr. Brezhnev, and a political disaster for Mr. Nixon would clearly cause him to shed no tears.

There is nothing very surprising about all this, of course, except to those who have persuaded themselves that the Russians are basically nice, friendly claps, and that the cold war was either a myth or an invention of us Americans. The Russians, in fact, are serious people, people who like to win, perfectly serious about promoting their own power, and the Communist cause—Russian-style—wherever the risk is not too great.

This suggests a reason why the liberal Democrats and their supporters in the media share a mutual interest with Mr. Nixon in downplaying the Soviet role in Vietnam. If the North Vietnamese offensive succeeds, they naturally want to blame Mr. Nixon—not the Russians—for the "abysmal failure" of Vietnamization. More basically, the notion that the Russians are nice friendly fellows and the cold war is a myth is the essential underpinning of the new lib-

24 APR 1972

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# Decline and Fall at Foggy Bottom

By ROBERT KEATLEY

WASHINGTON—The Japanese have demanded equal time and will get it: Henry Kissinger, at liberty between Mexico and Moscow, will soon spend three days in Tokyo explaining U.S. policies to business and political leaders there.

From Japan's viewpoint it seems only fitting. After all, the Chinese were awarded three visits by the senior White House adviser and the Russians will soon get their turn—so why not the Japanese too? Japan is dismayed by some American diplomatic tactics, and leaders want an explanation from someone who, in their eyes, really counts.

For Mr. Kissinger, it's an opportunity to do vital service. Japan remains the main U.S. friend in Asia, as the President repeatedly states, and so reassuring Tokyo is important work. Though the White House aide has limited respect for Japanese sophistication in foreign affairs, his usual erudition and intellectual brilliance may well calm Tokyo's assorted fears.

But back at the State Department the diplomats are increasingly dismayed. The coming Kissinger journey is just one more sign—in case another is needed—that foreign policy has become a White House preserve, and that influence of the department and Secretary of State Rogers is often marginal at best.

## Two Questions

Much has been written about this shift of authority from Foggy Bottom, as State's neighborhood is rather inelegantly called. So perhaps two questions should be raised: Who really cares? And what difference does it make?

Well, some people do care a great deal. Foremost, of course, are the foreign service officers themselves. About 3,000 strong, at home and abroad, they joined the diplomatic ranks under the illusion they would help steer the ship of state. Now they often find themselves shuffling papers for Henry Kissinger, deeply suspicious that the White House is burying them in busy work while it makes the decisions on its own. They have little sense of participation, and a spreading belief that their chosen profession has grown irrelevant.

Assorted internal bureaucratic problems add to their gloom. The service is top-heavy with rank just when its overall size is shrinking for policy and budgetary reasons; this means fewer promotions and fewer challenging jobs to go around. Moreover, the genial Mr. Rogers displays only intermittent interest in the bureaucracy he nominally leads. His loyalty is basically to Mr. Nixon. Many diplomats think he just doesn't care much about State's complex problems, and many subordinates complain that he doesn't work hard enough.

But outside these directly affected bureaucrats, there seem to be few worries. Sen. Fulbright and a few other legislators talk occasionally about putting affairs of state back in the State Department. And some Capitol Hill staffers—former foreign service officers among them—also wring their hands, while the State Department press corps frequently revives the issue.

say that the power transfer is not a matter of great public concern.

So what does it matter? Can critics prove that U.S. foreign policy is bad because State's experts offer neither device it nor execute it?

Doing so would be difficult. Even some of the most righteously indignant diplomats concede admiration for the main lines of Nixon foreign policy. He is pulling troops from Southeast Asia rather than sending more in. (The current air buildup is dismissed, too lightly perhaps, as a temporary aberration). Two decades of misguided China policy have been reversed, and to popular acclaim. More serious negotiations, about more things, are now under way with the Soviet Union than ever before. Meantime, relations with Western Europe—still the prime U.S. foreign policy concern—seem smoother than during the 1960s. Indeed, many argue that policy is now more innovative precisely because it has been wrested from a sluggish State Department.

This transfer wasn't a simple matter of a nimble Kissinger out-flanking a lethargic Rogers, as some would have it. Mr. Kissinger is a rather cunning bureaucrat in his own right, with proven ability to operate within the framework of President Nixon's work style and prejudices. But as the principals explain it, the power shifted basically because Mr. Nixon wanted it to.

He sees management of the federal bureaucracy as a key problem of any presidency. Bureaucracies, he thinks, spend too much time administering themselves and protecting their own interests and not enough in creating and administering innovative policies or in responding to the President's desires. Mr. Kissinger seems to share this view.

Mr. Kissinger, for example, believes the policy meetings he heads are leaner than those run by senior State Department officials. In his view, he is ruthless about who can attend; State lets in anybody with a marginal interest in the subject at hand. His meetings end with crisp decisions; State's ramble on to mushy compromises. When appropriate, he give Mr. Nixon a range of options to choose from; State too often serves up a bureaucratic consensus for the Chief Executive to ratify or reject in its entirety.

Close observers believe there were other, more personal, reasons that Mr. Nixon wanted foreign policy shifted to the White House.

They think the President has held a grudge against State ever since Alger Hiss days, when he attacked the department vigorously. Intensifying that grudge may be galling memories of the 1960s, when Mr. Nixon, a political loser, traveled widely. Sometimes he got off-hand treatment from U.S. embassy personnel who saw him as a has-been; he is not a man to forget such slights. The President may also still see himself as a poor California boy battling an entrenched Eastern establishment.

More generally, Mr. Nixon is said to consider the entire federal bureaucracy a Democratic enclave opposed to Republican rule, a result of the FDR days. "He also believes bureaucracy is too slow and too much to think in sweeping, global terms," says one

foreign service officer, who adds candidly: "He is often right about that."

## Long-Range Considerations

All these reasons may explain why State has suffered even if foreign policy has not, at least not so far. Yet there are some longer-range considerations that suggest the Nixon-Kissinger management could eventually do disservice to the national interest.

For one thing, many thoughtful officials believe policy revolves too much around the person of Mr. Kissinger—no man to allocate authority and acclaim to others. Despite heroic workdays, he just doesn't have time for everything, and important matters can slide while his attention is focused on the crisis of the day.

For example, South Asian policy may have gone sour partly because the White House worried mainly about strategic arms limitation talks and China, ignoring early warnings from State. By his own admission, the senior advisor has little interest in international economic problems; he has tended to slough them off. Even Mr. Kissinger's own staff grumbles about its inability to get his attention when some alleged crisis preoccupies him; the system funnels everything to him and has no other outlets.

Likewise, the Security Council system has grown complex partly because the Nixon-Kissinger team believes State incapable of initiative and action. Yet this alternate structure seems sure to stifle innovation; despite the administration's talks about seeking "options," the structure it relies most upon often chokes off backtalk and rival policies. For some, it seems an attempt to cure State's stodginess by guaranteeing that it will grow even more dull.

Diplomats wonder if encouraging such mediocrity is really what the White House wants. Unless some practices are changed, they see a foreign service stripped of its best men (many now seem to be seeking other work), leaving plodders charged with representing U.S. interests abroad. Some even say the quality of young people seeking jobs at State has dropped. This doesn't bode well for important international negotiations, nor for the vital flow of information needed for policymaking. Bad intelligence can only lead to bad policy, these diplomats contend.

Finally, State's denizens grumble because outsiders so clearly realize where power now lies. The Japanese, for example, weren't satisfied with the visit last March of Assistant Secretary Marshall Green, the top Asian hand at State. In requesting a higher-powered personage, they didn't ask for Mr. Rogers; they asked for Mr. Kissinger.

## Time and Trends

The problem is that the White House adviser hasn't time for all who demand his attention—even if he had the urge to see them. Meantime, the structure designed for such business calls, over at State, is under-used.

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STATINTL

**The Washington Merry-Go-Round****CIA Found Bombing Had Little Effect****By Jack Anderson**

A secret Vietnam study, which President Nixon ordered before he was sworn in, warned that the massive bombing of North Vietnam had failed to hamper the enemy effort.

As President-elect, he had sought hard answers about the war he had promised to end. His foreign policy czar, Henry Kissinger, fired off a series of questions to the key government agencies. The answers caused him to remark afterward: "We found out how ignorant we were."

Kissinger compiled the answers in a bulky National Security Study Memorandum, which became known inside the White House as NSSM-1. A bootleg copy found its way to Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska), who has been analyzing it for months. Significantly, he is the same senator who dared to spread the secret Pentagon Papers on the Senate record.

We have also obtained a copy of NSSM-1, which gives a devastating appraisal of

the ineffectiveness of ex-President Lyndon Johnson's bombing campaign.

Four years of bombing, reported the Central Intelligence Agency, "did not seriously affect the flow of men and supplies to Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam. Nor did it significantly erode North Vietnam's military defense capability or Hanoi's determination to persist in the war."

Agreeing, the State Department noted: "There is little reason to believe that new bombing will accomplish what previous bombings failed to do, unless it is conducted with much greater intensity and readiness to defy criticism or risk of escalation."

**B-52 Kill Rate**

Even the Defense Department acknowledged that "the bombing did not significantly raise the cost of the war" to North Vietnam.

The Pentagon estimated that "approximately 52,000 civilians were killed in NVN by U.S. air strikes." The Joint Chiefs and the Defense Secretariat disagreed, however, over how much

high explosives it took to kill an enemy.

The Joint Chiefs figured one giant B-52, which could drop 30 tons of high explosives, wiped out an average of 2.5 North Vietnamese on each mission. By this reckoning, it took 12 tons of high explosives to kill a single soldier or civilian.

But the statisticians in the Defense Secretary's office contended that a B-52, on the average, eliminated only 0.43 persons per sortie. If this estimate is correct, 45 tons of explosives were required to dispose of an enemy.

In addition to the casualties, the Pentagon noted: "The bombing undoubtedly had adverse effects on the people of NVN. Individual citizens suffered many hardships . . . Food was rationed and consumer goods were scarce; and air raid warnings disrupted the lives of the populace and forced many to leave their homes . . ."

Concurred the CIA: "There were some indications in late 1967 and in 1968 that morale was wavering, but not to a degree that in-

fluenced the regime's policies on the war. The regime was quite successful, however, in using the bombing threat as an instrument to mobilize people behind the Communist war effort.

**Bombing Failed**

All the secret estimates agreed that Russia and China were keeping North Vietnam in the war.

"Whereas the bombing destroyed capital stock, military facilities and current production in North Vietnam worth nearly \$500 million," noted the State Department.

"This high rate of foreign aid, coupled with the relatively low requirements of North Vietnam itself and of NVA/VC forces in the south, goes a long way toward explaining Hanoi's ability to withstand the bombing."

There was general agreement, too, that the bombing had not stopped the flow of outside aid to the battle grounds.

President Nixon, however, has largely ignored the lessons of NSSM-1.

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STATINTL

## On the Side of Restraint In Vietnam, an Aide Says

By WILLIAM BEECHER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 17—Well-placed Pentagon sources hinted today that Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird had been less than enthusiastic about bombing targets in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong before President Nixon's decision to do so over the weekend.

Asked if Mr. Laird had urged or supported such strikes, conducted over the weekend for the first time in four years, a Defense Department official answered obliquely: "He's been on the side of restraint on Vietnam since taking office."

The official then recalled that Mr. Laird had initially opposed ground attacks into Cambodia in the summer of 1970 and had consistently argued for larger troop withdrawals than have military commanders.

### Contingency Plans Noted

Two weeks ago, shortly after North Vietnamese tanks and troops moved through the demilitarized zone into South Vietnam, knowledgeable sources said, the Administration "dusted off" a wide range of contingency plans for consideration.

These included air strikes in the panhandle of North Vietnam and in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas. The mining of Haiphong harbor, the blockading of the North Vietnamese coast and assistance for South Vietnamese marines in staging brief commando raids on the North.

Officials said that on all decisions on targets recommendations for and against various courses may be raised anywhere along the chain of command from military commanders in Vietnam to Pacific Command headquarters in Honolulu, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense and State Departments and the White House itself.

### What Laird Advised

On the Hanoi-Haiphong option, Administration sources said, Mr. Laird advised the White House that the area contained petroleum stocks and truck and tank parks of great military significance. But he also noted that even if these were destroyed, little effect would be felt on the battlefield for weeks or even months.

Division was moving south from Hanoi toward the combat zone and recommend air strikes and naval gunfire to try to intercept it.

The recommendation would go to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, would discuss the matter with Mr. Laird.

At that point Mr. Laird might decide the matter was within the authority already given and approve a specific raid. Or he might decide to refer the matter to the Washington Social Action group, the crisis team presided over by Henry A. Kissinger, or if haste was called for, might discuss it on the phone with the President or Mr. Kissinger.

When diplomatic implications are involved, Secretary of State William P. Rogers, or one of his top aides would be contacted as well. The State and Defense Departments and the C.I.A. are all represented in the Special Action Group.

"But he realized there were more than strictly military considerations," a Defense official declared.

Government sources said that until Friday evening the decision had been not to strike the Hanoi and Haiphong areas. In fact, they said, B-52 bombers and fighter-bombers were scheduled to make a major raid just south of the 20th Parallel in the vicinity of Thanh Hoa and Baithuong.

But some time between Friday night and Saturday morning the President directed that the B-52's and certain other planes be diverted to the Hanoi-Haiphong area, the sources said. They also disclosed that a large number of other targets throughout the 200-mile-long panhandle of North Vietnam were struck at the same time. Roughly 200 aircraft were reported involved.

At a Pentagon news conference this morning, Jerry W. Friedheim, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, said the government knew of where American prisoners of war were imprisoned "and we have not targeted any areas near them."

Military sources said that this was an example of the many constraints placed on United States warplanes operating over the north.

They illustrated the process by which targets are chosen with the following hypothetical example:

Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, commander of American forces in South Vietnam, and his Deputy, Gen. John W. Vogt Jr., who commands the Seventh Air Force there, might report additional streams of troops and supplies moving into northern Quang Tri Province and ask permission for heavy strikes in the panhandle of North Vietnam.

The request would go to the Pacific Command headquarters, which would have access to strategic intelligence from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency and from state department reports from embassies all over the world. The command might note that the 325C



## THE WAR/COVER STORY

# Vietnamization: A Policy Under the Gun

**T**HE offensive began in the sky—with a shattering barrage of at least 12,000 rounds of rocket, mortar and artillery fire across the Demilitarized Zone, which divides North and South Viet Nam. Said Specialist Fourth Class Michael Hill, a U.S. adviser with ARVN units in the area: "It was like nothing we ever expected and nothing we ever saw." Then came the ground attack. Some 25,000 North Vietnamese troops, with Russian-built tanks and artillery, swept down through Quang Tri province, sending 50,000 refugees fleeing south and U.S. advisers scurrying to their helicopters. As his stunned military forces struggled to regroup, President Nguyen Van Thieu appeared on TV to deliver a grim ten-minute speech. "This is the final battle to decide the survival of the people," he said.

There may have been a touch of apocalyptic hyperbole in Thieu's words. Nonetheless, there was no doubt that the North Vietnamese had launched their largest offensive in South Viet Nam since Tet 1968. Hanoi clearly was seeking a decisive military victory that would both display the impotence of Thieu's regime and embarrass Richard Nixon politically. For Washington, and indeed for Saigon, it was the first real test of Vietnamization, a policy that the Administration had pursued—at a cost of 12,000 U.S. lives and three more years in a divisive and unpopular war—in order to buy time until the South Vietnamese could defend their own soil. To the Administration, however, the Communist attack was an opportunity as well as an uncertain challenge. The White House is convinced, as one official put it last week, that "if the Viet-

namese fight well, this will hasten the end of the war considerably." In short, Washington felt—perhaps too optimistically—the fighting could mean an end to the stalemate, both on the battleground and at the Paris talks.

**New Front.** The early drama focused on the north, where the Communist onslaught swirled around some names familiar to many American G.I.s: Camp Carroll, Camp Fuller, Camp Ann, Alpha Two, Alpha Four. It also added something startlingly new to the war: heavy Soviet weapons, including tanks (ranging from light PT-76s to heavy T-54s of World War II vintage), artillery (up to modern 130-mm. guns with a 19-mile range) and even SA-2 missiles. By week's end, as the northern fighting settled down to a wary probing of defenses around Quang Tri city and Hue, the offensive boiled up in other areas.


In the Central Highlands, known to the generals as Military Region II, North Vietnamese troops were maneuvering around Kontum, thought to be a prime Communist target. On the coast, sappers struck the big U.S. base at Cam Ranh Bay, killing 3 Americans and wounding 15. Far to the south in the Mekong Delta

(Military Region IV), there was a rash of shelling, and attacks hit airfields outside two provincial capitals. For the moment, however, the Communists had really opened only one new "front"; that was in Military Region III, the mid-country region that encompasses Saigon. That area was rapidly becoming the main worry of the U.S. and South Vietnamese commanders. At Loc Ninh, a rural district capital 75 miles north of Saigon near the Cambodian border, North Vietnamese troops routed the South Vietnamese defenders, organized "people's committees," and set up anti-aircraft positions. Other enemy troops were moving, in regimental strength, to areas west, north and south of Saigon, which was braced for its first rocket attacks in two years.

Despite the speed with which it spread, the fighting was still indeterminate. There had been no big set battles, certainly none with crack ARVN outfits like the 1st Division. "The ARVN hasn't stopped the [North Vietnamese] drive," said a U.S. officer in Saigon last week. "but the initial surge has ended. So far,

*continued*

PHOTOGRAPHS FOR TIME BY DAVID BURNETT



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this time, the peaks haven't been too high, and the valleys haven't been too low." The big peaks, evidently, were still to come.

Back in 1969, when Vietnamization was put into effect, the Nixon Administration had realized that the policy would eventually be put to a violent test. The time, it reckoned, would come after the U.S. had ceased to have a significant ground combat capability in Viet Nam, and before the November 1972 elections. More recently, U.S. intelligence had forecast that the Communist assault would come some time between February and April or May, when the monsoon rains begin the annual conversion of much of Indochina into a sea of mud.

**Like the Rhine.** For their part, the North Vietnamese were obviously poised for an unprecedented effort. In the words of a White House official, they had "a lot of chips in the pot." In the past, the North Vietnamese commander, General Vo Nguyen Giap, had always kept at least half of his 480,000-man army within North Viet Nam. Now 14 of his 15 divisions (or about 350,000 men) were deployed all across Indochina's battlefields; elements of ten divisions—including many units that had been operating in-country or on the borders for months or years—were committed to the adventure in South Viet Nam. Some 35,000 North Vietnamese troops were present in the provinces south of the DMZ in Military Region I; there were perhaps 25,000 in the Central Highlands, 16,000 in the hard-pressed provinces around Saigon, 6,000 in the Delta. Counting Viet Cong soldiers, the total Communist troop strength in South Viet Nam is well over 100,000 men—the highest total since the months before the convulsive Tet 1968 attacks. Against them stand 492,000 South Vietnamese regulars and about 513,000 militia troops. The U.S. forces remaining in South Viet Nam are not directly involved.

Despite the intelligence forecasts, the location and timing of the attack

caught the military men in Saigon and Washington off guard. When the first North Vietnamese troops appeared below the DMZ, Pentagon experts assumed that it was a feint. The main offensive, they believed, would come in the vulnerable Central Highlands. Not until the eve of Easter Sunday, four days after the beginning of the massive artillery barrage, was it clear that a major assault was under way.


By then, some 10,000 North Vietnamese regulars were driving straight through the DMZ into Quang Tri province to join another 20,000 troops already in the area. By Monday, said one awed CINCPAC officer, "it looked like the Rhine River campaign" of World War II. One column drove south along the beaches of the Tonkin Gulf, despite a heavy barrage laid down by U.S. destroyers offshore. Taking advantage of heavy rains and low clouds, which limited air strikes, other units rolled down French-built Highway 1 aboard Soviet-built tanks and trucks towing anti-aircraft or artillery pieces.

General Creighton Abrams, U.S. commander in South Vietnam, who had been spending the holiday in Bangkok

with his family, rushed back to Saigon. So did U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who had been in Katmandu with his wife Carol Laise, the U.S. Ambassador to Nepal.


In Washington, Nixon met with his military advisers: Admiral Thomas Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of State William Rogers, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and his recently named deputy Kenneth Rush. Meanwhile Henry Kissinger convened what would turn out to be the first of almost daily sessions of the WSAG (Washington Special Action Group), which consists of ranking officials of the State and Defense departments and the CIA, who form a sort of foreign policy crisis management team.

Administration spokesmen insisted that the President was "keeping his options open." In fact, the options were limited. Nixon ruled out any pause in troop withdrawals; he will announce the next phase sometime before May 1, when the U.S. troop level in Viet Nam dips below 69,000. The President also directed that the 6,000 U.S. combat troops currently stationed in Viet Nam should not be shifted from their defensive positions around U.S. installations



PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU

GENERAL VO NGUYEN GIAP



ARVN TROOPS NEAR QUANG TRI CITY DRAG BODY OF NORTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIER  
Looking for signs that the lines would bend but not break.

At a tough-talking Washington press conference, Laird branded Moscow as a "major contributor" to the war, and blasted the North Vietnamese for "marauding throughout Southeast

In a purely military sense, most U.S. strategists believe that Vietnamization will succeed. "It is inconceivable that the South can't hold out against the North Vietnamese," a senior Rand Corp. analyst observed last week. "They are just too good and well-equipped an army for that—unless the North Vietnamese are all Prussians and the South Vietnamese all Italians." He was deadpan and dry, but he was right. CIA-RDP80-01601R001300390001-8

Asia." Before the U.S. would return to the Paris negotiations, "the enemy would have to draw back across the DMZ." Privately, Administration officials were pleased that neither the Soviets nor the Chinese had reacted sharply to the bombing and the rhetoric; Moscow, like Washington, seemed unwilling to let the fighting get in the way of May's Nixon-Brezhnev summit.

**The Proof.** The White House saw another possible plus in Hanoi's switch from guerrilla tactics to conventional warfare. By coming out in the open with their heavy armor and artillery, the Communists have made themselves vulnerable to fearsome losses from air attacks. Said one senior U.S. military adviser: "They are going to be hurt badly." Conceivably—but that prophecy points to a crucial element in the war: the continued dependency of the South Vietnamese troops upon massive U.S. air support. Without it, ARVN might well have had to surrender even more territory than it did last week, which would have further reduced its credibility with the civilian populace that has counted upon it for defense.

But can ARVN lose? U.S. military experts are reasonably confident that unless overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, ARVN can handle North Vietnamese regulars. Nixon's criteria for success should not be beyond ARVN's reach. The President told a press conference last month that he was confident that "the South Vietnamese lines may bend, [but] not break. If this proves to be the case, it will be the final proof that Vietnamization has succeeded."

Last week, though, ARVN did not quite live up to Defense Secretary Laird's measure of success: winning 75% of its battles. In the very first hours

of the offensive, in fact, ARVN suffered only defeat. The big loser was the 3rd Division, whose troops abandoned 14 firebases below the DMZ in five days. The 3rd was a newly formed unit, raised largely by conscription, of local men, including a good many draft dodgers and delinquents. Considering the ferocity of the initial North Vietnamese barrage, retreat made sense. But it was not sensibly executed. Some units quit the field so quickly that they failed to spike their guns. Many 3rd Division soldiers joined the 50,000 refugees who fled south for sanctuary in Quang Tri and Hue.

At Camp Carroll, a former U.S. Marine outpost ten miles south of the DMZ, 3rd Division troopers mutinied. After three days of brutal shelling, their commander ordered a gradual retreat; they wanted to surrender. Luckily for the U.S. adviser, Lieut. Colonel William Camper, a passing helicopter heard his radio call: "They're running up a white flag! I'm leaving!" Camper was picked up, along with a couple of the soldiers who wanted to retreat too. But the unlucky base commander was reportedly tied up by the remaining mutineers and turned over to the NVA.

**Single Shot.** Inept as the 3rd Division appeared to be, it was a model of discipline by comparison with some of the Regional and Popular Force irregulars in the area, who were little better than gun-happy mobs. South of Quang Tri city, one such mob fired away with giddy abandon for two hours at Communists holding a bridge on Highway 1. When the Communists finally broke and ran, reported *TIME* Correspondent Rudolph Raueh, "the South Vietnamese ran off after them, hooting in jubilation—until the Communists turned to fire a few sobering rounds at their pursuers. The troops stopped, then fled back to the bridge, where they all crowded together and indulged in a flurry of mutual self-congratulations. There was a wounded prisoner lying on the ground, his face covered with dust and blood oozing from his mouth. Although a medic was present, the prisoner was given no attention. A private raised his M-16. 'Don't!' warned a Vietnamese-speaking journalist. 'Too many Americans.' The soldier put his gun down and the journalist moved off. A few minutes later there was a single shot; the prisoner had a hole between his eyes."

But when ARVN was good, it was very, very good. At Dong Ha, a town of rude wooden shacks and prosperous brick houses ten miles south of the DMZ on the banks of the Cua Viet River, one vital North Vietnamese objective was spiked by the tanks of the tough 20th Armored Squadron. As the Communist spearhead rolled south on Highway 1, the 34-ton M-48s of the 20th sped north. They met—and stopped—the Communist armor a scant 300 yards north of the Cua Viet bridge. The tankers and two companies of South Vietnamese marines held the bridge long enough for




**NORTH VIETNAMESE SAM MISSILE**  
Moscow gave generously.

viser. "Those outfits are heroes," said one American who observed the battle. "There hasn't been anyone in the Viet Nam War who fought better."

Hue, the ancient Vietnamese imperial capital, is presumed to be a prime target of the Communist invasion. So far, the North Vietnamese have been unable to slip past Bastogne and Birmingham, the ARVN 1st Division bases that guard the approaches to the city. Last week, Hue had a besieged look, nonetheless. No effort had been made to repair the walls and shrines that had been reduced to ruins four years earlier—the traditional period of mourning in Viet Nam—in the *Tet* offensive of 1968. At the university, faded signs on walls urged: SMASH THE ATTEMPT TO VIETNAMIZE THE WAR. The students were out in the streets, canvassing for contributions to relieve the plight of 50,000 refugees who swarmed into the city from the north.

**Few Clues.** "They came by bus, by put-putting Rototillers, aboard army trucks borrowed for an afternoon from ARVN," wrote *TIME*'s Raueh. "Those who had time to pack chose peculiar things to salvage: one family had a refrigerator in a wheelbarrow, nothing else. A lieutenant carried an enormous Sanyo sound system, still in its carton and minus the speakers, strapped to the back of his motorbike. Nearly everyone seems to have a pig. Pigs are strapped onto Honda seats, pigs are tied onto front bumpers, pigs hang in wire cages from tail gates and are slung from poles that peasants and their wives heft onto their shoulders. On the highway, a Jeep carrying six prosperous refugees had tried to pass a slower vehicle, strayed off the tarmac and hit a mine buried in the unpaved shoulder. The explosion blew the Jeep and its passengers clear across the road and into a field. No one even bothered to look at the bodies; like pedestrians avoiding a

**WEARY ARVN SOLDIER AT DONG HA**



hole dug by the blast and continued on toward safety."

What were the North Vietnamese really up to? There were few clues from the Communists; Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, the chief Viet Cong negotiator in Paris, spoke conventionally of overthrowing "the repressive regime of Saigon" and establishing a "government of national concord." All that intelligence officers know for sure is that Hanoi has planned a five-phase offensive for 1972. The first two phases, described in captured documents as terror in the countryside and attacks on militia outposts, began after the Tet holidays last February. Evidently, last week's offensive began Phase 3: an effort to pin down South Vietnamese forces where they are weakest, inflict casualties, and discredit Vietnamization. The final phases are attacks on major cities (quite possible) and a general uprising leading to the fall of the Thieu regime (farfetched).

In opening a multi-front offensive, as they seemed to be doing last week, the Communists could whiplash the ARVN command by reducing the pressure in one region, only to step it up suddenly in another. The idea would be to force reserve units to move and thus to weaken vital areas. Saigon last week was all but stripped of its reserves; even the presidential palace guard was sent north to the action.

At week's end, Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams were said to have told Washington that they believe the enemy drive will last for several months, until either victory is achieved or defeat is inevitable. Still most U.S. intelligence sources

seem to think that the offensive, however intense, will be of limited duration. Within a month or so, monsoon rains will make movement and resupply difficult in most of the country. But in Military Region I, where logistical support via the DMZ and Laos is relatively easy, the Communists could make trouble for a much longer time. President Thieu believes that the Communists may try to seize South Viet Nam's two northern provinces and use them as bargaining chips to force a negotiated settlement of the war.

**Shock Waves.** If Hué falls, the NVA might conceivably set up a "provisional government" of the long dormant National Liberation Front and the Viet Cong in the old capital. Washington believes that Hanoi will settle for a few "spectaculars"—perhaps the temporary occupation of a city or two—to embarrass Nixon and Thieu and perhaps force the U.S. to begin talking seriously about the Communist seven-point peace plan, which includes dumping the Thieu regime.

But what if ARVN and its air support hold fast and thwart the spectaculars? What if the Communists move back to their border sanctuaries without having inflicted a massive defeat? If that happens—and Washington is beginning to think optimistically of the prospect—North Viet Nam would have lost more than it did in Tet 1968. That furious onslaught created psychological shock waves in the U.S. and led to the beginning of American disengagement. From a military viewpoint, the post-Tet counterattack by U.S. and ARVN troops was a considerable success: it virtually shattered the Viet Cong infrastructure and pushed main-force NVA units beyond South Viet Nam's borders.

If ARVN comes out of the current offensive in good shape, Hanoi might be willing—or so Washington believes—to negotiate a settlement along the lines of Richard Nixon's eight-point peace proposal. With its provisions for an Indochina-wide cease-fire and return of all troops to their national boundaries, Nixon's eight points add up to something close to unacceptable surrender for Hanoi. Most likely, the Washington speculation goes, a way would be found to allow the North Vietnamese to save face, and thus not feel obliged to return to the battlefield later on.

That is a highly wishful scenario, and it would be extraordinary if the North should follow it. Washington traditionally has inclined toward optimism in its thinking about the war. In Saigon, however, the prevalent opinion is that the current offensive is not the decisive thrust, but is aimed mainly at punishing ARVN and pushing it back from the border sanctuaries that the Communists have carved out over the past two years in Laos and Cambodia. With the reconstruction of the sanctuary network completed, and with the war-weary regimes in Phnom-Penh and Vientiane all but on the ropes, the North Vietnamese are turning their attention to South Viet Nam again. The immediate goal is not to topple Thieu in 1972, but to begin to rebuild the weakened Viet Cong and otherwise prepare to act on the day when the Americans and their airpower are really gone.

Only then would Hanoi enter what it might consider, after 26 years of struggle, a "decisive" battle for Saigon. For as Ambassador Bunker frequently reminds dinner guests, the North Vietnamese have never given up hope of achieving a military victory.

## The Air War: To See Is to Destroy

For U.S. Air Force pilots in Viet Nam, it was one of the busiest weeks of the war, as TIME Correspondent David DeVoss discovered when he visited the big American airbase at Danang. His report:

THE flying weather was poor, air traffic heavy and hazardous, and there were rumors about the infiltration of SAM anti-aircraft missiles south of the DMZ. Nevertheless, U.S. Air Force Captain Donald E. Waddel, 26, was elated as he walked away from his F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber. "It was unbelievable," he said. "I've never seen anything like it—columns of tanks, columns of trucks, even men marching along the road."

Until the North Vietnamese launched their offensive across the DMZ, U.S. Air Force and Navy pilots in the war rarely saw their prey. Elusive guerrillas and cam-

ouflaged trucks on jungle trails seldom afforded high-flying supersonic pilots a visible target. Last week, whenever the cloud cover lifted, the flyers could sight the enemy on the ground. "You had the feeling," said Waddel, "that you were really doing something significant."

Last week's bad weather compelled the flyers to take even more risks than usual. Fighter-bombers had to slice below the overcast to "unload their ordnance" at heights of only 500 ft. or so. At that low altitude even a rifle bullet can bring down a jet if it strikes a vulnerable point.

The FACs—forward air controllers who spot targets from tiny two-engine Cessnas for the fighter-bombers—were also forced to fly dangerously lower. During one four-hour mission, FAC Captain Conrad Pekkola, 32, dodged 15 SAMs as he circled the area between Khe Sanh and the DMZ. "A lot of 23mm. and 37mm. anti-aircraft fire," he said, "was directed at the offensive began," said Pekkola. "Usually they aim at any break in the clouds because they know that's where we'll continue



eventually be." In the first six days of the offensive, the North Vietnamese shot down five U.S. aircraft and two South Vietnamese aircraft. One American-manned HH-53 helicopter crashed while on a rescue mission.

The stepped-up tempo of the air war was reflected last week in the frenzied activity on the ground. "We're working double shifts to keep the planes ready to roll," said Staff Sergeant John Macy, a crew chief at Danang.

When a flight of four Phantoms lands on the twin 10,000-ft. runways, the planes quickly taxi to rows of protective concrete revetments. Once a plane is safely parked, the pilot climbs out and is handed a cold can of Budweiser. While he sips the brew, a yellow forklift truck trundles up with armaments, and the ground crew hurriedly rearms the Phantom with an awesome array of weaponry—iron bombs, rockets and napalm canisters. Normally, the entire operation takes only 20 minutes. The beer never gets warm before the pilot climbs back into his Phantom to take off on another sortie.

## The Sea War: Barrages and Boredom

*During the first stages of the North Vietnamese offensive, gunfire from the U.S. destroyers that patrol the Tonkin Gulf succeeded in turning back 300 Communist troops from an attempted crossing of the Dong Ha River. Shortly before the Navy became engaged in the battle for Quang Tri province, TIME's Saigon Bureau Chief, Stanley Cloud, was a guest aboard one of those destroyers. There he was able to observe a vital but underreported U.S. contribution to the war:*

**T**HE U.S.S. *Buchanan*, a guided missile destroyer, rolls gently in the waters of the Tonkin Gulf, 5,000 yards offshore of the Demilitarized Zone. Overhead, a full moon slips in and out of wispy tangles of cloud. Crew members who are not needed to fire the guns or run the ship are down in the mess deck watching Jane Fonda in *Barbarella*.

One of the *Buchanan's* two automatic five-inch guns, with a maximum range of twelve miles, is trained to starboard. A voice rasps over the ship's loudspeaker: "Stand by. Mount 52. Two salvos." Five seconds later, the gun shreds the night. A pale orange flame shoots from the muzzle, and a 70-lb. shell whistles through the air en route to a target more than three miles inland from the Vietnamese coastline.

In the pilot house, the officer of the deck watches the flight of the projectile on radar. Then a second round is fired. "Bore's clear," comes the voice on the loudspeaker. "Next target is Number 17." So it goes until 5:30 the next morning, when 200 rounds of the *Buchanan's* "H and I" (harassment and interdiction) fire will have been spent on 25 targets inside the DMZ. Another night in the U.S. Navy's long war off the coast of Viet Nam has ended.

U.S. Navy destroyers first began patrolling the Tonkin Gulf in 1961, and providing gunfire support for troops on the ground in 1965. Largely because the small North Viet-

namese Navy has steered clear of combat, the naval war has been consistently overshadowed by American fighting on the ground and in the air. The major exception occurred in August 1964, when two American destroyers, the *Maddox* and the *Turner Joy*, reported that they had been attacked in the gulf by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. The incident, whose authenticity is still in doubt, led directly to passage by Congress of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which Lyndon Johnson used as authority for massive U.S. intervention in the Viet Nam War.

Last week, for the first time in two years, the ships that have been daily pounding the coast drew return fire from shore-based Communist artillery. One round hit the U.S.S. *Lloyd Thomas*, inflicting minor damage and injuring three crewmen.

Normally, though, war aboard the *Buchanan* and other destroyers is an impersonal war. The chief ingredients are radarscopes, computers, control panels, microswitches and radios—plus movies in wide-screen color. The only time the ammunition is touched by human hands is when it is loaded into the automatic hoist. Deep in the bowels of the ship, Fire Controlman Second Class Jim Fagan of Miami holds the portable trigger in his hand, nonchalantly squeezing the lever when he gets the signal over his headphones. "I don't feel like I'm part of this war," says one sailor. "I never see what we're shooting at, or whether it does any good."


In the style of Admiral Zumwalt's "New Navy," officers and enlisted men alike sport beards, waxed mustaches and hair long enough to have put them on report three years ago. The chief disciplinary problems are drug abuse and racial tension, though in scope they barely match similar problems suffered in the Army. Boredom is pervasive. As one *Buchanan* sailor puts it: "I sometimes go topside and stand at the rail, watching the moon on the water. I just stand there for hours like some damn U.S.O. ad."

It bothers many of the sailors that they are fighting a passive, unseen enemy. "We've been shooting at the same place for seven years," says one radarman. "By now, the Viet Cong must have the area roped off and posted with signs that say, 'Keep out, the ship is firing.'" Still, unlike the ground units in South Viet Nam, the Navy is not setting an immediate course for home. "When they talk about the U.S. withdrawing from Viet Nam," says a chief petty officer, "they don't count the Navy, because we're not in the country. I figure we'll be staying around a while."

### BUCHANAN FIRES AT TARGETS NEAR DMZ

DAVID J. RYAN

IN GUNFIRE CONTROL ROOM ON U.S.S. BUCHANAN



SAN DIEGO, CAL.  
UNION

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APR 1 5 1972

# White House Crisis Unit Studies War

By JAMES CARY  
Copy News Service

WASHINGTON — Hanoi's invasion of South Vietnam with massed infantry, tanks and heavy artillery set off a rapid-fire series of meetings here for one of the least known but most important crisis management teams in the government.

Called the Washington Special Actions Group (WASAG), it has met regularly at the White House since the North Vietnamese struck across the Demilitarized Zone April 2.

Members always include representatives of the State and Defense departments, the Central Intelligence Agency and the White House. Other departments are added if the subject matter requires it.

Ronald Ziegler, White House press secretary, has provided no information from the sessions other than to announce they had been held, name the participants, and say they were assessing and coordinating information from Vietnam.

## NO CRISIS

He also attempted to downplay suggestions that decisions had been or would soon be made to counter the invasion, that WASAG would play a role in determining what those decisions would be and to maintain that there was no crisis atmosphere at the White House.

Previous administration descriptions of the duties of the special action group, however, suggest that major decisions were being pondered and that action would follow.

President Nixon's first foreign policy report in 1970 stated in part:

"Some events in the world over which we have little control may produce crises that we cannot prevent. But we can be the masters of events when crises occur, to the extent that we are able to prepare ourselves in advance.

## SPECIAL PANEL

"For this purpose we created within the National Security Council a special senior panel known as the Washington Special Actions Group. This group drafts contingency plans for possible crises, integrating the political and military requirements of crisis action."

In 1971, the White House decided WASAG's functions were so important it raised the membership from the assistant secretary level to the under-secretary level.

It was also disclosed:

"In 1970 the WASAG had to deal with Cambodia, the Middle East and Jordan. In each case, it laid the groundwork for reasoned decisions to prevent crises from expanding and threatening our interests and the peace."

Cambodia, the Middle East and Jordan were the major crises of that year.

## THIRD REPORT

Again early this year, in Mr. Nixon's third annual foreign policy report, he said:

"The Washington Special Actions Group is charged with meeting the special need for coordination in crisis situations. . . WASAG serves as a management team assuring flexible and timely actions by the responsible departments. It is also responsible for . . . developing options for NSC (National Security Council) considerations."

Adding impact to the importance of the WASAG sessions launched in the wake of the North Vietnamese offensive was the fact that Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, attended on Monday, April 3, the day after the attacks began.

Also participating were Deputy Secretary of Defense Kenneth Rush, Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms, Undersecretary of State John Irwin, and Deputy Asst. Secretary of State William Sullivan.

## POSSIBLY ATTENDED

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird was in the White House at the same time to confer with the President on Vietnam and may have participated in the session, but this was never announced.

Dr. Henry Kissinger, Mr. Nixon's national security adviser, chairs all WASAG sessions.

The official descriptions of WASAG activities indicate they extend considerably beyond making contingency plans to meet anticipated crises of the future.

The group also has been involved, from time to time, in pulling together and examining information on a breaking crisis in order to provide options, if needed, from which decisions can be made.

14 APR 1972

STATINTL

# Key U.S. Aides Head for Vietnam

Maj. Gen. Alexander N. Haig is going to Vietnam to assess the war situation for President Nixon.

Haig, deputy presidential assistant for national security affairs, two members of the National Security Council staff and one representative each from the State and Defense departments will spend about a week in Vietnam.

Haig, who last visited Vietnam in September, will consult with Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, U.S. commander in Vietnam.

White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler made a special effort to tell newsmen yesterday that the purpose of Haig's trip is not to help Nixon decide whether U.S. ground troops should be recommitted to the war.

## Withdrawals Continue

Ziegler said Nixon is considering neither recommitment nor slowing the pace of U.S. withdrawals because of the Communist offensive.

Critics of the administration's Vietnam policies, meanwhile, were increasing their attacks against the current buildup.

On Capitol Hill, 62 members of Congress sent Nixon a letter asking that he inform them and the public "as soon as possible of the size, purpose and anticipated costs of the U.S. military actions now contemplated in and over Indochina."

"If news reports are accurate," the letter said, "our country is now assembling in Southeast Asia one of the largest air armadas in military history. The use of such a force would certainly add not only to the destruction our bombing has already brought to the people and land of Indochina, but also to the number of American casualties and prisoners of war."

The signers included 58 Democrats and four Republicans, of whom there were 17 senators and 45 House members. The senators included

Edmund S. Muskie and Hubert H. Humphrey, candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination.

Eleven senators reserved three hours of time for Wednesday to open the first full floor debate on the war since the Red offensive began.

Eight critics and three defenders of Nixon's policies were set for a general discussion of recent events. Six other senators, three on each side of the issue, were said to be considering joining in.



-AP

MAJ. GEN. HAIG

Sen. Alan Cranston, D-Calif., said in a statement that he has invited all 100 senators by letter to join the debate on the Senate floor. He said it will be open to all senators wishing to reserve time.

On the campaign trail, Humphrey, Muskie, George S. McGovern and Rep. Shirley Chisholm all hit out at the Nixon war policies.

## Humphrey Hits Involvement

Humphrey, for example, said "The United States is very much deeply involved again" in the fighting. "It is my judgment we should proceed to end, this conflict and withdraw our forces," he said.

Mrs. Chisholm said that Nixon should "just for once . . . listen to the American people."

Nixon has dispatched additional air and naval forces to Indochina, including aircraft carriers, destroyers, fighter-bombers and B52 bombers.

The pentagon has revealed few details of the buildup. But four aircraft carriers on duty in Indochina have 17,000 men on board, and the B52 force is being built up from about 50 at the start of the North Vietnamese offensive to about 130 — a record number to be assigned to the war zone.

At the same time, the administration has reported a continued drop in U. S. ground force stationed in South Vietnam, and officials have said plans to cut the troop level in South Vietnam to 69,000 by May 1 will go ahead as scheduled.

Naval forces based off the Vietnam coast and air forces based in Thailand and Guam used in the fighting are not included in the strength figure.

STATINTL

## U.S. Cautiously Optimistic But Sends Further B-52's

By TERENCE SMITH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 11—The Nixon Administration provided a cautiously upbeat assessment of the fighting in Vietnam today, but Pentagon sources disclosed that two more squadrons of B-52 bombers had been given orders to leave for Indochina shortly.

The additional planes, some 30 in all, will increase the fleet of the giant jets in the combat zone to approximately 130, the largest ever assembled during the war.

At the same time, White House sources reported that Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security, had decided to postpone his scheduled trip to Japan until early May, to keep a close watch on the situation in Vietnam.

Mr. Kissinger had been scheduled to leave this weekend for three days of talks with Japanese leaders. The sources said that he still planned to accompany President Nixon to Canada on Thursday for two days of conversations in Ottawa.

White House sources said that Mr. Kissinger believed that he should continue on the job in his capacity as chairman of the Washington Special Action Group, the Administration's high-level review panel, which has been monitoring the enemy offensive and recommending options to the President.

As a gesture of courtesy to the Japanese, who have been offended in the past by abrupt changes in plans and policy, the White House specifically decided that Tokyo should announce the postponement of the Kissinger visit.

### Praise for South Vietnamese

With Mr. Kissinger at its head, the Washington Special Action Group met this morning for the sixth time to assess the battlefield situation and to map strategy.

Shortly afterward, the Administration's spokesmen at the State and Defense Departments offered their first tentative appraisals of the South Vietnamese

performance. Stressing that Saigon still faces "several more weeks of major engagements" with the North Vietnamese, Jerry W. Friedheim, the Pentagon spokesman, said at a briefing that the South Vietnamese Army had performed "very well" in the latest fighting.

The State Department spokesman, Robert J. McCloskey, asserted today that the South Vietnamese had seized the initiative in the last 48 hours and that "the majority of the attacks" had been begun by Saigon's forces.

Both he and Mr. Friedheim were careful, however, to stress the tentative nature of their remarks and to emphasize that it was too early to reach any conclusion about the outcome of the offensive.

A less guarded — and more optimistic — appraisal of the situation was reportedly offered on Capitol Hill by Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in testimony before a closed session of the House Armed Services Committee.

A participant in the session said that Admiral Moorer had told the committee that the South Vietnamese were holding on in all three major fronts in the fighting. The Admiral reportedly said that the situation would improve further when clear weather permitted the full use of the augmented force of American aircraft and warships.

Representative Samuel S. Stratton, Democrat of New York, who attended the briefing, said he came away with the impression that "the attack has been contained and that the South Vietnamese have handled themselves well."

Admiral Moorer reportedly stressed the effectiveness of the strengthened American air power in turning back the North Vietnamese attacks.

A few hours after his remarks, Pentagon sources said that the latest deployment of B-52's would increase the strategic bombing force in Indochina nearly 30 per cent, to a highest previous reported total

of B-52's deployed in the combat zone was 103, in July, 1969.

The sources said this was the major deployment of the giant third, and probably the last, bombers to be ordered to counter the enemy offensive. Thirty of the planes were dispatched late in February in anticipation of the fighting and 20 were ordered to air bases in Guam and Thailand last week.

While Administration officials have clearly have been reassured by the South Vietnamese military performance in the last few days, they are still apprehensive about the fighting that lies ahead.

Heavy enemy attacks are still expected, for example, in the Central Highlands around the cities of Kontum and Pleiku and in the area of the Dakto airfield. About 30,000 North

Vietnamese troops are thought to have infiltrated into the vicinity from base camps in Laos and Cambodia.

"The South Vietnamese look as though they are in control of the situation at the moment," one State Department official observed today, "But no one is making any predictions. We are still waiting for the other shoe to drop."

### Carrier Leaves Florida

WASHINGTON, April 11 (AP) —The aircraft carrier Saratoga and two squadrons of Navy attack jets left Jacksonville, Fla. today, apparently to join the United States air and sea build-up in Indochina.

In Jacksonville, ships and aircraft were under a blanket of official secrecy. But sources indicated that the Saratoga, which is normally assigned to six-month tours of the Mediterranean, was heading for her first combat engagement since her commissioning in 1956.

After the Saratoga headed out into the Atlantic, Naval Air Station. They presumably landed on the carrier at sea.

The Saratoga was expected to pick up other fighter squadrons on the way to make a full battle complement of 70 aircraft. Sources said that the destroyer USS *Searsfield*, was to leave Jackson the following day

join the Saratoga and that another destroyer might follow. The carrier Midway, six destroyers and a guided-missile cruiser left Pacific ports today for reported assignments with the Seventh Fleet off Vietnam.

9 APR 1972

## The Challenge:

# A Crucial Test for The Nixon Policy

WASHINGTON — In the basement of the White House there is an area full of reassuringly modern communications equipment that is known to its inhabitants as the Situation Room. In the middle of the complex there is a small conference room insulated from the surrounding commotion by paneled walls. It was to this room that Henry A. Kissinger summoned President Nixon's senior advisers last week, and their mood was as sober and serious as the news clattering over the teleprinters outside.

The North Vietnamese had moved across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) to launch massive, coordinated attacks on South Vietnamese strongholds, thereby putting the Vietnam war precisely where Mr. Nixon did not want it—back on page one—and raising an ominous challenge to the President's election-year hopes.

By the end of the week the South Vietnamese seemed to have stiffened their resistance. Nonetheless, there was little question that the enemy attacks had severely shaken the Administration, confronted Mr. Nixon's military advisers with hard choices and caused his political strategists to question his three-year effort to engineer an American withdrawal from Vietnam by Election Day without simultaneously sacrificing Vietnam to the enemy.

Most analysts here saw the offensive as an all-out effort to discredit the Vietnamization program, shatter South Vietnamese morale, weaken Mr. Nixon's hold on public opinion at home and force him to offer more generous terms if and when the suspended peace negotiations resume in Paris.

Asked on Monday what the President would do to help South Vietnam in its moment of trial, White House spokesmen said Mr. Nixon was keeping his "options" open. But he did not seem to have many options left.

To withdraw completely from the conflict at this critical moment would be to concede the failure of Vietnam-

ization. It would seem to many to be an abandonment not only of Mr. Nixon's pledge to find an "honorable" solution in Vietnam but his own oft-stated concerns about the "credibility" of America's pledges overseas.

The President's withdrawal program has reduced American forces in South Vietnam to 95,000 men—including only 6,000 or so ground combat troops—and indications have been that the number would drop to 35,000 by Election Day. Reintroduction of ground troops at this point would have enormous political impact. It would amount to a public vote of no confidence in the South Vietnamese and an invitation to a renewal of sharp domestic dissension over Vietnam.

The President spent most of Monday on the phone—with Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with Melvin Laird, his Secretary of Defense, and with William P. Rogers, his Secretary of State—receiving estimates of the fighting and debating the alternatives. In the end he won support for his own tentative decision that if the fighting worsened the United States should seek to stem the enemy offensive by the only means available—air power.

The President assigned the task of devising detailed options to the Washington Special Action Group, a team of planners headed by Mr. Kissinger and including representatives of the State and Defense Departments, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that meets at moments of emergency. The group met daily in the Situation Room until Mr. Nixon left for Florida late Thursday.

And to his press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler, Mr. Nixon entrusted the propaganda war, instructing him to devise some way of portraying concern and preparing the public for retaliatory action without conveying or creating a sense of panic and failure in the White House itself.

The solution, devised in morning huddles among Mr. Ziegler and his counterparts at Defense and State, Dan Henkin and Robert McCloskey, was to impose on State and Defense the burden of enunciating Government policy and articulating official fears and hopes without directly committing the authority of the President to any particular argument or line of reasoning.

It was Mr. McCloskey, for example, who first pointedly called attention to the enemy's reliance on Soviet-supplied equipment—not the White House, whose occupant still wishes to go to Moscow and has no interest in engaging in personal name-calling with the Soviets. And when the first massive retaliatory raids began Thursday, Mr. Nixon—who of course had

ordered them to begin—was well away from the scene making a speech and shaking hands in Philadelphia.

As devised by the Special Action Group in conjunction with the United States commanders in Vietnam, the massive air strikes Thursday and Friday went well beyond the concept of "protective reaction" used by the Administration to justify earlier retaliatory raids.

Mr. Laird, speaking for the Administration while the President rested and conferred with Mr. Kissinger in Key Biscayne, said the bombing would continue until Hanoi withdrew its tanks and troops. Admiral Moorer said the planes were bombing targets up to 40 to 50 miles north of the DMZ. Other sources said the "upper limit" would probably be the 20th Parallel, about 200 miles above the DMZ and about 70 miles south of Hanoi.

In domestic political terms, the present round of fighting may yet prove to be acceptable. Much depends on how long it lasts. If the South Vietnamese show themselves capable of mastering what is clearly their sternest test in a year, it would strengthen the credibility of Mr. Nixon's withdrawal strategy.

But if the South Vietnamese fail to stem the tide, even with American air power to help them, or if the attack proves to be only one of a series of intermittent enemy offensives, each requiring new doses of American help, it may occur to the American public that the war, after all, is not going to disappear.

If this idea were to take root, Mr. Nixon's speeches about a "generation of peace" might begin to sound hollow. And his inability to shed an old commitment could make him yet another political casualty of the Vietnam war.

—ROBERT B. SEMPLE



# U.S. rushes 20 more B-52's to war

By CHARLES W. CORDDRY  
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The United States has rushed an additional force of about 20 B-52 bombers across the Pacific to bolster units already there in preparation for the heavy blows in retaliation for North Vietnam's attack into South Vietnam across the demarcation zone between the two countries.

This was disclosed by authoritative sources yesterday as one of the major immediate actions taken by the administration, which continued to say officially that it is keeping "all options open" to deal with what is shaping up as a large set-piece battle in South Vietnam's northern province.

## Defensive line..

The South Vietnamese appear, informants said, to have fallen back to a defensive line ranging along the Dong Ha River and then southward before Quang Tri city and Hue. These informants expected the enemy's next moves to become apparent in the next day or so.

Jerry W. Friedheim, a Defense Department spokesman,

said the enemy has put more than 30,000 troops from elements of three divisions and three separate regiments into the battle—entering South Vietnam from both the buffer zone and the Laotian border area.

He said the "invasion in force" is continuing across "what used to be the Demilitarized Zone."

At the State Department, Robert J. McCloskey, the official spokesman, sought to focus a spotlight on the Soviet Union's contribution to the offensive.

The Communist forces "are supported in a very large way by heavy military equipment" from Russia, he said. This referred to the tanks, artillery and antiaircraft missiles (some of the last-named reportedly now in the buffer zone) which Russia has supplied for years and, according to Mr. McCloskey, has lately increased.

Soviet and North Vietnamese news media have reported the visit to Hanoi—just before the offensive started—of a Russian military delegation headed by Marshal Pavel Fedorovich Ba-

bitsky, described as a Communist party Central Committee member and head of Soviet air defense forces.

While he raised the issue of Soviet backing of the new offensive, Mr. McCloskey said there was no reconsideration in any way of President Nixon's visit to Moscow, scheduled to start May 22.

The Washington Special Action Group—a sub-Cabinet level committee which prepares analyses and proposals for presidential action—met again yesterday on the Vietnam situation, but no official word emerged on specific actions to be taken.

The options realistically open to Washington are air strikes in support of the South Vietnamese in the battle area and against North Vietnamese targets, along with naval gunfire performing the same functions. Both are under way, but are expected to be escalated sharply with clearing weather.

With the B-52 reinforcements sent to the war zone from U.S. bases, American commanders now have about the same number of the bombers as they had at peak strength in 1968, when there were 102 based in Thailand and Guam.

In mid-February, two squadrons, 30 planes in all, were sent to Guam to bolster the air power than being brought to bear on an expected enemy offensive in the Central Highlands and the northern provinces. There were 50 at U Tapao Air Base in Thailand.

Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), the majority leader, raised his voice here yesterday against the use of either air power or American ground troops against the enemy offensive.

"It's time for vietnamization (turning the war over to the South Vietnamese) to fish or cut bait, to produce or else," Mr. Mansfield said. "My point is, and has been for years, we ought to get out lock, stock and barrel." He was asked the political implications for Mr. Nixon of the present attack and shot back: "I'm not interested in political implications."

But Senator Barry M. Goldwater (R., Ariz.) urged the President to end the "Dilly-dally bombing of North Vietnam" and cut loose a major campaign against enemy supply lines and marshalling yards. That would include Haiphong harbor, if necessary.

Mr. Nixon faces a "major decision" on how far to extend the bombing now. Mr. Goldwater said in the Senate. He had a "hunch" a large campaign was under consideration. He said he had no inside information, however.

The tenor of official indications thus far has been that air power will be used, at least initially, to try to influence the battle in northern South Vietnam and against the supply lines and facilities across the buffer zone that are supporting the offensive. The administration has left Hanoi to wonder what more may come.

# New look at Hanoi aims

## Washington seeks to gauge extent, duration of new assault

By Courtney R. Sheldon  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Washington may soon know if it has critically underestimated the military strength and political punch of the North Vietnamese.

If it has, a shift in President Nixon's three-year-old Vietnam war strategy could well follow.

Administration officials have consistently predicted harassing attacks by the Communists in 1972, but not debilitating or even seriously embarrassing ones.

Administration spokesmen indicate a belief that the North Vietnamese "invaders" are apparently intending to hold onto the land they have seized.

The North Vietnamese force, according to the Pentagon, is comprised of conventional ingredients such as "tanks, heavy artillery, antiaircraft fire, engineers, and fresh supplies."

### Bombing jab discounted?

At the White House, the Washington Special Action Group was summoned for the second day in a row to advise the President. The administration continues to discount the possibility that U.S. ground forces will be used, but White House officials will not say so publicly and explicitly.

Instead, the official position is that "all options" are open to the United States. One extreme one that could be under consideration is bombing of North Vietnam as far north as Hanoi. However, such action has generally been felt as unnecessary and likely to jeopardize the U.S. goals at the Moscow summit meeting in May.

The panic button has not been pushed at the White House. But there is admitted uncertainty and concern that North Vietnam will, at the very least, hold on to much of the territory it now has overrun south of the demilitarized zone.

Massive U.S. air support for reinforced South Vietnamese can prevent a rout of Saigon's forces, administration officials maintain. Whether U.S. air power can lead the South Vietnamese soldiers and refugees back into lost territory is a larger question.

### Too busy for theorizing

If this cannot be accomplished, would the U.S. public and Congress be able to resist the North Vietnamese ability to add to their real estate after eight years of decimating war?

Administration officials are too busy trying to bail out of the present military situation in northern South Vietnam to engage in such theoretical speculation.

They may soon be faced with further frontal attacks by the North Vietnamese in the central highlands, and farther south.

Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser for national security affairs, said as recently as Feb. 9 that North Vietnam "appears to be concentrating, especially in the area of the central highlands, but perhaps also for high-point activities, as far south as the delta."

A year ago, after North Vietnam's incursions into Laos, the White House accepted intelligence estimates that the North Vietnamese were no longer in a position to interfere with the Vietnamization program—the strengthening of the South Vietnamese to go it alone eventually.

At that time, it is understood, the White House was advised that Hanoi had been shaken to the core.

It was felt that the North Vietnamese could mount momentary spectaculars, but could not continue a protracted war if they did.

Administration officials warn against jumping to conclusions while the battle situation remains so murky in South Vietnam.

Until the North Vietnamese came swarming across the border last weekend, the Vietnam issue in domestic politics was subdued. California Congressman Paul N. McCloskey Jr. (R) had abandoned a futile race against Mr. Nixon in the GOP primaries.

The continued insistence by administration officials that withdrawals from Vietnam will continue on schedule has given war critics less room for new criticism. But this may not hold for long.

While the North Vietnam offensive was in its fourth day, Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield opposed "countering the North Vietnamese attack with huge bombing attacks which will only mean more planes shot down and more Americans falling into Communist captivity." He added that "we must get out, look, stock, and barrel."

### McGovern: 'two choices'

Sen. George McGovern's first reaction to the new Hanoi initiative was that he had "predicted two years ago that if we continued on Mr. Nixon's Vietnamization course, which is an effort to sustain General Thieu in power with reduced levels of American forces in Vietnam, at a certain point the other side would launch an attack and try to force us out, especially at a time when we're bombing them very heavily."

STATINTL

# NIXON DISPATCHING ADDITIONAL B-52'S

## 10 to 20 Craft Are Ordered to Reinforce Air Armada to Counter Enemy Offensive

By TERENCE SMITH  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 4—The United States tonight ordered the deployment of 10 to 20 more B-52 bombers to Indochina to strengthen the American ability to respond to the new North Vietnamese offensive.

The new planes will bolster the existing fleet of strategic fortresses by up to 25 per cent. Eighty more of the giant bombers already are stationed at airfields in Thailand and Guam.

The Pentagon spokesman, Jerry W. Friedheim, declined comment on the B-52 deployment, except to observe that President Nixon had expressed his readiness "to take whatever steps are necessary to protect the remaining United States forces in South Vietnam."

Meanwhile, the State Department asserted that what it said was North Vietnam's extensive use of Soviet supplied tanks and heavy artillery in its five-day offensive had added "a new factor to the battlefield situation in South Vietnam."

The department spokesman, Robert J. McCloskey, said that Soviet equipment had permitted the North Vietnamese to wage "conventional warfare rather than their traditional guerrilla-style attacks."

Mr. McCloskey's stress on Soviet equipment appeared to be an effort to provide additional public justification in case of a decision to renew the bombing of North Vietnam.

He specifically said the United States was still holding open all its retaliatory options, including resumed air strikes deep into North Vietnam while it continued to review the military situation.

Privately, Administration officials said that while President Nixon might order heavy bombing of North Vietnam, he had not made a decision.

At the White House, the deputy press secretary, Gerald L. Warren, said that Mr. Nixon was keeping in close touch with the Vietnam fighting through his advisers.

For the second consecutive day, Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security, presided at a meeting of the Washington Special Action Group to discuss the retaliatory options available to the United States.

The group, which is composed of senior officials from the State and Defense Departments and the Central Intelligence Agency, meets during emergencies. The officials conferred for an hour and 15 minutes today and are expected to meet again tomorrow.

Meanwhile, the President was receiving conflicting advice from Congress on what the American response to the enemy attacks should be.

The Senate Democratic leader, Mike Mansfield of Montana, said that he opposed the use of American air power or combat troops.

"Bombing the north will not bring about a settlement," he said. "I mean, we would just lose more planes, increase the number of prisoners of war and decrease the chances for a negotiated settlement."

He repeated his call for a complete American withdrawal from Vietnam, adding: "This is a time for Vietnamization to fish or cut bait."

On the Republican side, Senator Barry Goldwater argued the opposite view.

The President will have to make a decision, he said, whether "we continue the dilly-dally bombing" of enemy supplies as they are shipped south, or "go in earnest at the source of supplies in the north, including the harbor at Haiphong."

Mr. Goldwater left no doubt that he favored the second course.

The Administration took steps today to insure that it would speak with one voice. Its three principal spokesmen, Mr. McCloskey, Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, and Daniel Z. Henkin, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, met in Mr. Ziegler's office this morning to coordinate their statements.

In subsequent briefings, they or their deputies all made a point of stressing that full-scale conventional fighting was now going on.

Mr. Friedheim, Mr. Henkin's deputy at the Pentagon, described the fighting as a conventional combined-arms battle with the enemy employing tanks, heavy artillery, heavy antiaircraft fire, engineers and fresh supplies for its troops.

Mr. McCloskey characterized it as a "naked attack by the North Vietnamese military into South Vietnam."

## Troop Freeze Is Implied

Although the spokesmen said the new assaults would not interfere with the President's program for troop withdrawals, other officials implied that Mr. Nixon might freeze American troop strength in Vietnam at 69,000 after May 1.

That decision, and the question of resumed bombing of the north, will depend on the events of the next few days, the officials said.

Despite his stress on the role of the Soviet-supplied equipment, Mr. McCloskey backed away from suggestions that the attacks might effect a major change in United States relations with the Soviet Union. He specifically said that there was no reconsideration of the President's intention to visit the Soviet Union beginning May 22.

The spokesman said he did not know whether the Administration would approach the Soviet Union to persuade Hanoi to limit its offensive. But other officials said there was no reason to believe Moscow would be responsive to such a request. Rather, the deliberate emphasis on the role of the Soviet equipment in the spokesmen's statements today seemed to be designed to underscore the magnitude of the foreign support the North Vietnamese are receiving.

So far as the American response is concerned, officials at the State Department noted that increased air strikes were the only viable option for the United States to pursue, since the American combat forces had dwindled to the point where they could no longer be effective.

The officials said they doubted that Mr. Nixon would seek to re-introduce additional American forces.

"This has got to be a test for the Vietnamese," one official said, "and they have to pass it on their own."

STATINTL

# Foe Shifts To Frontal War Tactic

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

United States officials said yesterday that Communist forces are shifting from guerrilla tactics to frontal warfare in South Vietnam by introducing "massive" quantities of heavy battle equipment, including tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft guns.

"These units are supported in a very large way by heavy military equipment from the Soviet Union," said State Department press spokesman Robert J. McCloskey.

When newsmen asked if the raising of that issue carried the implication that the input of Soviet weaponry might jeopardize President Nixon's May 22 summit trip to Moscow, the spokesman disclaimed any such intention. "No, no," he replied. Until yesterday, however, U.S. officials had avoided statements that would raise such questions.

For the second straight day, spokesmen for the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon engaged in a coordinated escalation of the official level of U.S. concern about the North Vietnamese about the offensive.

"The North Vietnamese are blatantly moving in equipment in a sophisticated way through the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) into the south," said White House press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler.

What appears to be shaping up, said Defense Department press officer Jerry W. Friedheim, is "a more conventional-type battle effort on the part of the enemy than we have known for years."

Said McCloskey, "What we see on the ground . . . is a divergence from the more traditional pattern of guerrilla warfare into conventional warfare."

Missing from all these characterizations, however, was any comprehensive report on the actual state of battle, the prospects and the consequences of the

quences. To all these questions officials respond that the situation is still too "fluid" to make any durable assessments.

By labeling what has occurred as an "invasion," a "blatant invasion," or a "naked attack" by North Vietnam, the administration already has laid out a justification for greatly intensified U.S. air attacks on North Vietnam. The continuing expansion of the official denunciations of the Communist assault suggests, in addition, that the Nixon administration is bracing American public opinion for more adverse news about the military capacity of the Communist forces.

In claiming that the nature of the warfare is shifting fundamentally, the administration, in effect, was throwing a question mark over its own repeatedly expressed confidence that the Communists cannot sustain a prolonged major offensive in South Vietnam.

If the Communist offensive should succeed in seizing the northern provinces of South Vietnam, which some officials privately fear, that would not only batter the Nixon administration's claims of success for Vietnamization. A Communist advance of that scope would also impose a heavy burden of the administration to carry through the current presidential election campaign.

For the second day in a row, the Washington Special Action Group of the National Security Council, the administration's top task force for international emergencies, met at the White House under presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger. Participants included high officials of State, Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the NSC. Another meeting is scheduled for today.

Senate Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana told newsmen it is "time to fish or cut bait" in the Vietnamization program for turning the war over to South Vietnam. "We ought to get out lock, stock and barrel," he said.

Another round of U.S. bombing North Vietnam, said Mansfield, will mean that "we will lose more planes, the number of POWs will increase and the possibility of negotiations will evaporate."

Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), however, advocated exactly the opposite. President Nixon "must make up his mind whether to

continue dilly-dally bombing or go into the northern part of North Vietnam to the source of supply," he said. This is a long-standing Goldwater theme, and he said he has been advising the President privately to take that course.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird met with Mr. Nixon for an hour yesterday and spokesman Ziegler said the President continues to follow war developments closely, which Ziegler emphasized are still in their "early stages."

State Department spokesman McCloskey said North Vietnam has moved into the South far more Soviet-supplied tanks and other weapons than ever before. In addition, he said, Soviet-supplied surface-to-air missile sited in the Demilitarized Zone "add an important factor."

Defense and state officials said the unusually heavy flow of this equipment through the DMZ continues.

Despite the heavy Communist attacks just below the supposed buffer zone between North and South Vietnam, many officials believe that another and possibly larger assault is in the offing in the Central Highlands area around Kontum. This is where the heaviest thrust initially was expected.

North Vietnamese strategists openly boasted last week that since South Vietnamese forces "have lost their shield" through the withdrawal of about 400,000 U.S. troops, Saigon's forces are too weak to meet challenges from multiple directions. This is the critical test that is now under way.

U.S. officials said South Vietnamese commanders have moved 10,000 to 15,000 airborne troops, marines, and some portions of their highly rated First Division further north, to reinforce South Vietnam's Third Division at the main point of contact, just north and west of the city of Quangtri.

However, the bulk of the First Division, which is rated one of the best in South Vietnam, reportedly remains deployed around the coastal city of Hue, about 35 miles south of Quangtri. Some military analysts believe that the Communists, probably after an assault on Quangtri, may thrust at Hue, depending upon how much of the First Division is drawn off by the battle further north.

One of the paradoxes in the forces are now reverting to

conventional warfare is that this is the kind of warfare the American troops, which are now largely withdrawn, were best equipped to fight. The South Vietnamese First Division is rated as a prime example of this American training. U.S. officials say it will signify "serious trouble" for the Vietnamization program if this division fails to meet expectations.

Pentagon spokesman Friedheim said North Vietnam's battle force in the northern provinces of South Vietnam is now above 30,000, with the inflow continuing. The United States now has four aircraft carriers in the Tonkin Gulf, plus the U.S.S. Tripoli, a helicopter carrier used in amphibious assaults.

STATINTL

# U.S. Denies Crisis on Vietnam

By GEORGE SHERMAN  
Star Staff Writer

The Nixon administration has carefully escalated verbal attacks on Hanoi's invasion of South Vietnam while insisting there is no crisis here over what to do on the ground.

State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey, chief vehicle for transmitting Nixon concern, for the first time yesterday injected a mention of the Russians into his discussion of the "naked attack" on South Vietnam.

"I want to call attention to the fact," he told a news briefing, "that these (North Vietnamese) units are supported in a very large way by heavy military equipment from the Soviet Union."

Both he and Pentagon press spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim emphasized that the full-scale attack by North Vietnamese across the demilitarized zone shows a massive shift to sophisticated conventional warfare, and a turn away from the more traditional guerrilla pattern.

## Russians Equip SAMs

Later, intelligence sources said that \$45 million of the estimated \$100 million military aid sent by the Russians last year to Hanoi went into equipping 10 of the SAM 2 surface-to-air missile battalions now set up in and around the demilitarized zone.

The \$100 million aid for 1971 said that \$45 million of the lion sent in 1970.

But at the White House press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler, who is meeting daily with McCloskey, insisted that presidential concern over the invasion has not reached crisis proportions. Nixon yesterday was still "assessing" the situation, spending "some" but not "most" of his time on it, and there was no "crisis atmosphere" at the White House, he said.

Both the White House and State Department denied quickly — McCloskey answered "No, no" — that Soviet support for the invasion was causing Nixon to reconsider his planned trip to Moscow starting May 22.

(The White House announced yesterday that Agriculture Secretary Earl L. Butz would visit Moscow next week

to open talks on addition sale of American grain and feed to the Russians.)

A fear among some informed sources is that whatever retaliation Nixon decides upon in North Vietnam may cause the Russians to cancel the President's own Moscow visit. For that reason, McCloskey's official mention of Soviet involvement was kept purposely low-keyed and sketchy. He referred only to the added SAM missiles and heavy tanks supplied by Moscow to Hanoi.

Ziegler said afterwards that he had "nothing to add." Furthermore, he maintained that the daily meetings at the White House of the Washington Special Action Group, chaired by presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger and including top lieutenants from the State and Defense Departments and the Central Intelligence Agency, have been "routine, to a degree." He refused to call the group a "crisis-management" body.

The universal suspicion in official circles is that the President will order heavy bombing of the North Vietnamese staging and other supply sites just above the DMZ once the weather clears in the North. Officials point to a warning Nixon made in a press conference Dec. 10, 1970.

He said that if he concludes that the North Vietnamese, "by their infiltration, threaten our remaining forces, if they thereby develop a capacity and proceed possibly to use that capacity to increase the level of fighting in South Vietnam, then I will order the bombing of the military sites in North Vietnam, the passes that lead from North Vietnam into South Vietnam, the military complexes, the military supply lines."

Officials note that this course of action, at least initially, would not mean resumption of bombing of the highly populated areas of North Vietnam above the 20th Parallel.

But yesterday Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., made his first attack on the Nixon handling of the Vietnam war and called upon the President to order an all-out bombing assault on North Vietnamese

supply depots, including Haiphong harbor if necessary.

"The President is faced with a decision," said Goldwater in a Senate speech. "... He must make up his mind whether to continue dilly-dally bombing or go into the northern part of North Vietnam to the source of supply."

Although it was his first public expression of differences with Nixon over handling of the war, the senator added that he still supports Nixon's overall policy in Indochina.

His words contrasted with those earlier of Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, who said he would oppose resumption of the bombing "under any circumstances."

"It's time for Vietnamization to fish or cut bait — to produce or else," said the Montana Democrat. "We must get out, lock, stock and barrel."

Sen. George McGovern, who won a victory yesterday in the Wisconsin Democratic presidential primary, made the same point. He repeated his position that it is time for the President to set a definite date for total U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam.

## Humphrey Cautious

Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey, who finished third in the primary, was more cautious. While predicting failure of the North Vietnamese drive, he said that continued American air power in support of the South Vietnamese is necessary to keep the situation stable as American troop withdrawal continues.

U.S. officials here admit great puzzlement over the ultimate intentions of Hanoi in this conventional-type invasion. Perhaps the best-informed guess is that made public today by South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu — that the North Vietnamese are trying to take a limited amount of South Vietnamese territory for bargaining purposes.

Yesterday both the Viet Cong and Hanoi representatives in Paris made a formal proposal that the peace talks normal Thursday session be held this week. But both Washington and Saigon — who suspended the talks two weeks ago —

scorned the proposal. McCloskey said that chances are "dim" for public or private negotiations so long as the military invasion continues.

STATINTL



# Hundreds of U.S. air strikes flown against invaders in South Vietnam

STATINTL

By MICHAEL PARKS  
Sun Staff Correspondent

Saigon—A vast fleet of American warplanes has begun flying to aid South Vietnamese troops hurled into retreat by the North Vietnamese offensive in this country's northernmost province.

American military sources said that "several hundred" air strikes were flown in South Vietnam this morning by U.S. planes despite bad weather, but there was no official command announcement of what appeared to be the start of an intensive bombing campaign.

But the reported level of air strikes was still only a fraction of the U.S. command's reinforced capability as morning fog along with broken and low clouds kept many planes on the ground.

The raids this morning, an increase from yesterday's 123 in Quang Tri province, were flown by planes based on three U.S. aircraft carriers off the Vietnamese coast and from American bases in Thailand despite the low cloud ceilings, military sources said.

The American command is also believed preparing to resume the bombing of North Vietnam, at least on a limited scale north of the demarcation zone, in an effort to blunt the five-day-old Communist offensive.

A Reuters dispatch today quoted military sources who reported that 3,000 South Vietnamese marines waded ashore on the banks of the Cua Viet River below the demarcation zone to begin a counterattack.

The marines moved ashore five hours before dawn after being landed by U.S. and South Vietnamese landing craft, the dispatch added.

Reuters quoted the military sources as saying the marines were spreading across the beach and surrounding area to cut off any Communist thrust down that part of the coast known as "the Street without Joy."

The U.S. command said yesterday that it was taking what it called "additional precautionary measures" with its air and

sea power to protect remaining American forces, which were reduced by 6,200 men last week to 95,500.

An official Voice of America commentary broadcast later from Washington bluntly warned Hanoi that it would be "a serious miscalculation" to conclude that President Nixon will not resume bombing of North Vietnam if it presses its attack in the South.

The first targets of the American bombing campaign, however, will be the estimated 15,000 to 17,000 North Vietnamese troops who have pushed Saigon government forces out of 15 bases in northern and western Quang Tri province, which lies just south of the demarcation zone separating North and South Vietnam.

American B-52's bombed a series of suspected Communist troop concentrations pushing on Quang Tri city from the south, southwest and west yesterday across the buffer zone that are supporting the tanks and infantry driving into the South. The foe has wiped out the buffer zone, one official said.

While the first use of air power, as weather clears, will be aimed at influencing the immediate course of battle, all official indications were that strikes farther north must be considered likely.

Robert J. McCloskey, a State Department spokesman, recalled Mr. Nixon's frequent assertions that he would "take whatever action he considered necessary to protect U.S. forces and their continuing withdrawal" during the Vietnamization process.

Mr. McCloskey issued the denunciation of Hanoi for "flagrant violation" of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina and of the 1968 "understandings" which brought an end to America's continuous bombing of North Vietnam and a move to the Paris talks.

Those "understandings," now disowned by Hanoi, were that the bombing would stop if

would get under way, and Hanoi would respect the buffer zone and avoid shelling major South Vietnamese cities. The U.S. says it was to continue unmolested reconnaissance flights over the North. The U.S. also says that most of its bombing of the North since 1968 was in retaliation for North Vietnamese attacks on the photo planes.

President Nixon demonstrated his concern about the North Vietnamese offensive by having his spokesmen announce a meeting of the Washington Special Action Group, whose function would be to prepare analyses and proposals for presidential action.

This group, made up of State and Defense Department officials, Central Intelligence Agency representatives and others as required, and chaired by Henry A. Kissinger, the President's national security affairs assistant, is the action subcommittee of the National Security Council. It proposes, but does not decide, actions to be taken.

Gerald L. Warren, a White House spokesman, said in disclosing the high-level meeting that Mr. Nixon stands by his earlier expressions of confidence in South Vietnam's ability to cope with enemy offensives.

Dr. Kissinger and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with Mr. Nixon to discuss the offensive and the President conferred by phone with William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, and Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense.

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## NIXON SEES AIDES

## Renewed Bombing of North Among Steps Being Weighed

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 3 —

The United States accused Hanoi today of launching an "invasion" of South Vietnam and said Washington was leaving open all retaliatory options—including renewed American bombing of North Vietnam.

The justification for such strikes — if they are ordered — was provided by the State Department, which charged North Vietnam with "flagrant violations" both of the 1954 treaty ending the French Indochina war and of the 1968 understanding that led to the end of systematic American bombing of North Vietnam and the start of what were to be substantive talks in Paris.

Spokesmen for the White House, the State Department and the Defense Department refused, however, to predict what course of action might be taken in coming days.

## Some Bombing Foreseen

A senior Pentagon official said privately that he thought President Nixon would order American aircraft to bomb the supply lines and base camps in North Vietnam of those enemy units that have crossed the demilitarized zone in recent days into Quangtri, South Vietnam's northernmost province.

President Nixon spent most of the morning discussing the Vietnamese developments with his top aides. He met with Kenneth Rush, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He spoke by telephone with Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin A. Laird.

Later in the morning, Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security, presided at a session of the Washington Special Group to discuss what tactics to fol-

low. That panel, which includes representatives from the State and Defense Departments, the Central Intelligence Agency and other concerned agencies, meets during periods of emergency. Mr. Kissinger met privately with Mr. Nixon after the session, Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, said.

## Attack Expected, Ziegler Says

It was evident that despite the crisis in South Vietnam, the Administration was seeking to avoid giving an impression of undue concern. Mr. Ziegler referred several times to the current fighting as "the South Vietnamese operation" and said that the attack by North Vietnam had been expected. "Now that it is beginning, our position is to evaluate it day by day," he said.

He cautioned newsmen again making any "assumptions at this time" on what would be done, because, he said, the President wants "all options open."

Mr. Ziegler and the Defense Department spokesman, Jerry W. Friedheim, said that the American withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam was continuing on schedule despite the increased fighting. Mr. Nixon has said that troop strength would be reduced to 69,000 by May 1 and has promised a new troop reduction announcement before then. Mr. Ziegler said that this plan was unchanged.

The spokesman also said it was highly unlikely that any of the six United States combat battalions remaining in Vietnam would be engaged in the ground operations. They are committed to guarding United States installations.

In answer to questions, Mr. Ziegler also said that American air power would be used as necessary to aid South Vietnamese forces in combating enemy forces within South Vietnam.

Robert J. McCloskey, the State Department spokesman—who had attended the meeting of the Special Action Group—was the Administration's sharpest voice during the day.

## 'Flagrant Violation' Charged

He said that what had happened in South Vietnam was "a flagrant violation by North Vietnam" of the 1954 Geneva agreement on Indochina and the 1968 understanding between the United States and North Vietnam.

"And by any definition, what has occurred is an invasion of South Vietnam," he said.

Both the 1954 and 1968 accords have been sources of semantic contention between supporters and critics of American involvement in Vietnam.

In essence, the United States has charged North Vietnam with violating the 1954 treaty by infiltrating men and supplies into South Vietnam. Critics, however, have charged that South Vietnam broke the treaty in the middle nineteen-fifties by refusing to hold elections that might have led to Communist control of all Vietnam.

The 1968 "understanding," as made known by the Johnson Administration on Oct. 31, 1968, provided for an end of American bombing of North Vietnam in return for the start of substantive talks on Vietnam, with Saigon and the Vietcong represented at the table in Paris along with Hanoi and Washington. The United States also asserted that it had an "understanding" from Hanoi that the

North Vietnamese would not violate the demilitarized zone and would not shell cities in South Vietnam.

The United States also claimed the right to fly reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam. Hanoi has never acknowledged that it agreed to any restraint, and began in 1970 to shoot at these planes. This in turn led to American air strikes against antiaircraft emplacements and other military targets in North Vietnam.

Theoretically, under the Americans' interpretation, the abrogation of the 1968 understanding could justify a resumption by the United States of systematic bombing of North Vietnam.

## Time Limit Suggested

Such a course would lead to increased tensions with Hanoi's allies, such as the Soviet Union and China, and might even endanger the chances for success of Mr. Nixon's trip to Moscow set for May 22.

It could also lead to unforeseen political problems in this country, with Vietnam again becoming a major divisive issue.

For these reasons, it seemed likely that, barring very large North Vietnamese incursions, American bombing of territory north of the border would be directly linked to the invasion of South Vietnam by the 308th and other North Vietnamese divisions.

A Pentagon official said he expected that, if the decision was made to bomb north of the DMZ, the raids would be limited in time to as long as necessary to get the North

Vietnam—or to destroy their ability to fight.

The Paris talks on Vietnam have been indefinitely suspended, and the chief American negotiator, William J. Porter, has returned to the United States. Mr. McCloskey said there were no plans for Mr. Porter to return soon to Paris. He will confer with Mr. Nixon later this week.

Mr. McCloskey also said that one factor in the United States decision to suspend the talks had been the build-up of enemy forces for the expected attack against South Vietnamese forces. He said that the United States would not negotiate under the gun of the current offensive.

When he was asked what led him to call the latest offensive an "invasion," Mr. McCloskey said that this was the most serious violation of the 1968 understanding. He said there was a "qualitative" difference, as well, because of the heavy artillery, tanks and antiaircraft weapons used by the attacking forces. It is also the first time that an attacking force has come directly across the demilitarized zone, he noted.

# Diplomacy: U.S. Spokesmen Express Rising Concern Over Thrust

By Murrey Marder  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Administration spokesmen markedly raised the level of official U.S. concern yesterday over the North Vietnamese thrust into South Vietnam by labeling it an "invasion" and a "flagrant violation" of the Demilitarized Zone.

After a meeting of military and diplomatic strategists at the White House yesterday morning, spokesmen sounded the theme that the United States is "leaving all options open" for its response to the offensive that is unfolding.

"The administration is watching the situation very carefully," said White House press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler. "Our position," said Ziegler, is to evaluate the new military threat in upper South Vietnam on a "day-to-day" basis.

During the day, the administration backed away from the confidence expressed at the White House over the weekend that the South Vietnamese themselves "can cope with the enemy threat." While that was repeated at the White House in response to questions early yesterday, a noticeably more guarded response was given later at the State Department by press officer Robert J. McCloskey, in what the White House subsequently described as the basic administration appraisal.

"I would have to say presently that it is too early to judge the ability of the South Vietnamese to meet this," said McCloskey, following the White House meeting presided over by national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger. "The total situation," said McCloskey, "is under review. I am in no position to anticipate what course of action the United States might take."

By declining to rule out any "option," the administration even gave a signal to North Vietnam that it regards the unfolding

offensive with increased gravity, officials indicated.

This is a considerable shift of emphasis from the position the Nixon administration has taken since the offensive began last Friday. Initially, the public U.S. response to the offensive was low-key, in conformity with forecasts by officials during the past three months that a Communist offensive was in prospect to demonstrate a "show of strength" by "spectacular" but limited and containable thrusts of Communist power. By publicly forecasting that pattern of military action, administration officials hoped to forestall the political and psychological shock produced, especially in the United States, by the countrywide Communist Tet offensive of 1968.

What yesterday's heightened expressions of official concern indicated, however, was that U.S. planners nevertheless underestimated the military-political risks that North Vietnam was prepared to take in attacking directly through the politically sensitive Demilitarized Zone dividing North and South Vietnam. This is what appeared to surprise at least some U.S. planners, and which the official reaction yesterday registered.

The international implications of this thrust through the DMZ were still unclear yesterday, in part because the full scope of the Communist offensive is not yet discernible.

If U.S. planners have greatly miscalculated the power that North Vietnam and the Vietcong can bring to bear in the weeks ahead, some U.S. officials privately conceded, that could have major repercussions on the current American presidential election campaign and also on President Nixon's planned May 22 visit to the Soviet Union.

No official was ready yesterday to discuss that aloud. However, a high-ranking Soviet military delegation, headed by air defense commander Viktor Davydov, was in Hanoi just before the Communist offensive was launched.

At the White House yesterday morning, the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) was convened to assess the situation. In addition to Kissinger, participants included Under Secretary of State John Irwin; Deputy Secretary of Defense Kenneth Rush; Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other officials.

President Nixon also conferred by telephone with Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird and Secretary of State William P. Rogers, and met with Kissinger and Moorer, spokesmen said.

State Department spokesman McCloskey said afterward that North Vietnam has committed "a flagrant violation" of the 1954 Geneva accords on the neutrality of South Vietnam, and of the 1968 "understandings" negotiated between the United States and North Vietnam that accompanied the Nov. 1, 1968, halt in the continued bombing of North Vietnam. McCloskey said that "by any definition, what has occurred is an invasion of South Vietnam."

The 1968 "understandings" (which North Vietnam officially denies it ever accepted), McCloskey recalled, provided for "no abuse of the DMZ . . . no indiscriminate shelling or rocketing of the cities" of South Vietnam, and that North Vietnam "would negotiate with South Vietnam in the Paris channel."

The United States has engaged in considerable bombing of North Vietnam intermittently since 1968, but has called these attacks "protective reaction," or has employed other euphemisms to describe them. The U.S. rationale for these attacks has been that North Vietnam was firing at U.S. reconnaissance planes which were to con-

tinue to fly as part of the "understandings."

This is not the first time that the United States has charged North Vietnam with violating the "understandings." McCloskey, however, said "this is unquestionably a more severe violation than has occurred heretofore."

When newsmen asked McCloskey if the present Communist military offensive exceeds U.S. forecasts about it, he replied, "I would be hard put to say it is exactly what was anticipated in terms of numbers, targets." While the numbers of Communist forces were in range of the predictions, McCloskey said, the amount of "heavy equipment, tanks, anti-aircraft" thrown into the battle has changed the expected mix of forces.

The administration yesterday sought to invoke the Communist planning of the current offensive as an added retroactive rationale for the recent U.S. decision to end the weekly meetings of the Vietnam peace talks in Paris. McCloskey said that while "we were actively seeking to negotiate, the North Vietnamese were very clearly undertaking to mount a military offensive in the South." McCloskey said the United States "remains prepared to talk" in Paris when North Vietnam is prepared for substantive negotiations, but not "under military pressure."

No mention initially was made of any military reasons for halting the weekly talks, which North Vietnam claims the United States has "sabotaged."

# CIA: THE PRESIDENT'S

**VICTOR MARCNETTI**

Mr. Marchetti was on the director's staff of the CIA when he resigned from the agency two years ago. Since then, his novel *The Rope-Dancer* has been published by Grosset & Dunlap; he is now working on a book-length critical analysis of the CIA.

The Central Intelligence Agency's role in U.S. foreign affairs is, like the organization itself, clouded by secrecy and confused by misconceptions, many of them deliberately promoted by the CIA with the cooperation of the news media. Thus to understand the covert mission of this agency and to estimate its value to the political leadership, one must brush myths aside and penetrate to the sources and circumstances from which the agency draws its authority and support. The CIA is no accidental, romantic aberration; it is exactly what those who govern the country intend it to be—the clandestine mechanism whereby the executive branch influences the internal affairs of other nations.

In conducting such operations, particularly those that are inherently risky, the CIA acts at the direction and with the approval of the President or his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Before initiating action in the field, the agency almost invariably establishes that its operational plans accord with the aims of the administration and, when possible, the sympathies of Congressional leaders. (Sometimes the endorsement or assistance of influential individuals and institutions outside government is also sought.) CIA directors have been remarkably well aware of the dangers they court, both personally and for the agency, by not gaining specific official sanction for their covert operations. They are, accordingly, often more careful than are administrators in other areas of the bureaucracy to inform the White House of their activities and to seek Presidential blessing. To take the blame publicly for an occasional operational blunder is a small price to pay in return for the protection of the Chief Executive and the men who control the Congress.

The U-2 incident of 1960 was viewed by many as an outrageous blunder by the CIA, wrecking the Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit conference in Paris and setting U.S.-Soviet relations back several years. Within the inner circles of the administration, however, the shoot-down was shrugged off as just one of those things that happen in the chancy business of intelligence. After attempts to deny responsibility for the action had failed, the President openly defended and even praised the work of the CIA, although for obvious political reasons he avoided noting that he had authorized the disastrous flight. The U-2 program against the USSR was canceled, but work on its follow-on system, the A-11 (now the SR-71,) was speeded up. Only the launching of the reconnaissance satellites put an end to espionage against the Soviet Union by manned aircraft. The A-11 development program was completed, nevertheless, on the premise that it, as well as the U-2, might be useful elsewhere.

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When the Nation exposed the CIA in 1967, its labor and cultural funding conduits, neither tried to restrict the Senator Fulbright's control over the CIA; he was simply told by Powers and got on with its business, formed to look into the Secretary of State, through the CIA. Some critics because they had been no longer thought worth

continued under improved cover. A few of the larger operations went on under almost open CIA sponsorship, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Air America being examples. And all the while, the CIA was conducting a \$500 million-a-year private war in Laos and pacification/assassination programs in Vietnam.

The reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community late last year in no way altered the CIA's mission as the clandestine action arm of American foreign policy. Most of the few changes are intended to improve the financial management of the community, especially in the military intelligence services where growth and the technical costs of collecting information are almost out of control. Other alterations are designed to improve the meshing of the community's product with national security planning and to provide the White House with greater control over operations policy. However, none of that implies a reduction of the CIA's role in covert foreign policy action. In fact, the extensive review conducted by the White House staff in preparation for the reorganization drew heavily on advice provided by the CIA and that given by former agency officials through such go-betweens as the influential Council on Foreign Relations. Earlier in the Nixon Administration, the Council had responded to a similar request by recommending that in the future the CIA should concentrate its covert pressure tactics on Latin American, African and Asian targets, using more foreign nationals as agents and relying more on private U.S. corporations and other institutions as covers. Nothing was said about reduc-

*Provides Red World with Factual, Balanced View*

# Information Agency Fights for U.S. Image

WASHINGTON — (AP) — While Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe fight for survival in Congress, this country's third and largest propaganda agency is alive and busy, selling the American Way of Life from 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue and a half a dozen other Washington buildings.

The U.S. Information Agency is, in fact, so busy that in the days of federal belt-tightening, it is asking Congress for more money, not less.

USIA wants \$198 million for fiscal 1973, a \$2 million increase, to continue cranking out a stream of books, magazines, pamphlets, films, radio broadcasts, TV programs and to maintain outposts in such remote spots as Luluabourg in the Republic of Zaire and Maseruin Lesotho.

THE MILLIONS of words and pictures flowing daily through USIA's printers and transmitters carry one continuous message, chiefly to Iron Curtain countries:

No matter how turbulent American society may seem because of riots, assassinations, plots and bombings, life in the United States is better than anywhere else.

Item: Although USIA reported every known detail of last fall's Attica prison uprising during which 40 convicts and hostages died, it managed in the course of a special series over Voice of America to convey the impression that life here is better even in prison.

For example, the VOA found a California professor who said Americans invented modern incarceration which he describes as just locking people up and not locking them up and beating on them, too.

CITING a general easing of world tensions, some in Congress argue that hard-sell propaganda is no longer necessary, and USIA should be abolished.

One who does not in USIA's chunky boyish-looking director, Frank Shakespeare Jr., 45, who next week must go before a skeptical Senate Foreign Relations Committee to defend his budget requests.

"A major world power, which we are in this moment in history, must have a mechanism by which it attempts to communicate what it stands for to people throughout the world," the ex-television executive said.

In past years, USIA has had little trouble obtaining its budget requests from Congress because the law required it to appear only before generally sympathetic appropriations committees.

UNDER A RECENT legislative reorganization act, however, USIA must appear for the first time before Foreign Relations, headed by Sen. J. W. Fulbright.

USIA officials are understandably nervous. The Arkansas Democrat has just won the first round in a battle with the administration that could end government financing for Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe which have been beaming propaganda to the Soviet Union and its East European satellites since the peak of the Cold War.

"These radios should be given an opportunity to take their rightful place in the graveyard of Cold War relics," said Fulbright, who contends U.S. propaganda acts as an irritant, delaying arrival of Nixon's "era of negotiation instead of confrontation."

FULBRIGHT WAS out of town and unavailable for comment. But an aide, saying the committee was approaching the hearings with an open mind, also said the senator could be expected to remain consistent with his stated desire to see a lowering of the U.S. profile in the world.

The effort to scuttle the two radio stations began last year with disclosures in the Senate that they were being supported secretly by the Central Intelligence Agency.

For years there have been rumors USIA, too, is linked with CIA.

Questioned by Fulbright on possible links with CIA at a 1970 hearing, a USIA officer said any comment would have to come "in executive session from appropriate other officials."

EVEN PRIVATELY, USIA officials are unanimous in denying any link with the CIA. "Look," commented one young officer, "the CIA is the best run agency in town. If they ran us we wouldn't be so fouled up."

While there is some talk on Capitol Hill of doing away with USIA entirely, serious debate centers on the agency's size. Its 9,881 employees are more, according to a former USIA official, than those employed full-time on propaganda by all other nations combined. Its role in U.S. foreign policy, and the tone and quality of its product will also be questioned.

"USIA has been a puzzle to policy makers ever since it began back in World War II," said one 28-year-old employee. "Hell, it's had half a dozen different names."

"EVERYTHING this agency does is based on the idea we've got something the Zambians want. Well, maybe they don't want it."

A veteran USIA employee who thinks the agency is too big said, "Look at this, we have a guy in Lesotho. I don't even know what they do there. But I do know that whatever they do in Lesotho, there is no way it can be better than what we're doing here."

The most talked of alternative to abolishing USIA is returning it to the State Department where most of its programs were lodged from 1946 to 1953.

State, indeed, would probably like to have control over the agency, now legally bound only to listen to the State's policy guidance.

BUT SHAKESPEARE has pushed hard to give USIA a higher position in the policy pecking order, specifically to get it back on the National Security Council from which President Nixon excluded it three years ago in a streamlining effort.

"If you are going to effectively promulgate a program on a worldwide basis it is necessary to have the deepest possible understanding of the nuances," Shakespeare in an interview said.

Because Shakespeare was and is an outspoken anti-Communist, there was open speculation in Washington that USIA would speak more stridently after he took over. The official line, however, has not grown perceptibly harder.

"Mr. Shakespeare is as firmly anti-Communist as he ever was," said one top-ranking agency official. "But I think he's more subtle than when he first came here. That's because he has traveled and has a better understanding of world affairs. It was inevitable."

SHAKESPEARE ALSO went a long way toward improving strained agency morale by encouraging young officers to form a grievance committee which can see him at a moment's notice. The consequence of that: A dearth of serious grievances.

As for the agency's products, Bruce Herschensohn, head of the film service said: "We are trying to build a climate of understanding between the United States and a climate of disrespect for

continued



# CAPITOL STUFF

By FRANK JACKMAN

Washington, March 10—The White House, according to the National Geodetic Survey, has subsided only four-hundredths of an inch—actually, just a silly millimeter—since its reconstruction back in 1952. But when they announced the big order allegedly loosening up on all that secret stuff the other day, the executive mansion must have sunk at least another foot.

"First of all," said David Young, a special assistant to the National Security Council, "I think this is evidence of, and in keeping with, the President's pledge to have an open administration."

## A Top Secret Over What's Top Secret

This is something that is specific. This is something that you can analyze. We have tried to be as concrete and forthcoming as we can."

Well, maybe you have, Dave. And then again maybe not. Take, for example, who in the executive office is entitled to classify documents and information "top secret"—No. 1 among all the various spooky categories the

government uses to keep things to itself.

Besides the White House office, the National Security Council, the Office of Emergency Preparedness, and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (our beloved governor, the Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller, serves on that one, friends; aren't you proud?), the Office of Telecommunications Policy and the President's Council of Economic Advisers also can stamp things "eyes only" or some of those other nifty hush-hush terms.

It's plain to see why the Council of Economic Advisers needs the authority to classify things top secret: There are a lot of things they are keeping under their hats over there. Why, if the Democrats ever found out when the rate of unemployment was going down, or when wage and price controls were being lifted, they'd claim all the credit for these nice things for themselves. You can't be too careful in politics.

But giving the top secret stamp to the Office of Telecommunications Policy is a mystery, too. So far—and this might very well be garbled in translation—the only conspicuous public action the Office of Telecommunications Policy has taken is to warn Congress that public television is kind of leaning in one ideological direction. And, privately, to complain about the \$80,000 salary Sander Vanocur is getting to work for public TV. Of course, William F. Buckley Jr. is getting quite a lot, too, for his Firing Line show, but that's different.

Maybe what the Office of Telecommunications Policy is stamping top secret is how you go about getting those \$80,000 jobs. Sure, that's it. And when they're through, all the biggies on TV will be on piecework. Walter and Howard and Harry and John and David and Sandy will be brown-bagging it to the old shop every day. On the bus. Join the club, guys.

But perhaps the best explanation of how the new system actually works came in this bit of persiflage between John D. Ehrlichman, President Nixon's top domestic affairs adviser, and some nosey newsmen at Wednesday's White House briefing. Ehrlichman said that the overhaul of the whole classification system had been ordered in January 1971 when the National Security Council issued a "study memorandum" on the subject.

"That was not particularly noticed at the time," he said, "but six or seven months later it became a matter of some notoriety in connection with the controversy concerning classification of the Pentagon papers."

"John," pipes up a reporter, "can I ask one question about that? Where you mention that the original NSC memo didn't receive very much attention, was it publicly announced, or was it classified?"

Ehrlichman: "It was not classified."

Q. "Was it announced by the White House?"

A. "Nobody and came out seized you by the lapels, but those kinds of things are available."

Q. "Is there something available now in the NSC emeos that we ought to be digging up?"

A. "I don't know. Go ask."

(At this point, David Young began his explanation of the new system, mercifully cutting off the hollow laughter at Ehrlichman's blithe "go ask" the NSC. At the NSC, they regard it as treasonable to give out the day of the week.)

Subsequently, however, it became clear that Ehrlichman wasn't kidding when he said nobody was going to come out and "seize you by the lapels" in connection with the immense mass of classified documents.

### 'The Reasonableness Test'

Said Young: "If the individual, after 10 years, wants to get a (top secret) document which has been exempt, he is given . . . a mandatory right of review if he can identify the document and we can produce it with a reasonable amount of effort. These are the two criteria which are used under the Freedom of Information Act: particularity and the reasonableness test."

But who ultimately judges what is "particular" and "reasonable"? The new Inter-Agency Classification Review Committee acts as a sort of appeals board. And who's on the Inter-Agency, etc.? The State Department, the Defense Department, the CIA, the Justice Department, the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Security Council. And who classifies the most stuff in the first place? The State Department, the Defense Department, the CIA, the Justice—*you get the idea.* In this ballpark the pitcher is also the umpire.



John D. Ehrlichman  
"I don't know—go ask"

# Rogers Defends State Department Policy Role at Senate Hearing

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

Senate concern over the "erosion" of the State Department's theoretical primacy in foreign affairs was disputed and brushed aside yesterday by Secretary of State William P. Rogers.

"I am perfectly satisfied with the way it is operating," said Rogers. The State Department is "happy to play a role" in foreign policy, and "Mr. Kissinger has a role," said Rogers, but "the people elected the President" to "make foreign policy."

Rogers refused in that fashion to debate whether he is being overshadowed by presidential security adviser Henry A. Kissinger. That conformed with his insistence on Monday that, "I didn't feel excluded at all" during the President's trip to China.

As a result, Rogers' words deflected the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday from its own groping efforts to enhance the State Department's share in formulating foreign policy.

The committee, headed by Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) held its first hearing on \$563 million requested in authorization funds for the State Department as required by a rider it attached to last year's foreign aid act. A major purpose, as Fulbright noted yesterday, is "restoring Congress' proper role in the making of foreign policy."

With Kissinger beyond the official reach of the committee because he is a White House adviser, Fulbright and other senators hoped Rogers would join in seeking to strengthen State's hand in policy making. In theory, that would strengthen the role of Congress, because State is obliged to be more responsive to Congress than is the White House.

Rogers, however, pronounced himself quite satisfied with the status quo.

He disclaimed any concern

about having State Department positions lost in the National Security Council staff machinery that Kissinger controls. If anything develops "contrary to what I think should be done," said Rogers, "take it up with the President."

"The system is working very well," Rogers insisted. "The foreign policy is very effective."

Rogers also came under close questioning yesterday about the need to jettison what several senators called remnants of the cold war.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), commending the President's China trip, said it is time to eliminate all vestiges of the "China demon fixation" in U.S. policy. Church said there is "no relic" that more deserves being "tossed in the ash can" of history than the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty of 1954.

The SEATO treaty is "a corpse," said Church, long abandoned by France, Britain and Pakistan; invoked as "an after thought" to help justify U.S. involvement in the Indochina war, but now deserving "decent burial" to avoid use in other entanglements.

Rogers, however, told Church "your timing is particularly unfortunate."

Following the President's China trip, said Rogers, the United States is now reassuring its Asian allies that it will abide by all its "commitments." To abandon the SEATO treaty now, said Rogers, could be "quite danger-

ous" and would suggest "a 180-degree turn" in U.S. policy.

Church countered that since ancient Rome, "no other country in history has undertaken so many formal commitments as the government of the United States—to 44 countries."

Rogers also was challenged by Fulbright and Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) on administration support of funds until June 1973 for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. They were previously financed covertly by the CIA. The dispute is in a Senate-House conference, with the Senate favoring funding only until June 30 of this year.

The U.S.-China communique, pledging peaceful co-existence, Fulbright said, "is quite inconsistent with what you are doing in Russia." The broadcasts beamed into the Soviet Union, said Fulbright, continue "old, obsolete programs created at the beginning of the cold war, at the height of the McCarthy period."

Fulbright claimed that continuation of such broadcasts could result in "a lack of credibility" about U.S. intentions to negotiate in the strategic arms control talks (SALT) and to reduce tensions. Rogers disagreed. He said he sees the radio as no "interference in the internal affairs of other countries," and he expressed optimism for a SALT agreement this year.

During the hearing, Ful-

bright suggested various approaches for strengthening the State Department's position in foreign affairs, including a "unified budget for foreign affairs." Rogers said that would be "too complex." Fulbright noted that other agencies, including CIA and Defense, have "seven or eight times as many people in our embassies as the State Department does." Rogers said State has only 16 per cent of its own employees in embassies overseas, and State's total employees were listed at 13,236.

Rogers disagreed, however, with Fulbright's claim that the growing National Security Council structure, which Kissinger heads, has overstepped its intended authority.

STATINTL

## MILD ON CHINA

# Russia Is Rapped In Rogers Report

STATINTL

By GEORGE SIHERMAN  
Star Staff Writer

Secretary of State William P. Rogers today presented his second annual foreign policy report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with stern words for Moscow and gentler gestures toward Peking.

Soviet-American relations cannot be harmonious, Rogers wrote, in his personal forward to the 621-page volume, until the Russians overcome their "temptation to exploit explosive situations for national advantage."

The Soviet Union was not "helpful" last year in promoting peace either in Indochina or the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, Rogers wrote. Furthermore, he said in another part, Soviet intervention in European states "must change quite profoundly if Europe is to achieve the more difficult object of reconciling its nations."

### Frank Talks Foreseen

"We will discuss these issues frankly with the Soviet leaders in May," wrote Rogers of the coming Nixon visit to Moscow.

The Senate hearing today was technically concerned with the request of the State Department for funding authorization for next fiscal year, but Rogers took the occasion to go over the whole range of Nixon's foreign policy.

His report follows the same line as the voluminous World Report put out by the White House last month. The State Department said it also contains the administration's first written evaluation of the President's trip to China.

It gives no new details, save a mention that an agreement is being worked out for the exchange of language students between China and the United States.

The journey, wrote Rogers, "has established a solid foundation on which to build

differences are being dealt with in honesty and candor." Without going into detail, Rogers told newsmen — at a session yesterday introducing the report — that the Chinese leadership gave Nixon no pledge to settle the dispute over Taiwan peacefully.

### Standing by Treaties

The report stressed, with particular emphasis on the priority of Japan in American thinking and continued loyalty to the Nationalist Chinese government, that the U.S. will "stand firmly by all our treaty commitments."

The tone of the language was noticeably more positive and hopeful toward China than toward the Soviet Union. Rogers explained to newsmen that the United States and the Soviet Union long have been discussing "contentious issues realistically and frankly, as you would expect between two super-powers that have had relations for a long time."

With China, he noted, there had been no relations at all for 22 years. Therefore, "I think maybe our language is somewhat different."

### Hope on Arms Pact

At the press conference, Rogers also spoke briefly about the extent to which he will take part in politics this year. He will not take part in "normal partisan political activities" like rallies and fund-raising, he said, but he will speak out in defense of Nixon's foreign policy if it is attacked in a way "harmful to the national interest."

He also asserted that he and the State Department had played "an essential and important role in the formulation" of policy in the administration. He commented in response to contentions that they had been overshadowed by presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger and the National Security Council staff.

In the report, the emphasis was totally on policy past and

out hope for concluding an initial agreement this year with the Russians on limiting strategic nuclear weapons. He said two major issues remain to be negotiated: Where and in what numbers anti-ballistic missile launchers (ABM) may be deployed, and how far to go on the interim agreement limiting offensive nuclear weapons.

With obvious reference to China, the report added, any initial Soviet-American agreement must lead toward a more comprehensive agreement extended in time "to others." But Rogers told his press conference that the Chinese gave Nixon no encouragement about entering any arms talks.

The report gave the strongest official indication to date that American recognition of the new state of Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, is soon to come. Bangladesh, wrote Rogers, echoing the President in using the name of the new state, "clearly is now separately governed."

### Troops at Issue

One of the criteria for deciding on recognition, he told the press conference, is the "presence of Indian troops on Bangladesh soil." Rogers refused to say, however, whether Washington will recognize Bangladesh once those troops are removed later this month.

Rogers also confirmed at the press conference that North Korea has been signaling a desire for improved relations with the United States. He did not elaborate, but other officials said North Korean leader Kim Il Sung has begun hinting publicly that total withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea is no longer a requirement for improved relations between North and South Korea and North Korea and the U.S.

Rogers said the United States will take no action until South Korea has been closely consulted "and until we understand exactly what North Ko-

# How U.S. foreign policy is shaped

By George W. Ashworth

Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

When President Nixon announced his plans to go to Peking, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird sent an immediate message to the White House, offering the Pentagon's help.

The offer was met with resounding silence for some time. Then came a message from Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, the President's National-security adviser, saying, in effect, that the offer was appreciated but unnecessary.

Thus began and ended Defense Department involvement in the preparations for the trip beyond the most routine matters.

According to sources who disclosed this rebuff, the incident indicates the reliance placed regularly upon the Pentagon in matters of great national importance.

After having watched the sometimes disorganized procedures used by the Johnson and Kennedy administrations in making policy, some senior officers were convinced that the revitalization of the National Security Council system was imperative.

Later, after some saw how it was revitalized, there were misgivings.

## Personal briefings

Mr. Nixon has chosen to brief key congressional leaders himself on details of the trip. Later, however, as the China drama unfolds further, Congress may have to depend upon Secretary of State William P. Rogers and his assistants for further information. Congress already has misgivings—justified or otherwise—over just how privy State will be to the inmost details.

Similarly, on defense issues, there are many matters in which the national-security staff has better information on defense directions to be anticipated than does the Pentagon. Some programs are literally run from the White House, and the composition of the United States defense establishment is dictated by it.

On the surface, this may all appear well and good, as the White House, ultimately answerable to the people, must assume final responsibility for national defense.

The problem comes, many sources believe, in the way the decisions are reached. Theoretically and in fact, the Pentagon has within its walls a great deal of expertise on defense matters, as it should.

## Expertise overlooked

This expertise is often overlooked or bypassed.

Rather than seek Defense Department positions—which would include military and civilian—the White House often goes directly to one branch of the department for answers, such as the joint chiefs and their staff.

Or the National Security Council may send over questions that clearly do not call for thought by several offices. A memo might be tailored so that only systems analysis can properly answer. In this way, systems analysis can in effect work directly for the White House rather than the defense leadership.

A main purpose of the defense program review committee of the National Security Council is the maintenance of White House control over the Pentagon.

The deputy secretary of defense normally sits on that group, which has powerful sway in defense decisions. When introducing Kenneth Rush the other day as the new deputy defense secretary, Mr. Laird referred with clear pleasure to the expertise that Mr. Rush may give Pentagon representation at the White House.

Of course, no bureaucracy operates as the lines on charts indicate it might. The federal government is no exception.

Mr. Nixon obviously enjoys having the strings of power concentrated in the White House. In some instances, such as the invasion of Cambodia, the system works. Other efforts, such as the invasion of Laos, are now considered failures by the White House, it is said.

But, going beyond the practical, there are real questions raised here on whether the country is indeed best served by the present concentrations of influence and power.

Beyond that is the difficulty this administration has had attracting and keeping good middle- and upper-level talent. The present approaches, both as they are and as they appear to be, have tended to help lower morale and cause some officials to wonder whether they really serve a useful purpose. In Peking the President, Dr. Kissinger, and his assistants worked with the Chinese leadership at the senior level. When points were settled at the highest levels, they were referred to a working group chaired on the American side by Secretary of State William P. Rogers.

According to the White House, there was a great deal of work back and forth with Dr. Kissinger acting as the go-between on the American side as the agreements and the joint communiqué were brought into final form.

Thus, State Department officials did apparently gain a close working knowledge of what was going on, although they may have been removed from the decision-making process to some degree. Of course, much of the work that led to the communiqué and the discussions took place here in the direction of the National Security Council staff with State Department input.

## Powerful voice

It is clear the State Department is not near the center of things as many in the department would wish. Similarly, it is clear Dr. Kissinger maintains a powerful voice—usually the dominant one—in many foreign policy decisions.

From all of this, one gathers that the White House staff was at the heart of the decisionmaking process, and that the State Department was more removed. How moved depends upon the point of view of the observer to a large extent.

But, as the explanation process begins at home and abroad, the administration will have to try to cope with the essential fact that many persons have come to believe that President and Dr. Kissinger are just about the sole authoritative spokesmen for the U.S. and foreign affairs.

CROSBY S. NOYES

## Papers Need Degree of Protection on Sources

Newsmen who claim immunity from being forced to testify before grand juries or divulge their confidential sources of information to government agencies have a tough case to prove. Indeed, it is far from clear that the press as a whole backs such a claim.

The Supreme Court, in hearing opening arguments in three cases involving grand jury subpoenas to reporters last week seemed highly skeptical of the contention that the questioning of newsmen involved an infringement of their protection under the 1st Amendment to the Constitution. They appeared receptive to the argument of Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold that "reporters are citizens and retain the responsibilities of citizenship" — including the obligation to tell what they know to government investigators.

In terms of public reaction as well, the cases have come before the court at a singularly unpropitious time. For a variety of reasons, the popularity of the press today is at an unusually low ebb and its claims of privilege and special immunity from the normal processes of law and justice are widely rejected.

The episode of the Pentagon papers and more recently the Anderson reports of National Security Council meetings left a bad taste in many people's mouths. Whatever the merits involved in these cases, many people have come to look on the press and its confidential informants as the adversary of orderly government and potentially perhaps a danger to the national security.

The claim of a right to receive official secrets and publish them with legal impunity whenever, in the opinion of individual editors, it is in the "public interest" is not very widely conceded by the public itself. Indeed, there is a strong impression that public opinion would tolerate much stronger restrictions on the freedom of the press today than the courts themselves are likely to entertain.

Beyond this, there is little sympathy for the informants involved except from those who happen to agree with their political motivations. For most people the betrayal of government secrets is a betrayal of trust, and protection of the informant's identity is not an ethical obligation of the journalist.

All this, however, is quite beside the point of the cases

before the Supreme Court. The real question involved is the ability of reporters and newspapers to function effectively as news-gatherers if the confidentiality of their sources is not, at least to some degree, protected.

The problem can be exaggerated. It does not happen very often that reporters are summoned before grand juries and required to reveal their sources of information on a given story. On the other hand, nearly all reporters receive a very substantial amount of their information on a confidential basis.

If they could not, as a result of a court ruling, undertake to keep the sources of this information confidential, they could not function effectively, whether they were dealing with the Black Panthers or the secretary of state. On whatever level he operates, to require a newspaperman to reveal his sources is to put him out of business.

The same thing goes for newspapers themselves. Their ability to operate effectively as news-gathering organizations depends on their being outside of, and to some degree

impervious to the apparatus of government.

In the course of covering a civil disturbance, for example, a newspaper will assign dozens of reporters and photographers to the news-gathering effort. They may well, in the course of their assignment, obtain pictorial or eyewitness evidence that would be relevant to ensuing criminal actions against individuals involved.

Yet the government, in most such cases, has very wisely refrained from requiring newspapers to hand over their unpublished photographs or requiring the appearance of reporters before grand juries. There is a general realization on both sides that if the press is used by the government as a kind of unofficial investigative branch, its value as an independent institution will be rapidly destroyed.

Also, one might add, its value as an investigative branch. For there is no law which says that newspapers have to keep unused photographic negatives forever or that reporters have to squirrel away their notes and memos in file cabinets. If it became fashionable or common to use newspapers as evidence-gathering institutions at the service of the state, the evidence would inevitably become a much more perishable commodity.

So it is very much to be hoped that the Supreme Court in its wisdom will not reject out of hand the contention that newsmen and newspapers should have a degree of immunity when it comes to revealing their sources of information. Few people would contend that this immunity must be absolute or that a reporter who has pertinent evidence to give in a civil or criminal trial should not be required to testify. But this is not the situation in the cases under review.



## Heroin traffic:

Some amazing  
coincidences linking  
the CIA, the Mafia,  
Air America,  
several  
members of  
the Brook Club,  
Chiang  
Kai-Shek,  
the Kuomintang,  
Prince Puchatra  
of Thailand,  
many banks and  
insurance companies  
— practically  
everyone except  
Richard Nixon.

Wasn't he asked?

by Peter Dale Scott

Professor Samuel Eliot Morison, a 1903 Theodore Roosevelt Medalist in national law and morals, told the US Navy to support the "reclamation" of Panama from Colombia. The result of the Canal Zone treaty, is described as "Panama businessmen, agents of the treaty" and United States agents. [which stood to gain \$40 million from the treaty] and United States agents to add that the "agents" of J. & W. Seligman and their Washington Company were New York in the Waldorf-Astoria.

In some ways, the Panama Canal partition is an instructive prelude to involvement in Indochina. Let us be different today; for many years ago, preparing for revolution and war, under sections 956-60 of the laws. In theory, at least, responsibility of American "interests" is not. But in fact, the CIA still maintains contacts with J. & W. Seligman and similar firms.

These contacts have been maintained from Wall Street which succeeded in turning the CIA into its first covert operation. The man who created the CIA in 1949 was unhappy at the deflection of the CIA's original function: "I never had any thought . . . when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations."<sup>3</sup> His intentions, however, counted for less than those of Allen Dulles, then a New York corporation lawyer and President of the Council on Foreign Relations. The Administration became concerned that the Communists might shortly win the Italian elections:

Forrestal felt that a secret counteraction was vital, but his initial assessment was that the Italian operation would have to be private. The wealthy industrialists in Milan were hesitant to provide the money, fearing reprisals if the Communists won, and so that hat was passed at the Brook Club in New York. But Allen Dulles felt the problem could not be handled effectively in private hands. He urged strongly that the government establish a covert organization with unvouchered funds, the decision was made to create it under the National Security Council.<sup>4</sup>

continued

MAR 1972

## Kissinger Under Attack By House Foreign Panel

By BENJAMIN WELLES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 29 — Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's assistant for national security, came under severe criticism today from members of Congress who accused him of pre-empting the State Department's traditional role in formulating United States foreign policy.

Representative Wayne L. Hays, Democrat of Ohio, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations, charged that Mr. Kissinger had "taken over the policymaking functions of the State Department."

"He and his ever-growing National Security Council staff are making policy," Mr. Hays charged. "He's flown off on 12 or 14 secret trips. He's got a string of 25 or 30 starlets he takes out. He seems to pack 36 hours into every day where the rest of us have only 24."

Mr. Hays's comments came as William B. Macomber Jr., deputy Under Secretary of State for Management, appeared before the subcommittee to ask authorization for a \$563.4-million budget for the department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973.

### Double Approval Needed

This was the first time that the department has been obliged to seek authorization from Congress for its annual operating budget as well as requesting appropriations of the funds themselves.

The new requirement results from an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, sponsored by J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. Fulbright has long sought

to make the State Department as responsive to the two Congressional committees principally involved with foreign policy as it has traditionally been to the two appropriations committees whose members are normally less versed in foreign affairs.

Much of Mr. Fulbright's insistence has been based on mounting irritation over Mr. Kissinger's persistent unwillingness to testify before Congress—except in strict privacy and informally. From the tone of remarks made at the hearings, the Senator's irritation appears to be shared by several senior members of the House subcommittee.

### Would Restore 'Primacy'

Subcommittee members repeatedly called on Mr. Macomber to help strengthen the State Department's "primacy" in foreign policy and, by implication, to stave off what many called the National Security Council's inroads into the foreign policy process.

Representative John Buchanan, Republican of Alabama, asserted that the State Department had "declined in power and prestige." Representative Donald M. Fraser, Democrat of Minnesota, called on the department to upgrade its role in political and military affairs to offset what he termed the Defense Department's "scare" tactics.

"I've become a great defender of the Central Intelligence Agency in recent years," Mr. Fraser said, "because every time I get briefed on strategic weaponry the C.I.A. gives the impression of being more-balanced and objective than the Pentagon. The Pentagon is always trying to scare you. They always put forward the worst imaginable case."

STATINTL

## A Finger in Every Dike

**RISE TO GLOBALISM:** American Foreign Policy Since 1938. By Stephen E. Ambrose. Penguin Books. 352 pp. Paper \$2.45.

**COLD WAR AND COUNTERREVOLUTION:** The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy. By Richard J. Walton. The Viking Press. 250 pp. \$7.95.

### RONALD RADOSH

Mr. Radosh is author of *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy* (Random House) and editor, with Murray N. Rothbard, of the forthcoming *A New History of Leviathan* (Dutton). He teaches history at Queensborough Community College of the City University of New York.

During the past ten years, it has become much more widely accepted that the cold war was not a Russian invention. Cold-war "revisionism" has made its impact. The shock of the Pentagon Papers has been eased for many by acquaintance with the historical analysis of such scholars as William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko, David Horowitz and Walter LaFeber. Yet until now, there has been no overall synthetic account that tells what each postwar administration did and also provides a critical analysis of its policies.

This task has been realized by Stephen E. Ambrose's *Rise to Globalism*. As the title suggests, Ambrose is concerned with the developing globalist conception of America's role abroad. He realizes that this posture developed from the need to avoid a postwar depression by achieving new foreign markets—a problem, since "much of the proposed market place was closed." Ambrose sees postwar foreign policy as formulated particularly to prevent nationalization of American-owned property abroad, which meant an effort to create "an open door everywhere." The globalist shift was not mindless. "Politicians looked for areas in which American influence could dominate; the businessmen looked for profitable markets and new sources of raw materials; the military looked for overseas bases," and America began a "program of expansion that had no inherent limits." This basic stance was developed by the administration of Harry S. Truman; it is in its account of these years that Mr. Ambrose's book makes its most significant contribution.

By 1947, Truman and his advisers "saw communist involvement in every attack on the status quo anywhere and convinced themselves that the Kremlin was at the head of the parade to conquer the world." To deal with what was regarded as a worldwide threat, they

undertook to arm Europe. The program had to surmount an initial obstacle: the American populace was not yet ready for a new holy crusade, and Truman needed large economic and military largesse from Congress to meet the supposed threat.

The issue Truman found to get this funding was Greece, as the United States prepared to move into the areas from which Britain was forced to withdraw. But to mask their real purpose, Truman had to present his intervention as a step on behalf of worldwide freedom. Hence the Truman Doctrine was devised, and it "defined American policy for the next twenty years. Whenever and wherever an anti-communist government was threatened, by indigenous insurgents, foreign invasion, or even diplomatic pressure . . . the United States would supply political, economic, and most of all military aid." For Truman the terms "free peoples" and "anti-communist" were assumed to be synonymous." Once the premise was accepted, the enormous interventions of future administrations were but a step away.

It was Korea, however, that allowed the Truman administration to finally achieve the enormous defense budget called for in the secret and influential National Security Council resolution 68. The drafters of NSC 68 asked for a \$35 billion budget. This task Truman considered hopeless, calculating that a reluctant Congress would grant at most \$17 billion. At least, until Korea. The crisis allowed Truman to put the recommendations of NSC 68 into effect. Ambrose is emphatic on one point: the Korean War, whichever side started it, was a boon—politically, economically and socially—to American imperialism.

As for the war itself, Ambrose corrects major errors in our understanding of it. First, he points out that the U.S. authorities knew that North Korea was planning to invade across the 38th Parallel. In fact, the State Department had prepared a resolution condemning North Korean aggression days before the attack. But unlike I. F. Stone, who argued in his book that Syngman Rhee started the war with covert American support, Ambrose writes that the North Korean action was "too strong, too well coordinated, and too successful to be a counter-attack." He believes that the North Koreans simply calculated that they could overrun the peninsula before the United States could reinforce South Korea. Moreover, American officials had already defined South Korea as outside the U.S. defense perimeter, and the North Koreans

may very well have doubted that America would move in.

Second, Ambrose presents a major revision of standard accounts of the MacArthur-Truman dispute. Truman's assumption that American bombers alone would force the North Koreans back was quickly shattered. American troops were then brought in, supposedly only to restore the border at the 38th Parallel. But by August, the policy was to reunify Korea under the aegis of the South.

Now, the policy of crossing the 38th Parallel and unifying Korea was not MacArthur's. Rather, it was the new policy of the Truman administration. The President's advisers argued that China would not intervene on Korea's behalf. Quoting from instructions issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur, Ambrose writes that stepping beyond containment "came after full discussion and consideration in the highest levels of the American government. Truman later implied, and millions believed, that MacArthur had gone ahead on his own, that it was the general in the field, not the government at home, that had changed the political objective of the war in the middle of the conflict. Such was never the case. Truman, with the full concurrence of the State and Defense Departments and the Joint Chiefs, made the decision to liberate North Korea." Much later, after MacArthur's February 1951 offensive, Truman moved away from the objective of a military victory. But that policy had itself arisen from the decision to favor containment, which actually meant war mobilization, a high defense budget, and a permanent cold-war footing for the nation. That is the significance of Truman's flat rejection of Clement Attlee's plea for peace in Asia.

In contrast to Truman and the policy of permanent intervention, Dwight D. Eisenhower appears in Ambrose's book as a President struggling nobly to minimize the effects of the cold war. While his administration engaged in the rhetoric of liberation, the reality was more often a restrained version of Truman's containment. Despite John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower was more flexible than his predecessor. The Republicans may have rattled the saber, but "they also shut down the Korean War, cut corporate taxes, and reduced the size of the armed forces. Despite intense pressure and great temptation, they entered no wars. They were willing to supply material, on a limited scale, to others . . . but they would not commit American boys to the struggle."

By 1955, the decision to go to the summit had undercut the failure of Re-

## Official Secrets

At least three times in the past year the administration has suffered the embarrassment of unintended leaks of classified information. *Intended leaks are a commonplace—a form of standard operating procedure.* Nothing but embarrassment, however, was entailed in the publication of files stolen from the Media, Pa., office of the FBI, or in the publication of the so-called Pentagon Papers, or in the publication of some reports of National Security Council sessions obtained and made public by columnist Jack Anderson. When we say "nothing but embarrassment" we mean: no irreparable injury to the country's security, no loss of human life, no disclosure of vital facts such as the sailing of transports or the location of troops. Nevertheless, it is easy to understand why the administration was embarrassed and why it would have preferred to keep these documents securely locked up in its own file cabinets. In fact, a great deal of what goes on in the executive agencies of the government is wisely and properly kept secret. No one with any practical sense would suggest that Cabinet meetings ought to be conducted on television or that the Pentagon publish all its war plans or that the Secretary of State's talks with ambassadors be made known to all the world. Confidentiality is a key to many kinds of policy planning, many kinds of contingency preparation, many kinds of difficult and delicate negotiation.

Nevertheless, the first responsibility for the preservation of government secrets is clearly the government's. And clearly the government isn't discharging it very well. Thanks to yet another unofficial leak, this newspaper published the other day an account of the final draft of a proposed revision of the executive order establishing security classification procedures. It would prescribe, among other things, new standards for classification and declassification of government information. A highly sophisticated criticism of this proposal is contained in a letter appearing on the opposite page today from William G. Florence, an experienced security policy specialist formerly with the U.S. Air Force.

We have no quarrel with the proposed measures for tightening the physical safeguards for preserving official documents. And we are in full accord with the philosophy of the proposal's opening statement: "It is essential that the citizens of the United States be informed to the maximum extent possible concerning the activities of their government. In order that it may protect itself and its citizens against hostile action, overt or covert, and may effectively carry out its foreign policy and conduct diplomatic relations with all nations, it is equally essential for their government to protect certain official information against unauthorized disclosure."

One proposal tentatively put forward in the draft

seems to us, however, to be fraught with danger to self-government. Existing law makes it a criminal offense for any government employee or official to disclose classified information to a foreign agent; the proposal would make it a crime to disclose classified material to any unauthorized person, if the classification was "secret" or "top secret." In addition, it is suggested that legislation be enacted in imitation of the British Official Secrets Act, which would impose criminal penalties not only on the government employee who divulges classified information but on the recipient of the information as well. That seems pretty plainly aimed at newspapers.

But newspapers in America are not agents, or even allies, of the government. They are, by specific provision of a written constitution—something England doesn't have—wholly independent of governmental regulation, precisely in order to enable them to serve, in Mr. Justice Hugo Black's splendid phrase, the governed, not the governors. If they are to do this effectively, they must be free to publish, within the limits of their knowledge, what they believe the public ought to know. The very-essence of press freedom, it seems to us, lies in leaving the determination of what to publish to editors, when information becomes available to them, rather than to government officials.

Under American law, the press may not publish with perfect impunity. It may be called to account and punished for publishing official information if it does so with reason to believe that the publication will do injury to the United States. But this is a standard which imposes on the government, before publication can be punished, the burden of proving injury—not merely embarrassment—and of proving intent. Thus a free press is left free, if its editors and publishers have the courage of their convictions, to publish what they think the public ought to know.

There are risks in this system—as there are risks in all forms of freedom. But these are risks that a self-governing society must run if it wants to be informed, in spite of official classification, of corrupt deals like the Teapot Dome oil leases or the fact that government agents are maintaining surveillance of persons not charged with, or even suspected, of any violation of law, or the deliberate manipulation of public opinion to take the country into war. Official secrets are sometimes disclosed because someone inside the government regards it as his patriotic duty to make the information available to a free press, some ramifications of which are discussed by Kenneth Crawford elsewhere on this page. But to foreclose the publication of such information, when it is not actually injurious to the nation, is to foreclose an essential means of keeping control of the government in the hands of the governed.

# An Appeal for a Sensible Policy on National Defense Secrecy

The Washington Post recently published news of a National Security Council recommendation that the existing secrecy policy in Executive Order 10501 for safe-guarding national defense information be reissued in a new order. Measures currently imposed to keep Congress and the people from knowing what the Executive branch is doing would be continued.

We can all be thankful for the opportunity to explore this subject with the President and express our own views. Excessive secrecy has developed into one of the most critical problems of our time. The court cases and other events of 1971 show that the more secret the Executive branch becomes, the more repressive it becomes. It has already adopted the practice of honoring its own secrets more than the right of a free press or the right of a citizen to free speech.

The NSC "final draft" revision, as obtained by The Washington Post, claims that an Executive Order is required to resolve a conflict between (a) the right of citizens to be informed concerning the activities of the government and (b) the need of the government to safeguard certain information from unauthorized disclosure. Of course, that *simply is not true*. The Constitution did not create and does not now contain a basis for any such conflict. The interests and the power of the people are paramount in this country.

The only conflict about this matter is the President's failure to recognize the citizens' rights and ask Congress for legislation, in addition to existing law, that would provide the protection he wants for information bearing on the active defense of this nation. The information could be called National Defense Data. A specific definition for the data could be similar to the one already recommended in the report submitted to the President and Congress last year by the National Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Code. The President should take guidance from the fact that the Atomic Energy Act has been quite effective in controlling Atomic Energy Restricted Data without objectionable impact on the citizens' right of access to government activities.

If the President still insists on having an Executive order on the subject of safeguarding information, here are some comments that could be helpful:

1. *Updating.* The procedures in Executive Order 10501 for classifying defense information as TOP SECRET, SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL are substantially the same as the Army and Navy used before World War II to classify military information as SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL. The policy was suitable for small self-contained military forces. All of the SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL material held by some of the large Army posts could fit in a single drawer of a storage cabinet. Circumstances are completely different today. The strength of our national defense is not limited to military effort. It stems from the vast politico-social-industrial-military complex of this country. A commensurate interchange of information is essential. Therefore, such Executive order as the President considers to be required should be radically updated.

2. *Definition.* A fatal defect of Executive Order 10501 was the absence of a definition of "national defense information." That comparatively narrow term was an improvement over the broader terms "national security" and "security information" which were discarded in 1953. However, it is imperative that the designation used be limited severely by specific definition to information which the President really believes would damage the national defense and which leads itself to effective control measures.

3. *Categories.* Consistent with the urgent need to narrow the scope of protection, there should be only one category of defense information. Internal distribution designators could be used to limit distribution of a given item, but there need be only one classification marking. Experience proves that three classifications invite serious confusion, promote uncontrollable overclassification, and reduce the effectiveness of the security system.

4. *Authority to Classify.* The President's assumed authority to impose a defense classification authority since they are not classification ought to be exercised by only a tiny fraction of the hundreds of thousands of people who are now classifying. The new definition and great importance of the information involved would permit limiting classification authority to persons designated by the President and to such others as they might designate. (Individuals who put markings on documents containing information classified by someone else do not need classifiers.) As a new procedure, anyone who assigns a defense classification to material which does not qualify for protection should be made subject to disciplinary action as a counterfeiter.

5. *Declassification.* The millions of classified papers currently gushing forth cannot possibly be kept under review for declassification on a document-by-document basis. But that is no reason for perpetuating assigned classifications as the NSC proposed. The President should take the insignificant risk and cancel the classification on historical material by appropriate order. As guidance, this writer authored DoD Directive 5200.9 in 1958 which canceled the classifica-

tion on a great volume of information under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense that had originated through the year 1945. As for the smaller number of items that should be produced in the future, declassification by the originating authority would be practicable and enforceable. Exceptional classified items, if any, sent to records repositories could be declassified automatically after the passage of a period of time such as 10 years.

6. *Privately Owned Information.* It is estimated that at least 25% of the material in this country which bears unjustifiable classifications was privately generated and is privately owned. The Executive order should specifically exclude privately owned information from the defense classification system.

7. *Misrepresentation of Law.* The NSC draft revision would continue the existing misrepresentation of the espionage laws by warning that disclosure of information in a classified document to an unauthorized person is a crime. The law applies only if there is intent to injure the United States, with no reference to classification markings. Falsification of the law should be eliminated.

The President could do the country a great service if he would seek advice from Congress and others outside the Executive branch regarding Executive Order 10501. It is hoped that many concerned citizens will help influence the adoption of that course of action.

WILLIAM G FLORENCE.

Washington.

The writer retired from the Air Force in May, 1971, after 43 years of government service, including 26 years as a security policy specialist.

(See editorial, "Official Secrets.")



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## A Light Checkrein On The CIA

THE CENTRAL Intelligence Agency gets a large chunk of its funds through hidden channels.

A favorite method is for another agency's budget to be kited by a certain amount, then that amount is declared surplus and transferred to the CIA.

In this manner, only a handful of people know what has occurred, most of them in the Executive branch. There is an oversight committee of the Senate made up of senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, plus four members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

As chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Sen. John Stennis of Miss. presides over the group, which is supposed to monitor all CIA activities. Last year the oversight committee didn't meet a single time.

The Foreign Relations Committee members on the oversight panel are angry. They contend CIA activities around the world have a decisive effect on the conduct of U.S. diplomatic policy.

They have taken action to bypass Stennis and to gain some measure of control over CIA funds, personnel and activities by writing new curbs into the foreign aid authorization bill.

The bill, signed by President Nixon the other day, requires for the first time a reduction in military personnel working for the CIA in activities similar to the assistance and advisory groups now operating in Cambodia and Laos.

It includes the CIA in the \$341,000,000 ceiling on aid to Cambodia and requires CIA arms transfers to be counted against the military aid appropriation. The CIA is reported to have warehouses filled with arms at various points in Southeast Asia for distribution to anti-communist guerrillas.

The CIA will be forbidden to pay foreign troops — such as the 4,800 "volunteers" in Laos — more than their counterparts in the U.S. armed forces. The bill specifically places the CIA under existing restrictions on giving arms to forces in Asia.

It will require quarterly reports to Congress on Cambodia and annual reports on foreign aid. CIA assistance will be included in the totals, although it will probably not be pinpointed.

These regulations will increase congressional supervision over shadow wars, but the language is not so tight as to prevent some circumvention, if the CIA is supported by the White House.

The National Security Council, the President's consultative committee to which the CIA reports, has the final decision on the agency's activities.

However, the new controls should require the CIA to think twice before committing the U.S. to clandestine wars, as it has done all too often in the last several years.

# View from the fudge factory

By David K. Willis

Washington

It looks the same, outwardly—endless antiseptic corridors; subdued lighting; anonymous doors opening into hushed offices; the flags and the globe and the slippery floor of the diplomatic entrance on C Street. . . .

This is home to that body of men and women whom Franklin D. Roosevelt called "cookie pushers," and whom John F. Kennedy characterized as "those people over there who smile a lot"—the professional diplomatic corps of the United States.

But the "fudge factory" (as the State Department has ingloriously been dubbed) is not the same at all, really. To a visitor returning after several years, it is even more subdued than it was in the late '60's. It feels even less in the mainstream of U.S. policymaking than it felt in Lyndon Johnson's day; morale is low, and the talk of the building is often about what might be done to redress the balance.

The thoughts come thick and fast as President Nixon's party heads to Peking. Diplomats at the State Department welcome Mr. Nixon's initiative toward the People's Republic. They want to see it succeed. Some of them helped in preliminary staff work, writing papers for Dr. Henry Kissinger and his national security staff. And yet, even those officials who would normally expect to know the ins and outs of evolving U.S. strategy toward Peking were frank to admit in private conversation a few days ago that they did not know the exact state of play.

It hardly needs restating: Major American foreign policy is formed and executed largely in the White House these days. The Kissinger staff, according to a late report, numbers 46 assistants, with 105 administrative personnel. Both Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger like to plan quietly—and to move quickly. Neither demonstrates much regard for the diplomatic bureaucracy. They ask it questions, but not for crucial policy recommendations—or so one is led to understand. They do not ignore it entirely, but neither do they keep it informed of just who is saying what to whom when Dr. Kissinger makes his dramatic, secret journeys: to Peking, to Paris.

Some diplomats, unsurprisingly, don't like it at all. No one man, or two men, no matter how brilliant, can cover every nuance in dealings with nations such as China or North Vietnam, they say. Others are seriously concerned with the quality of recent appointments to the rank of ambassador: former Treasury Secretary David Kennedy to NATO, for instance (considered by some too old, by others too inexperienced); Borg-Warner's Robert Ingersoll to Tokyo (recognized as a gracious businessman, an expert in business, but largely inexperienced in Japanese affairs outside business, and a newcomer to Asian diplomacy in which Japan is beginning to play what the professionals consider an enormously significant part).

Granted, it is said, that Mr. Nixon has disliked the Foreign Service since 1954 when the Republicans came to power with a fistful of new slogans such as "massive retaliation." And Mr. Nixon was right: The professionals didn't like him, or President Eisenhower, or John Foster Dulles. But those days have gone. The world has changed.

Issues are increasingly complex. The bureaucracy of State and the Central Intelligence Agency does possess expertise, built up over the years. True, bureaucracy grinds slowly—and true, it needs shaking up from time to time: prodding, cajoling, pushing. Yet, by cutting State out from the crucial decisions, the view maintains, the White House runs clear and definite risks, both now and for the future.

How, then, to marry professional expertise to the need of the White House to move fast and flexibly? One answer: the White House could cut in six or seven top professional diplomats on China and Vietnam strategy. This could serve several purposes, it is said: ensure that all policy bases are covered; prevent further atrophy of State, which is becoming more and more cautious about making firm recommendations to Dr. Kissinger's people ("Where is Henry right now, while we're talking?" asked one source with a grin; "in Pyongyang? Could be . . ."), thereby lowering its standing in the White House still more. It could even help prevent "leaks" from the bureaucracy of the kind that Mr. Nixon detests. Where no one knows anything, the argument runs, disgruntlement can lead to erroneous speculating to friendly journalistic ears; it is safer, paradoxically, if a few people know a lot.

Professional diplomats have deep respect for Dr. Kissinger, and, they say, for Mr. Nixon's approaches; privately, however, many feel that the quality of the national security staff does not equal the best men in State. The professionals acknowledge that State needs to find ways to keep secrets better—to show Mr. Nixon that it can indeed be trusted.

It asks for the chance.

David Willis, Monitor American news editor, was this newspaper's State Department correspondent for four years from 1965.

STATINTL

# White Housekeeping

By RUSSELL BAKER

STATINTL

## OBSERVER

WASHINGTON, Feb. 14 — Dear Spiro:

Have stepped out for a while. Over to China for a few days to see Chou and Mao and that strange bunch of Commies. Remember? I told you about it several weeks ago. Anyhow, would you be a real pal and keep an eye on the White House while I'm out? If you get hungry, all you have to do is pick up the telephone and tell the operator you want to order some food. Same thing if you want to go out. Get the operator and say, "I want to go out."

She'll say something like, "Do you want to go bowling, or do you want to go to the Azores to see Pompidou, or what?"

The thing is, Spiro, she has to know whether to order the limousine or the helicopter or one of the big jets, so don't tell her it's none of her business where you want to go. She is just trying to be helpful.

Now about using my desk. . . . When you sit down at the desk you'll see a lot of buttons. Whatever you do . . . and I really mean this, old buddy . . . don't push any of those buttons. Okay?

I mean, really, Spiro, keep your fingers off the buttons, okay? We don't want to have any nuclear mistakes. On second thought, it might be a good idea if you didn't use my desk. Get the White House operator and ask her to have somebody set you up a little desk of your own by the window without any buttons. There's a terrific view of the Washington Monument from the window. If you want to be photographed for the newspapers there, just get the operator and say you want your picture in the papers, and she'll do the rest.

About the Hot Line: If the Hot Line rings, pick it up and say, "Hello-ovich, Gospodin. Have you got bad news for me?" If the voice on the other end says "Nyet," you can quit worrying because they are just playing around again. If the voice says, "Da," you've got a problem.

The best thing is to see if you can get hold of Mel Laird. Also it might be a good idea to go to the air-raid shelter. Pick up the phone. Get the White House operator and tell her you want to go to the air-raid shelter and she will arrange for you to be taken down there.

Oh, almost forgot Congress. There's a Congress going on at the Capitol. A Congress is a big swarm of Democrats who are running for President. They are in the White House. They have places of their own—the Capitol, New Hampshire and Florida.

If they come around and start tormenting you while you're out walking on the White House lawn, don't argue with them. Just tell them, "If you don't like me here, why don't you go back to New Hampshire?"

If they insist on coming right on into the White House, just get hold of the operator and tell her the Democrats are giving you trouble and she'll get hold of somebody who will have them removed.

Incidentally, Spiro—Congress loves to get messages from the White House. It makes them feel important, as though somebody still needs them. If you've got some spare time, send them a White House message on something and urge them to pass an important new bill.

If you want to send a message to Congress, all you have to do is get the White House operator and tell her what you have in mind and she will send in some message-to-Congress writers.

I can't think of much else that might go wrong before I get back, although there's a possibility that a certain fast-buck roofing contractor will drop by and give you that line about how he was working in the neighborhood and just happened to see some loose shingles around the White House chimneys and thinks you ought to have him go up there and see if you don't need some roof work done. What he does then is go up there wearing hob-nailed boots and kick holes through the tar paper, which I then have to pay him to patch up. If this character takes advantage of my absence to show up, just pick up the phone and get the White House operator. She will know how to have him put out quietly.

That's about all I can think of, Spiro, except don't let any hippies in.

You don't have to worry about any routine foreign crises. If you get a sudden crisis, the National Security Council will meet and tell you what to do. Of course, you don't have to accept their advice. If you're in doubt about whether to do it their way or not, get hold of the White House operator and tell her your problem and she'll work it out for you.

Last thing: "What do I do if I pick up the phone and the operator isn't there?" you're going to ask. Don't worry about it, Spiro. Believe me, I've lived with the same question for three years now, and I can assure you, there are a lot of ways.

See you on the telly.

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# Hopes Pinned on Vast Reform at State Dept.

BY PAUL HOUSTON  
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—As is the practice of diplomats, William B. Macomber ushered the visitor away from his desk and over to the more relaxed setting of couch and side chairs.

"Somebody said the only thing that had changed in American diplomacy over all these years was the invention of the telegraph," Macomber laughed. "Well, now we have about 400 other things."

Macomber, deputy undersecretary of state for management, is in charge of implementing a vast reform program that rather desperately seeks to restore to the State Department some measure of its old clout—if not its former preeminence.

## New Catchwords

Hence, Foggy Bottom has some new catchwords:

—"Openness" (seeking more contact with the rest of the foreign affairs community);

—"Creativity" (encouraging more dissent from the official line);

—"Democratization" (ridding foreign missions of the hierarchal structure topped by an authoritarian ambassador);

—"Functional specialization" (turning all-purpose diplomats into political, economic, administrative and consular—visa-stamping—specialists).

After World War II, the accelerating complexity of international affairs brought many other government departments (Defense, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, etc.) and agencies (for intelligence, foreign aid, propa-

ganda) into the foreign policy arena in a big way. State was slow to learn that it was losing prominence by dealing with these "interlopers" at arm's length.

## Security Council Rises

Meanwhile, Congress in 1947 established a National Security Council to review, coordinate and control American foreign policy. This led to the eclipse of State's traditional quarterback role in the foreign policy process.

It is the hope—some say the vain dream—of many in the foreign service that reforms will persuade future presidents to have the State Department take over some of the National Security Council's duties. There is not much belief that President Nixon will change his preference for a National Security Council directing foreign policy under a special assistant, Henry A. Kissinger.

Charles W. Bray III, 38, is one of the aging "Young Turks" who prodded the State Department into instituting a massive introspective study that led to the reforms.

"Historically," he says, "the foreign service has been a very closed corporation with a highly paternalistic system of internal administration."

"To some of us the department's isolation from the American mainstream, and its declining influence in Washington, were intolerable."

As one indication of changing department attitudes, there was a time when Bray's foreign service career was in doubt. His agitating almost got him exiled. But then, as reform became the "in" thing, Bray rose with uncommon swiftness last February to become the department's spokesman at daily press briefings.

As might be expected, the reforms have not been universally cheered.

"A lot of schisms have been created," complains a former high official who

recently retired. "A lot of the old corps spirit has been not only permitted to die but encouraged to die."

What rubs old guardsmen most is the development of a collective bargaining unit among foreign service officers and the establishment of strong employee grievance procedures.

One disgruntled senior official says, "There's a great deal of outcry for rights and benefits, but there is very little talk of duty."

## 400 Changes Made

Despite these criticisms, the reforms seem to have gained wide acceptance in a bureaucracy that must have the biggest group of frustrated intellectuals in government.

Macomber, noted that 400 recommendations for change have been implemented out of 500 put forward in an inch-thick plan 17 months ago.

He cites the following changes as "solid and significant, although not the millenium":

—Modern management techniques have been instituted using systems analysis and interdisciplinary teams of senior officials. The aim is to identify priority issues, assign the right kind of manpower to each issue and review policies periodically in toughminded adversary proceedings.

## Computer Indexing

With the microfilming and computer indexing of 25,000 documents requiring action at the State Department every year, it is hoped there will be no repeats of the kind of embarrassment that hit the department in 1967 during the Arab-Israeli six-day war.

American officials could not find the copy of a crucial letter former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had written to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion in 1956. Sheepishly, the State Department had to ask Israel

—New ideas, divergent opinion and "creative dissent" have been encouraged, Macomber says, through the use of special message channels, new staff functions and something called the Open Forum Panel. At weekly, closed-door meetings of the panel, younger officers take issue with various American policies and advance their views in papers to the Secretary of State.

—A complete overhaul of the controversial "selection out" and promotion system also is aimed at encouraging officers to take unpopular positions.

## Automatic Retirement

Formerly, a lower or middle-grade officer had to think twice about sticking his neck out, because if he failed to win a promotion to the next grade within a certain number of years, he was involuntarily retired without a pension.

The system, when fairly administered, was invaluable in shedding dead wood. But it was widely judged to be unfairly arbitrary in many cases—including that of Charles Thomas.

After Thomas, the father of three, was selected out at the age of 46, he had no success with 2,000 job applications (being over-qualified or over-age). Last May he shot himself to death.


The suicide stirred a furore and prevented former State personnel director Howard P. Mace from being confirmed by the Senate as ambassador to Sierra Leone.

Now, after a junior officer passes a certain low threshold, he is guaranteed tenure of 20 years plus a pension—and may gain promotions in competition with others in his specialty.

A major problem remains, however, and it will be aggravated by the tenure system. State is topheavy with senior officers who refuse to retire

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The New York Times/Nancy Moran

**LAOTIANS ON THE MOVE:** Soldiers board plane at Ban Xon, Laos, for flight to Long Tieng, a base operated by the Central Intelligence Agency that was recently under siege. The Airline, Air America, is also supported by C.I.A.

## First Congressional Restraints Are Imposed on C.I.A.

By BENJAMIN WELLES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 12—The foreign aid authorization bill, signed by President Nixon on Monday, includes for the first time in a quarter-century new controls on the operations, cost and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The controls, which thus far have attracted little public attention, are the first to be added since Congress created the agency through the National Security Act of 1947, a measure that was amended in 1949.

This act exempts the CIA from most fiscal and personnel controls imposed on other federal agencies. Funds, personnel and material voted by Congress to other agencies, such as the Defense Department, can, for example, be switched legally to the C.I.A.

The controls were inserted at various points in the bill largely through the ef-

forts of Senators Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey; Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, and Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri.

They are members of the Foreign Relations Committee. Together with the committee's Chairman, J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, they have protested increasingly in recent months that Congress has too little knowledge of, let alone control over, the agency's activities, particularly in Southeast Asia.

Senator Case urged on July 12 a tightening of restrictions over the Defense Department's use of its funds overseas and over its power to transfer "surplus" military material to other United States agencies. Mr. Case insisted that the C.I.A. be included in the restrictions lest United States involvement in Cambodia develop surreptitiously, as he said it had in Laos.

Laos. He said, "would prevent the cir-

cumvention of Congressional intent in the funding of activities such as the Thai troops in Laos through C.I.A. rather than through more open Government agencies."

"It would also," he said, "eliminate the possibility that the Cooper-Church prohibitions against the use of American troops or advisers in Cambodia could be skirted by using C.I.A. personnel."

### Stennis Their Irritant

The ire of the committee members is reported to be less against the C.I.A. itself than against Senator John C. Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee and of the so-called "Oversight" Committee for the agency. The Oversight Committee comprises senior members of the Armed Services

and Appropriations committees plus four members of the Foreign Relations Committee. It is supposed to watch over all the agency's activities.

Under Senator Stennis's direction, however, it did not meet at all in 1971—to the annoyance of Senators from the Foreign Relations Committee, who contend that C.I.A. activities around the world intimately and sometimes decisively affect the conduct of United States foreign policy.

They have now moved to bypass Senator Stennis and to gain some control over the agency's funds, personnel and activities by writing controls into the aid bill. Some Congressional sources say, however, that there are still loopholes.

Specifically, according to legislative specialists, the new controls will require the following actions:



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## NEW RULES URGED ON SECRET PAPERS

### Security Agency Proposes a Presidential Order on Law

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 10—The National Security Council has proposed an Executive order tightening regulations governing the handling of classified information and suggested the possibility that the President might seek legislation to make it a crime for unauthorized persons to receive secret documents, a White House official said Thursday night.

The legislative suggestion, if accepted, would result in a proposal by the President of a tough new law similar to the British Official Secrets Act, which imposes stiff penalties on those who receive as well as on those who disclose classified information.

This was one of three alternatives suggested for the President in a draft proposal now being circulated among the Departments of State, Defense and Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other governmental bodies, the White House official said.

Of the two others, the draft suggested that the President might seek revision of a section of the Federal Espionage Act to make it a crime to give classified information to any unauthorized person. The law now provides penalties for disclosure to "a foreign agent."

#### Other Possibility

The other possibility suggested was merely that present laws be left unchanged.

These were the only legislative suggestions in the draft proposals, which were offered in response to the President's demand for a study of the handling of classified material, made shortly after the publication of the Pentagon Papers, the Defense Department's secret study of the United States drift into the Vietnam War.

The other suggestions in the draft proposal applied primarily to the classification of Government documents, setting up regulations over how materials should be classified, the length of time certain documents could remain classified, and who would be allowed to receive them.

These, the draft proposal said, could be effected in a revision of the Executive order that now controls the handling of classified information.

The draft was being circulated to the various agencies for their comments.

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# Pentagon Fights Secrets Plan

By Sanford J. Ungar  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Defense Department is opposing a National Security Council recommendation that all classified government information be made public after being kept secret for a maximum of 30 years.

Criticizing an NSC draft revision of government security regulations, the Pentagon has appealed for a "savings clause" that would permit agency heads to designate material affecting foreign relations which they believe must remain secret indefinitely in the interest of "national security."

But the Defense Department also questions some sections of the NSC draft as unduly restrictive and has suggested changes that might have the effect of reducing the number of classified documents in government archives.

The Pentagon suggestions are contained in a memorandum to the National Security Council from J. Fred Buzhardt, general counsel of the Defense Department.

The Washington Post has obtained a copy of that memorandum, one of several that will be considered by the National Security Council before submitting the draft for presidential approval.

Meanwhile, members of Congress and other experts on security classification attacked the NSC draft for cutting back on public access to government information rather than expanding it.

Rep. John E. Moss (D-Calif.), the author of the Freedom of Information Act, said that "no more stringent regulations are needed. They are the antithesis of a free society."

Commenting on details of the NSC draft as revealed in The Washington Post yesterday, Moss was especially critical of the suggestion that the President seek legislation, similar to the British Official Secrets Act, which would severely punish anyone who receives classified information as well as those who disclose it.

Such legislation, Moss said, "would be an outrageous imposition upon the American people. I will fight it, and I would hope that every enlightened American will fight it."

Rep. William S. Moorhead (D-Pa.), whose House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information will open new hearings next month, complained yesterday that the NSC draft was "aimed only at closing information leaks in the executive branch rather than (making) more information available to the public and in Congress."

Moorhead said he had requested a copy of the NSC draft from the White House. Early in the day, the Office of Legal Counsel at the Justice Department declined to provide a copy to the staff of the Moorhead subcommittee, saying that it was only "a working draft."

The Jan. 11 letter of transmittal which accompanied the NSC proposal when it was sent to the Departments of State, Defense and Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission, however, called it "the final draft."

The Defense Department recommendations concerning the draft, sent to the NSC on Jan. 21, were the product of a review by the three military departments and "a working group composed of classification specialists, intelligence experts and lawyers," according to Buzhardt's memorandum.

Buzhardt observed in the memo that the Pentagon found so many problems with the draft that it should "be substantially reworked before submission to the President."

Among other matters, the Defense Department urged an updating of the definitions of the three security classifications as follows:

- "The test for assigning 'Top Secret' classification shall be whether its unauthorized disclosure would reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation or its citizens."

As examples of such damage, it cited a range of situations from "armed hostilities against the United States or its allies" to the compromise of cryptologic and communications intelligence systems.

- "Secret" is to be used to prevent "serious damage" such as "endangerment to the effectiveness of a program or policy significantly related to the national security" or "jeopardy to the lives of prisoners of war."

- "Confidential" refers to national security information or material, the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably cause damage to the national security." No examples were listed in this category.

The Pentagon also said that "it is imperative that these restrictions be imposed only where there is an established need."

The Defense Department objected, however, to the NSC's proposed requirement that every classified document be marked to indicate who had declared it secret. Buzhardt's memo called this condition "both unrealistic and unworkable."

Its strongest objection appeared to involve the NSC suggestion for a 30-year rule guaranteeing that all secret documents are released eventually.

"A savings clause to provide for exceptions to be exercised only by the agency head concerned is essential to prevent damage to national security," the Pentagon recommendations said.

"There are certain contingency plans dating from the 1920s which should be exempt from the 30-year rule," the Pentagon critique added. "Release of such documents would be unacceptable from a foreign relations standpoint for an indefinite period."

William G. Florence, a retired security expert for the Air Force, complained yesterday that the NSC draft, as reported in The Washington Post, "will continue to permit hundreds of thousands of people to continue putting unwarranted security classifications on information."

Florence referred to the practice as "illegal censorship."

# The most important No. 2 man in history

by HUGH SIDEY

**H**enry Kissinger sits at the round table in the corner of his blue-and-gold office. His back is to the window, and beyond the window the White House lawn is just touched by the winter sun. With the lone exception of Richard Nixon, who is 50 paces down the hall and already deep into the morning's routine, Kissinger is the most talked about, most analyzed and most important man in Washington. There is not a No. 2 man in history who has ever wielded such power, with such authority.

He has devoured his dietary portion of scrambled eggs, crunched through half an English muffin and now is pouring black coffee. He has read hastily through the cover stories on him in both *TIME* and *Newsweek*. After a few caustic comments about how journalists think the National Security Council works, he grins and says, "I asked [White House speechwriter] Bill Safire if he thought I could survive two cover stories in a single week. Safire said, 'No, Henry, but what a way to go.'"

Henry is not going. Now, suddenly, he seems to drop a curtain between this office and such notions as public image. He leans forward, his brow furrowed. His eyes are wide, even gentle. His physical presence is again unassuming. He is the professor, sure enough of himself and the knowledge he brings, but nevertheless aware of how much he does not yet know and of how uncertain are the affairs of men.

"I'm concerned about American civilization," he says, his hands fumbling with each other, his voice slow. "We live in a world in which some countries pursue ruthless policies. . . . We are in a period which someday may be compared to one of the religious ages, when whole values change. . . . We are a warm-hearted people, concerning ourselves with a lot that is superficial, not willing to believe that we can make irrevocable errors, not willing to trust the judgment of the leaders until all the facts are in and it is usually too late, absorbed in bureaucratic infighting and indulging in various forms of debilitating nostalgia."

being where he is. Richard Nixon, gut-bucket Middle American, and Henry Kissinger, Harvard intellectual, share doubts about the future. They also share something else—the belief that their particular talents are the right ones for these times, to arrest the national decay and help revitalize the American spirit.

Kissinger looks uneasily at the lighted buttons on his huge phone console, the fever chart of the White House. "The historian in me says it can't be done. The political man in me says it is possible. This is an elemental country, capable of tremendous effort when moved." Optimism is clearly ascendant this morning with Henry Kissinger—and most mornings. Part of it comes from the sheer joy of power, a glandular stimulant that is not found in Widener Library stacks or in graduate seminars on international affairs. Another part is the realization that three years of the Nixon-Kissinger sense of objective and order have perceptibly calmed the world and nurtured hope.

"That's our major concern about Vietnam," Kissinger says, shifting so he can watch the progress of the thin sun against the frost on the window panes. He throws a leg over the chair arm. "The President very badly wants to end the war, but not in a way that breaks the American spirit, in a way that this country can preserve its confidence in itself." Behind him are shelves of books on history and politics, a kind of background tapestry to Kissinger's life. Since his childhood in Germany, he has lived in a world of collapsing political systems. A "sense of things failing" has been the subject of his scholarship, and guided the choice of one of his major study areas, the five weeks of miscalculation and error which preceded World War I. "History is not a cookbook from which you can get recipes," Kissinger has said. But his cardinal rule of diplomatic planning comes from his understanding of historical prec-

# NSC Urges Stiffer Law On Secrets

By Sanford J. Ungar  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The National Security Council is proposing tougher regulations to keep classified information out of the hands of unauthorized government officials, defense contractors and the public.

It suggests that President Nixon may want to go as far as seeking legislation similar to the British Official Secrets Act, which would have the effect of imposing stiff criminal penalties on anyone who receives classified information, as well as on those who disclose it.

The recommendations are contained in the draft revision of the executive order that has governed the security classification system since 1953.

The draft was submitted to the Departments of State, Defense and Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission last month for their comments. A copy was obtained by The Washington Post yesterday.

After suggestions have come back from those agencies, a revised draft is expected to be sent to the President for approval on his return from China.

The National Security Council draft is the result of a year's work by a special inter-agency committee headed by William H. Rehnquist, formerly an assistant attorney general and now a Justice of the Supreme Court.

National Security Council sources said yesterday that Rehnquist's contributions to the revision were "very important." He did yeoman work.

Rehnquist resigned from the inter-agency committee when he was sworn in as a member of the high court last month, and he has not been replaced.

If adopted in its current form, the NSC draft would freeze the existing secrecy stamps on thousands of documents now in special categories exempt from automatic declassification over a period of 12 years.

The exempt documents now include "information or mate-

rial originated by foreign governments or international organizations," "extremely sensitive information or material" singled out by the heads of agencies and "information or material which warrants some degree of classification for an indefinite period."

The NSC draft abolishes special categories and introduces a "30-year rule" setting the time limit for declassification of all future secret government information.

The time period over which some documents would be automatically down-graded in security classification and eventually declassified would be reduced from 12 to 10 years.

Documents originally stamped "top secret" could be made public after 10 years. Those marked "secret" could be declassified after 8 years, and those with a "confidential" stamp after 6 years.

But before that time has passed, the NSC draft suggests, "classified information or material no longer needed in current working files" may be "promptly destroyed, transferred or retired" to reduce stockpiles of classified documents and cut the costs of handling them.

A House subcommittee investigating the availability of classified information has estimated the cost of maintaining secret government archives at \$60 million to \$80 million annually.

Although the special review of classification procedures was commissioned by President Nixon long before the top-secret Pentagon papers on the war in Vietnam were disclosed to the public last summer, the NSC draft reflects a number of the problems debated during the Pentagon papers episode.

Among the recommendations in the NSC draft are:

- Creation of an "inter-agency review committee," whose chairman would be appointed by the President, to supervise all government security classification activity and handle complaints from the public about overclassification.

- An annual "physical inventory" by each agency holding classified material to be sure that security has been strictly preserved.

- Establishment of a requirement that everyone using classified material not only have a security clearance, but "access" to particular items "in connection with his perform-

ance or official duties or contractual obligations."

- Tighter control over "dissemination outside the Executive Branch" to such organizations as the Rand Corp. in California, which performs defense research under government contracts.

- Establishment of safekeeping standards by the General Services Administration to assure that all classified material is appropriately locked up and guarded.

- Markings on every classified document to make it possible to "identify the individual or individuals who originally classified each component."

- Establishment of its own rules by every government agency on when and how it will make classified information available to Congress or the courts.

The NSC draft lists 41 government agencies which would have the authority to put classification stamps on documents and other materials. They range from the White House and Atomic Energy Commission to the Panama Canal Co. and the Federal Maritime Commission.

Several agencies which previously did not have such authority are added to the list, such as the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy and the Export-Import Bank.

Only two agencies—ACTION, successor to the Peace Corps, and the Tennessee Valley Authority—are to be restricted to the use of "classified" stamps, and banned from classifying documents "top secret" or "secret."

Except for its final pages, which are stamped "For Official Use Only," the copy of the NSC draft obtained by The Post bears no security marking itself.

It is in the final pages that the National Security Council makes its recommendations for revising criminal statutes to deal with unauthorized disclosure of classified information. The President is offered three options:

- Leaving existing law unchanged.

- Revising one section of the federal espionage act to omit the requirement that disclosure, to be considered criminal, must be "to a foreign agent." The revision would make it a crime to disclose classified information to any unauthorized person.

- Seeking legislation like the British Official Secrets Act, which severely punishes those who disclose and receive classified information.

Touching on an issue that was repeatedly raised during the court cases involving the Pentagon papers, the NSC draft also instructs:

"In no case shall information be classified in order to conceal inefficiency or administrative error, to prevent embarrassment to a person or agency, to restrain competition or independent initiative, or to prevent for any other reason the release of information which does not require protection in the interest of national security."

Several judges ruled last summer that publication of the Pentagon papers, a history of American involvement in Vietnam, might cause embarrassment to government officials but would not endanger the national well-being.

The draft also substitutes the term "national security" wherever "national defense" was used in the previous regulation controlling the classification of information.

One expert on security classification said yesterday that national security is generally considered a broader term which permits the classification of more material.

The NSC draft also provides for classification of anything whose "unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to result" in damage to the nation, a less stringent condition than was previously imposed.

The preamble to the draft states that "it is essential that the citizens of the United States be informed to the maximum extent possible concerning the activities of their government," but adds that it is "equally essential for their government to protect certain official information against unauthorized disclosure."

The draft, says the NSC, is intended "to provide for a just resolution of the conflict between these two essential national interests."

# Nixon Studies U.S. Reports For Upcoming China Visit

By Paul G. Edwards

Washington Post Staff Writer

KEY BISCAVNE, Fla., Feb. 4 — President Nixon spent today at his Florida retreat reading State Department and National Security Council reports in preparation for his upcoming trip to China.

Press secretary Ronald Ziegler said at a morning briefing that Mr. Nixon plans to study about 500 pages of material on China during the weekend, including transcripts of discussions between White House foreign affairs adviser Henry Kissinger and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai.

Ziegler said the President also has with him some of the books on China that he has been reading, but he said that Mr. Nixon had asked that the titles of the books not be released.

The press secretary was asked if the books included the thoughts of Mao, the "Little Red Book" of party doctrine by Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Ziegler replied that he did not know.

On national employment figures released today, Ziegler said that the addition of 240,000 workers to the job force last month and resulting decline in unemployment from 6 per cent to 5.9 per cent of the work force "give us a sense of optimism."

"If the growth in employment continues at this magnitude," he said, "we feel it will cut away at the unemployment rate."

Ziegler also announced appointment by the President of four former top government officials to the general advisory committee of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. If confirmed by the Senate, the nominees will replace four members of the committee who have resigned.

Appointed were Robert Ells, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency; David

Packard, former deputy Secretary of Defense, and Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Those who have resigned are William Casey, chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission; Cyrus Vance, former Secretary of the Army; Peter G. Peterson, newly appointed Secretary of Commerce, and Douglas Dillon, former Secretary of the Treasury.

Mr. Nixon was greeted at Miami International Airport by personal friend Charles G. (Bebe) Rebozo when the presidential plane landed at 9:36 p.m. Thursday night.

At 4 o'clock, the President took an hour-long break for a ride on Biscayne Bay in Rebozo's boat, the Coco Lobo III. On board with Mr. Nixon were Rebozo and the President's younger daughter and son-in-law, Julie and David Eisenhower.

The weather was sunny but windy with the temperature in the mid-60s.

The plane left Andrews Air Force Base at 7:04 p.m. On board with the President on the trip was National Football League Commissioner Pete Rozelle.



When Britain pulled out of Rhodesia after the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the CIA worked to ferret out details of the sanction-busting. In the popular traditions of spying, secret documents disguised as letters were used to convey messages in invisible ink. It was a shock when one of the informers was a prominent lawyer. But it was not the CIA had expanded into an area where the British were unactive in Egypt, Iran and Syria. E. H. COOKRIDGE ends his column and looks at the Director, Richard Helms

# DEAD LETTERS

## IN SALISBURY

**M**ANY of the bright young men Allen Dulles had recruited to CIA from law offices and universities had gained their spurs in London, where they were sent to glean some of the methods of the British Secret Intelligence Service. Dulles enjoyed making wisecracks about the Victorian and Indian Army traditions still surviving in the British secret service, but he had a healthy respect for its unrivalled experience and great professionalism. He knew that CIA could learn a lot from the British about operations in the Middle East and Africa, where its stations were rapidly expanding.

After Archibald Roosevelt, one of CIA's foremost "Arabists", had restored cordial relations with SIS when station head in London, a plan of co-operation was devised for Africa, where most of the former British colonies had gained independence, and were becoming subject to strong Soviet and Chinese pressure. Roosevelt was still in London when, in 1965, Rhodesia made her momentous "Unilateral Declaration of Independence" (UDI), which led to the conflict with the British Government.

There is no better instance of the strengthening of CIA-SIS collaboration than the hitherto undisclosed story of the services CIA rendered the British authorities in Rhodesia, particularly since about 1968.

Indeed, in assisting the British SIS in its thankless task of implementing the policy of economic sanctions against the Smith regime, CIA put its relations with the Portuguese in jeopardy. It has an enduring understanding with the Portuguese Government and its PIDE secret service on many aspects: NATO security, anti-communist operations, the use of radio stations in Portugal and her colonies, and of bases for the U.S. Navy, Marines and Special Forces in Angola, Mozambique and Macao. However thin the

British sanction policy became, British consular offices and SIS men were supposed to watch the steady flow of Rhodesian pig-iron, tobacco, and other products through the Portuguese ports of Lorenzo Marques and Beira in East Africa to Europe and the Far East. Merchants and shippers there had made fortunes out of the traffic which the Portuguese were bound, by United Nations resolutions and agreements with Britain, to regard as illegal.

After the closure of British missions in Salisbury all information about Rhodesian exports dried up at source. At this juncture CIA stepped in to assist the British. It was not merely a labour of love. American tobacco syndicates in Virginia, Georgia, North and South Carolina, Tennessee and Kentucky greatly increased their production and sales to Europe when Rhodesian tobacco growers lost most of their trade through sanctions. Traditionally, Rhodesian tobacco was used for cigar and cigarette manufacture in Belgium, Holland, Germany and Switzerland. When these supplies dried up, European manufacturers turned to American growers. But by and by Rhodesian exports began to flow again, by the use of false certificates of origin and smuggling through the Portuguese ports and through Durban in South Africa, much to the displeasure of the Americans.

Thus, obliging the British and helping American business, CIA ordered its agents to ferret out the secrets of the sanction-busting schemes devised by Mr Ian Smith's regime. Soon the CIA station in Salisbury was bustling with activity. Since 1962 it had been headed by Richard La Macchia, a senior CIA official, who had joined it in 1952 from the U.S. Development Aid Agency.

Other CIA men were Cal Francis M who had cloak-and-wigant, Congo du and sever the most Edward

Salisbury----- 1957 from the State Department; from 1959 he headed the East and South African section and, at the time of his new appointment, was Station Head in Pretoria. Among his various exploits he was reputed to have initiated the first contacts between the South African government and Dr Banda of Malawi.

The CIA agents were perpetually journeying between Salisbury and the Mozambique ports, and Murray was temporarily posted to Lusaka to maintain personal contact with British officials resident in Zambia. Mr Ian Smith and his cabinet colleague, Mr J. H. Howman, who looks after foreign affairs as well as security and the secret service of the Rhodesian regime, were not unaware of the unwelcome operations of the Americans. They suffered them for the sake of avoiding an open clash with Washington. Their patience, however, became frayed when it was discovered that secret documents had disappeared from the headquarters of the ruling Rhodesian National Front Party. Subsequently,

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## The Nixon Watch Shooting at Henry

The worst possible judge of the need for secrecy in government and of the ethics of officials who break the rules of secrecy is a working reporter such as myself. I do what I can to penetrate the official fog and I'd welcome a lot more collaboration in that endeavor than I get at the Nixon White House. It is with diffidence, therefore, that I state at the outset of this note on a recent breach of government secrecy that in my opinion the official who must have been responsible for the breach is a rat who should be dug out of his hole and fired.

The occasion for this observation is the theft from classified government files of documents that were given to columnist Jack Anderson in early December and have been publicized by him in fragments and in text since then. "Theft" is the proper word, although the responsible official looted his own files and gave facsimiles to Anderson. Jack Anderson inherited the "Washington Merry-Go-Round" newspaper column when its founder and his employer, Drew Pearson, died in 1969. Pearson was and Anderson is a master seeker and purveyor of secrets. Conducted as it is in the Anderson column, the traffic in secrets is a business that makes the columnist the instrument of sources who may be trying to use him for the noblest or the most vicious ends. My infrequent reading of "Merry-Go-Round" indicates to me that Anderson does his best to conduct it in a decent way. He appears to be more careful than Pearson was to deny the column and its outlets in some 700 newspapers to self-servers and back-stabbers. It is believable that Anderson believed, as he says he did, that the initial source of the documents in question made them available because he was convinced that the Nixon policy toward India and Pakistan was disastrously mistaken and ought to be exposed and discredited. It is also believable that Jack Anderson was had. The difficulty with the explanation that he says he accepted is that the policy was already known and discredited. Another columnist, Joseph Kraft, presented a more credible explanation of the original act of disclosure when he wrote that "most of the evidence suggests that the true cause is a vulgar bureaucratic row aimed at getting the President's chief assistant for national security affairs, Henry Kissinger."

Only five of the many documents that Anderson says he garnered in his December haul and later are alluded to here. Four of them are official and verbatim accounts of meetings of the Washington Special Action Group, the action arm of the National Security Council, on December 3, 4 and 6. The fifth document is the paragraph

can Senator Kenneth Keating, the US ambassador in New Delhi, sent the State Department on December 8. I deduce from Anderson's cautious account of how he obtained the documents that the WSAG texts came from a single source who first offered him a dozen or so classified items and subsequently, under pressure from the columnist, let him take his pick from "a whole massive file of documents." Anderson says that the stuff came from "plural" sources and implies that their rank is such that public identification of them would embarrass the Nixon administration. The nature and variety of the documents on which Anderson has drawn in successive columns indicate that this is true of the total haul. The WSAG texts are special. Their content suggests to me, as it did to Joe Kraft, that the official who gave them to Anderson was shooting at Henry Kissinger and only incidentally, if at all, at the Indo-Pakistan and perhaps other policies with which Kissinger is associated. It is this official whom I take to be a high-ranking rat.

Kissinger brought the publication of three of the four WSAG texts, and extensive printed quotations from the fourth, upon himself with his remark that previous references to him in Anderson columns were "out of context." Anderson, angered, gave the texts to *The Washington Post*, *The New York Times* and several other newspapers in order to prove that his Kissinger references were accurate understatements. The texts are fascinating documents. They illumine a part of the Nixon-Kissinger policy operation as it has never before been exposed. But it is important to distinguish between the parts of the policy process that the WSAG texts do and do not illumine. They do not, as one commentator thought they did, show how "the decisional process" actually works. The Special Action Group deals with policy after it has been laid down. Kissinger's job when he functions as WSAG chairman is to see that the military services, State, Defense, CIA and other agencies involved in foreign policy understand exactly what the President has decided and implement the decided policy exactly as he wants it to be implemented. The Anderson texts show that Kissinger performs this task with a certitude, an arrogance, a display of proxied presidential authority that smothers any tendency toward dissent that there may be in the WSAG forum. A reader may gather from the published texts that Kissinger dominates subordinate NSC bodies where preliminary policy options are discussed in the same way with the same effect. But the WSAG texts do not prove that this is the case. They make it difficult but not impossible to believe, as I have been told at the White House and elsewhere for three years, that Kissinger in these formative sessions and in the course of directing preliminary policy studies for the NSC and for the President not only welcomes but demands a

STATINTL

**The Washington Merry-Go-Round****Nixon to Spur Economy via Defense**

By  
**Jack  
Anderson**

President Nixon has called an abrupt halt to military cutbacks and will grant the armed forces a bigger bite out of the next budget.

He has decided to use military spending rather than domestic increases to stimulate the economy. Indeed, the brass hats will get more money, if the President has his way, than they requested.

The question of matching Soviet military expansion has come up at secret National Security Council meetings on the defense budget. Showing grim determination to meet the Soviet threat, the President has decreed:

- The army will maintain 13 divisions, two more than the generals expected. Combat readiness will also be improved.

- The Navy will get 55 more ships than the admirals finally requested. This will bring the fleet up to 600 ships. The emphasis will be upon smaller, less costly ships.

- The Air Force will get extra crews and spare parts not in the budget proposals that came out of the Pentagon. Air sorties in Southeast Asia will also be stepped up by 50 per cent. The 463 giant B-52 bombers will be improved. A sophisticated new bomber, known as the B-1, is

under development. SRAM missiles, capable of striking targets from the air hundreds of miles away, will also be installed aboard bombers.

- Multiple warheads will be installed on many of our 1,054 land-based intercontinental missiles and 656 sea-based missiles. By 1978, the number of deliverable warheads will be doubled from 4100 to 8200. These pack a smaller nuclear wallop, however, than do the big Soviet warheads. For this reason, our land-based missile sites are being hardened by a factor of three to withstand a Soviet near miss.

The President's military budget request for the fiscal year starting in July is expected to be over \$82 billion.

Footnote: In contrast, the Soviets have about 1,500 intercontinental missiles that are scheduled to go in submarines now under construction. The Soviets are believed to be behind the U.S. in the development of multiple warheads.

**Whalley's Boasts**

Rep. Irving Whalley, (R-Pa.) is a reputed millionaire who boasts of giving \$75,000 to colleges, fire houses, boy scout troops, churches and athletic clubs.

As part of this charitable outpouring, the former United Nations delegate tells his constituents that he has "donated about 6,000 flags... at a cost of \$20,000" to various civic groups.

But what the philanthropist fails to tell the voters of his district is that many of these 6,000 flags were bought with the taxpayers' funds.

The money Whalley used to wrap himself in the flags comes from his stationery allowance which House rules say are "for stationery and other supplies," not for personal use.

And Whalley, the fourth-ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has had his fingers in the stationery till for more than flags. Each Christmas, the Windber, Pa., church elder chisels the fund for gifts for his friends.

Reached at his home, Whalley promised to find out whether he had a right to use the funds as he had. Asked if he were, indeed, a millionaire, he said, "I don't know."

The FBI is now investigating our charges that Whalley has required payroll kickbacks from his staffers. The Windber wheeler-dealer has also been reported to the House Ethics Committee for alleged kickbacks by an ex-staffer.

Whalley need have no fear from the Ethics Committee which has a better supply of whitewash than of righteous zeal. Nevertheless, he has called in two top lawyers. One, former Rep. Bill Cramer (R-Fla.) is a close Nixon ally. The other is Benton Becker, a tough young ex-Justice Department lawyer who, ironically once fought to indict Rep. Adam Clayton Powell (D-N.Y.) on kickbacks and related charges.

**Washington Whirl**

Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) has jumped on the Lockheed Company in Marietta, Ga., for its fabulous failures

with the giant C-5A transport plane. But the people of Marietta love Lockheed because it poured money into the community. When the Ramada Inn in Marietta was opened, its proprietor, Jack Hurt, named its public rooms after Lockheed planes. There is the Jetstar restaurant, the Galaxy ballroom and the Starlifter room. Then it came time to name the men's restroom. Hurt jestingly suggested that maybe it should be named the "Proxmire Room." Hurt, however, reneged and so the "Proxmire Room" remains an anonymous men's lounge.

**Frugal Flood**—The Senate Post Office and Civil Service Committee is considering a bill that would let members of congress collect their full retirement benefits even if they have a break in their membership. All the congressmen would have to do is pay the retirement and related deductions for the period they were not in congress. The man putting in the bill is Rep. Dan Flood, D-Pa., who has had two such breaks in his own service.

**Hartke and Blacks**—Sen. Vance Hartke, D-Ind.) complained at a recent Senate hearing that the Interstate Commerce Commission did not have a single black member. Hartke failed to note he had only a single Negro on his own staff of some 30 people. We chided the senator about it, and are glad to report that Hartke has been able to find five talented blacks who are now on his and his committee staffs.

Ben-McClure Syndicate

STATINTL

## NIXON ACTS TO END SECURITY LEAKS

Bids Staff Halt Disclosures  
From 'Policy Discussions'

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 17—

President Nixon has instructed his subordinates to make stronger efforts to prevent leaks of information on national security matters, the White House said today.

Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, said that efforts, which he did not explain or describe, had been taken "at direct Presidential direction" to make certain that "information on various segments of policy discussions" does not "flow from private meetings."

It had been generally assumed here that Mr. Nixon was not happy with the recent disclosures by Jack Anderson, the syndicated columnist, of secret memorandums describing the proceedings at several National Security Council meetings during the Indian-Pakistani crisis last month.

Last July, two members of the White House staff, David R. Young of the National Security Council and Egil Krogh Jr. of the Domestic Council, were asked to investigate earlier leaks and prevent recurrences.

### President Shows Concern

Today's comments by Mr. Ziegler represented the first official acknowledgment of the President's personal concern about the Anderson papers, as well as the first official acknowledgment that Mr. Nixon himself had ordered steps taken to insure tighter security.

"We hold the view that the American people should be kept informed of the foreign policy of this nation," Mr. Ziegler said at his regular afternoon briefing.

However, he added, "subordinates of the President, in order to make recommendations to him, must be able to discuss freely the issues and options for policy."

Mr. Ziegler said that publication of the minutes of meetings had caused "great concern" generally throughout the White House, and declared that steps would be taken—he would not elaborate on them—to make sure it doesn't happen again.

# AGAIN, A FUROR OVER SECRET DOCUMENTS

**Latest top-level "leak" in Washington brought red faces—and more. It raised a question of whether there is any way at all to maintain secrecy.**

Another storm is boiling in Washington over publication of secret Government documents—this time centering on U. S. policy in last month's Indian-Pakistani war.

Because the latest breach of security concerns a continuing international crisis, officials regard it as more damaging than the disclosure in 1971 of years-old Pentagon papers dealing with U. S. escalation in Vietnam.

Obtained by Jack Anderson, a syndicated columnist, and released by him earlier in January to a number of newspapers, were several reports classified as "secret sensitive." The documents were minutes of a series of meetings, held December 3, 4 and 6, by the National Security Council's top-level strategy unit, known as the Washington Special Action Group.

**Keating cable.** Also distributed by Mr. Anderson were copies of a secret cablegram sent to the State Department during the Indian-Pakistani conflict by Kenneth B. Keating, U. S. Ambassador to India.

The message from Mr. Keating complained that the Nixon Administration's explanation of its pro-Pakistan stand did not square with the Ambassador's own knowledge of events, and that it adversely affected American credibility.

Mr. Anderson, who refused to say who gave him the secret documents, began releasing them after Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national-security affairs, told newsmen on January 3 that the columnist—in his own use of the papers—had "taken out of context" remarks indicating an anti-India stand by the Administration.

**Kissinger remarks.** On December 7, Mr. Kissinger told reporters at a White House "background" briefing: "There have been some comments that the Administration is anti-Indian. This is totally inaccurate." He added, however, that India's military action "was taken in our view with a very real threat."

In the leaked report on the Special Action Group's White House meeting on

December 3—the day that full-scale fighting erupted between India and Pakistan—Mr. Kissinger was quoted as saying:

"I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise."

**The conferees.** Among top officials present at the meetings were Mr. Kissinger, Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Assistant Secretary



—Crockett in "Washington Star"

of Defense G. Warren Nutter, and Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

The texts released by Mr. Anderson disclosed discussion by Mr. Kissinger and other Security Council members on the possibility of arms aid to Pakistan by transfer of U. S.-supplied military equipment from Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The report said that Mr. Kissinger was told that the U. S. "cannot permit a third country to transfer arms which we have supplied to India. We do not authorize sales to the ultimate recipient, such as Pakistan."

In further give-and-take on the arms-aid question, Mr. Sisco was quoted as saying that "from a political point of view our efforts would have to be directed at keeping the Indians from 'extinguishing' West Pakistan."

The strategists also discussed U. S. moves in the United Nations on the Indian-Pakistani crisis. Mr. Kissinger was quoted as commenting that "the exercise in the U. N. is likely to be an exercise in futility, inasmuch as the Soviets can be expected to veto." The report shows Mr. Kissinger added that "the U. N., in itself, will in all probability do little to end the war."

On December 4, the United States called for a meeting of the U. N. Security Council to press India for withdrawal of its forces from Pakistani territory.

On the same day, Mr. Sisco told newsmen that the United States believed India bore "major responsibility" for the conflict. This surprised most diplomats in Washington, who had expected the U. S. to take a more neutral position.

The Department of Justice, under Attorney General John Mitchell, and other Government agencies have pressed investigations into the latest leakage.

Two congressional probes took shape. House Armed Services Committee Chairman F. Edward Hébert, (Dem.), of Louisiana, announced a "major inquiry into the problem of classification and handling of Government information involving the national security." A similar investigation was scheduled by Representative William Moorhead (Dem.), of Pennsylvania, who heads a House subcommittee on Government information.

Government officials pointed out that as many as 25 persons at the Pentagon alone had access to the White House papers.

Mr. Anderson said he had received from unidentified sources in the Government "scores" of highly classified documents relating to the U. S.

role in the India-Pakistan crisis. He said his sources acted as they did because they felt that the U. S. might be "bungling" its way into a confrontation with the Soviet Union, which has a special relationship with India.

The columnist declared that if his sources were identified, "it would embarrass the Administration more than it would me."

The latest leak of classified documents—coming atop publication of the Pentagon report—raises the question of what the Government now will do to tighten protection of its secrets. [END]



STATINTL

## **—Washington Whispers®—**

Administration officials are more concerned over publication of the so-called Anderson papers detailing secret National Security Council meetings on the Indian-Pakistani war than they were about the Pentagon papers on Vietnam. Says one: "The leak to Jack Anderson, the syndicated columnist, came from the 'inner sanctum' of the Administration. If you can't trust the people in the White House Situation Room, who can you trust?"

★ ★ ★

*Chou En-lai startled American officials with the tough demands the Chinese Communists intend to present to President Nixon during his Peking visit next month. The Reds want the U. S. to cancel its 1954 security treaty with Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan and to announce publicly that the island is an integral part of mainland China. Aides say Mr. Nixon has no intention of going a fraction of that distance.*

★ ★ ★

The 10-year-old Berlin Wall and other massive barriers have failed to dam the flow of escapes from Communist East Germany. In the past 12 months, nearly 17,000 East Germans made it safely to the West.

STATINTL

## SECRET U.S. DOCUMENTS

## India Aim Seen to Crush Pakistan

Exclusive to The Times from  
the Chicago Sun-Times

WASHINGTON — CIA Director Richard Helms told the White House that India did not intend to stop fighting with Pakistan until Pakistani air and armored defenses were destroyed, a new set of Anderson papers revealed.

Presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger responded that "elimination of Pak armored and air forces would make the Paks defenseless. It would turn Western Pakistan into a client state . . . a vassal."

The newest set of secret documents released by columnist Jack Anderson tend to support current claims by Kissinger that fear of an Indian assault on West Pakistan was the motive behind the "tilt" in U.S. policy toward Pakistan in the recently concluded war.

## First Indication

The latest document, minutes of a meeting of the Washington Special Action Group on Dec. 8, is the first of the Anderson papers to give any indication of U.S. motives during the crisis.

Amid speculation that President Nixon acted

against India out of personal pique or to protect relations with China, Kissinger has been putting out word that the CIA offered "conclusive proof" of an Indian intention to demolish Pakistani defenses and dismember Pakistan.

The Anderson document says Helms told the WSAG, "It is reported that prior to terminating present hostilities, Mrs. Gandhi (Indira Gandhi, Indian prime minister) intends to attempt to eliminate Pakistan's armor and air force capabilities."

## Threat to Kashmir

Kissinger and Helms agreed that India intended to seize Azad Kashmir, the portion of the disputed northern territory in Kashmir in Pakistani hands. The documents do not make fully clear whether it was thought the Indians were intent on still further "dismemberment" of Pakistan.

Kissinger said that "if the Indians smash the Pak air force and the armored forces we would have a deliberate Indian attempt to force the disintegration of Pakistan."

A dissent was registered by Joseph Sisco, assistant

secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs.

Sisco reportedly said that "if the situation were to evolve as Dr. Kissinger had indicated, then, of course, there was a serious risk to the viability of West Pakistan."

## Expressed Doubt

"Mr. Sisco doubted, however, that the Indians had this as their objective. He indicated that Foreign Minister (Swaran) Singh told Ambassador (Kenneth) Keating that India had no intention of taking any Pak territory."

"Mr. Sisco said it must also be kept in mind that Kashmir is really disputed territory."

After further discussion, Kissinger said that "what we may be witnessing is a situation wherein a country (India), equipped and supported by the Soviets, may be turning half of Pakistan into an impotent state and the other half into a vassal. We must consider what other countries may be thinking of our action."

Kissinger said that "we are not trying to be even-handed. There can be no doubt what the President wants. The President does

not want to be even-handed. The President believes that India is the attacker. We are trying to get across the idea that India has jeopardized relations with the United States."

The day before the WSAG meeting was held, Kissinger told reporters at a backgrounder that "there have been some comments that the Administration is anti-Indian. This is totally inaccurate."

The WSAG discussed possible ways, in Kissinger's words, to "turn the screw" in the situation, apparently settling on none.

There is no mention in the document of the plan that Kissinger now says was successful—a forceful message to the Soviet Union insisting that Russia stop her ally, India, from attacking West Pakistan.

According to the documents, it was King Hussein of Jordan who initiated an offer to provide eight U.S.-built jet fighters to Pakistan, another Muslim country. Previous installments of the Anderson papers implied that the United States had thought up the plan.

# Text of Memo on Indian-Pakistan War

WASHINGTON, Jan. 14—Following is the text of a memorandum on a meeting of a National Security Council committee on Indian-Pakistani hostilities, made public today by the columnist Jack Anderson:

**SECRET/SENSITIVE**  
**THE JOINT STAFF**  
**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301  
 8 DECEMBER 1971  
**MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD**

**SUBJECT:** Washington Special Action Group meeting on Indo-Pakistan hostilities; 8 December 1971

1. The N.S.C. Washington Special Action Group met in the Situation Room, the White House, at 1100, Wednesday, 8 December to consider the Indo-Pakistan situation. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Kissinger.

## 2. ATTENDEES

A. PRINCIPALS. Dr. Henry Kissinger, Mr. Richard Helms, C.I.A., Gen. John Ryan, J.C.S., Mr. Donald MacDonald, A.I.D., Mr. David Packard, Defense, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, State.

B. OTHERS: Mr. Maurice Williams, A.I.D., Mr. John Waller, C.I.A., Col. Richard Kennedy, N.S.C., Mr. Samuel Hoskanson, N.S.C., Mr. Harold Saunders, N.S.C., Mr. Armistead Selden, Defense, Mr. James Noyes, Defense, Mr. Christopher Van Hollen, State, Mr. Samuel De Palma, State, Mr. Bruce Laingen, State, Mr. David Schneider, State, Mr. Joseph Sisco, State, Rear Adm. Robert Welander, O.J.C.S., Capt. Howard Kay, O.J.C.S.

Group 4 downgraded at 3-year intervals; declassified after 12 years.

3. Summary. Dr. Kissinger suggested that India might be attempting, through calculated destruction of Pak armored and air forces to render Pakistan impotent. He requested that the Jordanian interest in assisting Pakistan not be turned off, but rather kept in a holding pattern. He asked that Pak capabilities in Kashmir be assessed.

4. Mr. Helms opened the meeting by briefing the current situation. In the East, the Indians have broken the line at Comilla. Only major river crossings prevent them from investing in the West. Indians are advancing rapidly throughout East Pakistan. All major Pak L.O.C.'s in the



Associated Press

David Packard

East are now vulnerable. In the West, the Paks are now claiming Punch, inside the Indian border. However, the Paks are admitting fairly heavy casualties in the fighting. Tank battles are apparently taking place in the Sind/Rajasthan area. Mrs. Gandhi has indicated that before heeding a U.N. call for cease-fire, she intends to straighten out the southern border of Azad Kashmir. It is reported that prior to terminating present hostilities, Mrs. Gandhi intends to attempt to eliminate Pakistan's armor and air force capabilities. Thus far only India and Bhutan have recognized Bangladesh. It is believed that the Soviets have held off recognition primarily so as not to rupture relations with the Paks. Soviet action on the matter of recognition, however, may be forthcoming in the near future.

5. Mr. Sisco inquired how long the Paks might be expected to hold out in East Pakistan, to which Mr. Helms replied 48 to 72 hours. The time to reach the ultimate climax is probably a function of the difficulties encountered in river crossings.

6. Assessing the situation in the West, General Ryan indicated that he did not see the Indians pushing too hard at this time, rather they seem content with a holding action.

7. Dr. Kissinger asked how long it would take to shift Indian forces from East to West. General Ryan said it might take a reasonably long time to move all the forces, but that the airborne brigade could be moved quickly, probably within a matter of five or six days.

8. Dr. Kissinger inquired about refugee aid. After a discussion with Mr. Williams it was determined that only a very small number of U.S. dollars earmarked for refugee relief was actually entering the Indian economy. Contrary to the sense of the last meeting, the Indians have actually lost foreign exchange in the process of caring for refugees. In any event, the entire relief effort is currently suspended in both India and Pakistan.

9. Dr. Kissinger then emphasized that the President has made it clear that no further foreign exchange, PL-480 commodities, or development loans could be assigned to India without approval of the White House. Mr. Williams stated there was no problem of anything sliding through.

10. Dr. Kissinger inquired what the next turn of the screw might be. Mr. Williams said that the only other possible option was taking a position concerning aid material currently under contract. This however would be a very messy problem inasmuch as we would be dealing with irrevocable letters of credit. Mr. Williams further stated that we would have to take possession of material that was being consigned to the Indians by U.S. contractors and thus would be compelled to pay U.S. suppliers, resulting in claims against the U.S.G.

11. Mr. Packard said that all of this could be done, but agreed that it would be a very laborious and difficult problem. He further elaborated that all the items involved would have to be located, the United States would have to take ownership, settle with suppliers, locate warehousing, etc. Nevertheless, if such was desired it could be done. Mr. Williams said that in a very limited way this type of action had been taken against some Mid-East countries, but that it had taken years to settle the claims.

12. Dr. Kissinger asked how India was handling next year's development loan pro-

gram, to which Mr. Williams responded that nothing was under negotiation at the present time.

13. Dr. Kissinger inquired about next year's [A.I.D.] budget. Mr. Williams stated that what goes into the budget did not represent a commitment. Dr. Kissinger stated that current orders are not to put anything into the budget for A.I.D. to India. It was not to be leaked that A.I.D. had put money in the budget for India, only to have the "wicked" White House take it out.

14. Dr. Kissinger suggested that the key issue if the Indians turn on West Pakistan is Azad Kashmir. If the Indians smash the Pak air force and the armored forces we would have a deliberate Indian attempt to force the disintegration of Pakistan. The elimination of the Pak armored and air forces would make the Paks defenseless. It would turn West Pakistan into a client state. The possibility elicits a number of questions. Can we allow a U.S. ally to go down completely while we participate in a blockade? Can we allow the Indians to scare us off, believing that if U.S. supplies are needed they will not be provided?

15. Mr. Sisco stated that if the situation were to evolve as Dr. Kissinger had indicated then, of course, there was a serious risk to the viability of West Pakistan. Mr. Sisco doubted, however, that the Indians had this as their objective. He indicated that Foreign Minister Singh told Ambassador Keating that India had no intention of taking any Pak territory. Mr. Sisco said it must also be kept in mind that Kashmir is really disputed territory.

16. Mr. Helms then stated that earlier he had omitted mentioning that Madame Gandhi, when referring to China, expressed the hope that there would be no Chinese intervention in the West. She said that the Soviet had cautioned her that the Chinese might rattle the sword in Laddakh but that the Soviets have promised to take appropriate counteraction if this should occur. Mr. Helms indicated that there was no Chinese build-up at this time but, nevertheless, even without a build-up they could rattle the sword and rattle the sword."

STATINTL



Joseph Kraft

# Undermining Kissinger

HIGH POLICY differences are widely supposed to have prompted the leak of secret documents on the Indo-Pakistani crisis to Jack Anderson. But most of the evidence suggests that the true cause is a vulgar bureaucratic row aimed at getting the President's chief assistant for national security affairs, Henry Kissinger.

The most striking evidence is like the evidence of the dog that didn't bark in the Sherlock Holmes story. The fact is that no enduring policy issue of high importance is involved in the leaks.

The fight over East Bengal is largely a one-shot affair. Hardly anything that happens on the subcontinent is central to international politics. The United States had already tipped toward Pakistan — and practically everybody knew it—when the leaks were sprung. At the time, as some of Dr. Kissinger's comments make plain, the administration was anticipating a return to more normal relations with New Delhi.

A SECOND BIT of evidence involves Mr. Anderson himself. He is not deeply versed in foreign affairs. No one who aimed to change a line of international policy would single out Mr. Anderson as the agent for deflecting that result through the leak of secret information.

Mr. Anderson's specialty—and it is an important specialty—is putting the journalistic arm on wrong-doers.

By no mere accident the chief fruit of his disclosures was not something that affected policy. The chief consequence was to impugn the integrity of Dr. Kissinger.

As a third bit of evidence there is the state of relations among senior officials and principal agencies of the foreign affairs community in the Nixon administration. Washington veterans tell me that to find a fit counterpart they have to go back to 1950, and the deadly you-or-me rivalry between Dean Acheson who was then at the State Department, and Louis Johnson, who then ruled the roost at the

Pentagon. In any case, relations nowadays are marked by paranoia, jealousy and hatred.

The chief target for most of the venom is Dr. Kissinger, and some of the fault is his. He has a sharp tongue, and he has been unnecessarily unkind in comments about some of the senior officials of the most prestigious departments.

But most of the resentment has been caused by what Dr. Kissinger does in the service of the President. The present administration has expanded the job of special assistant for national security affairs way beyond what it was under Walt Rostow and McGeorge Bundy. Dr. Kissinger has virtually eliminated from the decision-making business some of the most high-powered men and agencies in town.

The office of Secretary of Defense is perhaps the chief victim. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird is going to be stepping down soon with practically nothing to his credit. Even his claim (which has at least some foundation) to be the author of the policy for getting out of Vietnam is not widely believed.

He seems hostile to the administration's policy on an arms control agreement, and he was completely cut out of plans for the President's visit to China. His general reputation for trickiness has caused the cognoscenti, rightly or wrongly, to establish him as the short-odds favorite for almost all leaks regarding national security these days. Indeed, some White House officials at first believed Mr. Laird leaked the Pentagon papers.

THE UNIFORMED MILITARY comes a close second in the odds. Many of them do not like the way the White House is winding down the war in Vietnam. Almost all are opposed to the arms control agreement which the White House is now negotiating with the Russians. Some are hostile to the Okinawa reversion agreement which the White House has far, far more than civilians in the government, the uni-

formed military are in the habit of leaking classified information to serve their own interests.

Not that the State Department or other civilian agencies can be entirely exempted from suspicion. Except as regards the Near East, Dr. Kissinger has taken over the whole realm of foreign policy—including even negotiation with foreign officials. This assumption of the State Department's traditional role is bitterly resented by many of the department's leading officials. Indeed, one of them, not long ago, voiced the suspicion that Dr. Kissinger spent an extra day on his last trip to China in order to embarrass the State Department which was handling the United Nations vote on Chinese admission.

With suspicions at that level, there is every reason to figure bureaucratic rivalry as the key element in the background of the Anderson papers. There is no case for lionizing, or even protecting the sources of the of the leaks.

On the contrary, for once there is a case for a presidential crackdown. Mr. Nixon's interest—and that of the country—is to find the source of the leaks and fire them fast.

STATINTL

# White House Took Steps to Stop Leaks Months Before Anderson Disclosures

STATINTL

By ROBERT M. SMITH  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 8—The columnist Jack Anderson has been able to disclose secret memoranda concerning National Security Council meetings recently despite White House steps months ago to prevent leaks to reporters and to insure the secrecy of council proceedings.

According to reliable sources, the White House quietly ordered David R. Young of Henry A. Kissinger's national security staff and Egil Krogh Jr. of John D. Ehrlichman's domestic advisory staff to investigate the leaks and to stop them. The action was prompted, according to Government sources, after an article in The New York Times July 23 that dealt with the talks on limitation of strategic arms and caused concern in the White House.

It is not known specifically what Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young have done in the five months since the security assignment was added to their duties. They are reported to have reviewed the procedures used by the council and to have inquired into the methods used by council members, such as Secretary of State William P. Rogers, to prepare for meetings and to handle the council's papers.

## F.B.I. Called In

Presumably, Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young have had their task made more difficult by the disclosures by Mr. Anderson. The Justice Department has confirmed that the Administration had called on the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate the leaks.

According to one source, Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young are authorized to call on the F.B.I. but hold the principal responsibility because "it is a White House problem" and because "it would be inappropriate to send some F.B.I. man around to talk with people like the Secretary of State." It is not known whether Mr. Rogers himself was interviewed.

The article that prompted the move was written by the Pentagon correspondent of The Times, William Beecher. The article reported that American negotiators had proposed to the Soviet Union an arms-control agreement that would halt construction of both land-based missiles and missile submarines. Mr. Beecher also reported that a companion proposal would allow as many as 300 defensive missiles in both the United States and the Soviet Union to protect offensive missiles.

The article said that the

American proposals had been made orally at negotiations in Helsinki but that specific draft agreements were still being written in Washington.

According to one Government official, the disclosure came "during a very critical stage of the negotiations" and the proposals involved "were not even in any written memo." He said the Administration's feeling was that the information had to come from someone present at the discussions of the National Security Council.

Officials at council meetings include representatives of the Defense and State Departments, the intelligence community and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The F.B.I. has conducted an extensive investigation over more than four months in an effort to uncover Mr. Beecher's sources. The inquiry has been conducted here, elsewhere in the United States and abroad, and was still going on last week.



# The Anderson Papers

By JAMES RESTON

WASHINGTON — The Anderson Papers on the U. S. Government's handling of the Indo-Pakistani war suggest that the Nixon Administration has learned very little from the damning disclosures of the Pentagon Papers on the Vietnam war.

For Jack Anderson's classified documents tell much the same story of damaging decisions arrived at in secret; of subjective Presidential orders imposed on the objective analysis of the President's own principal advisers; of official explanations which mislead the Congress and the American people, and finally of defiant disclosures of the true facts by officials who have lost faith in the judgment and truthfulness of their superiors.

Every time these official deceptions are published, the issue is presented to the public as a conflict between the Government and the press, but the issue is much deeper than that. It is a conflict within the Government itself on how to make and present policy in such a way as to retain the confidence and trust of the civil service, the Congress, the nation, and the other governments of the world.

If you read the official reports on the meetings of the National Security

## WASHINGTON

Council's Special Action Group for Dec. 3, 4 and 6, it is hard to get the impression that Dr. Henry Kissinger and other top officials are really grappling with the political, strategic and moral problems of the Indo-Pakistani crisis. Mainly they are being told by Dr. Kissinger, who is obviously under pressure from his boss, what the President wants done—he wants no even-handed stuff but wants to favor Pakistan—and there is a clear suggestion that the bureaucrats are opposing the President.

"I'm getting hell every half hour from the President," says Dr. Kissinger, "that we are not being tough enough on India . . . the President is blaming me, but you people are in the clear."

The impression left by the papers is that the President is not only moving along with his friends in Pakistan, and that the official explanations were

so inaccurate or incomplete that even the American Ambassador in New Delhi, Kenneth Keating, protested that they "did not add to our position, or, more importantly, to American credibility."

It is the old story, and it has poisoned American policy and diplomacy under both Presidents Johnson and Nixon for almost a decade. The issue is "credibility."

Something new seems to have come over American political life, and it is not official lying. It is the widespread public tolerance of misleading official statements, and even a general tendency not to denounce the twisters who indulge in this practice but the reporters who expose it.

The Johnson and Nixon Administrations have been deceitful, clumsy and unsuccessful, but even after the Pentagon Papers and the Anderson Papers, the reaction seems to be, not that they were wrong and deceptive, but that they were caught.

It is clear that policy is being planned, not in the State Department, but in the White House, and that in the Indo-Pakistani case it was being guided primarily by Dr. Kissinger, who is not available for questioning even in secret by the responsible committees of the Congress.

"We need to think about our treaty obligations," Dr. Kissinger told the National Security Council Special Action Group in the Dec. 3 meeting. "I remember a letter or memo interpreting our existing treaty with a special Indian tilt. When I visited Pakistan in January, 1962, I was briefed on a secret document or oral understanding about contingencies arising in other than a SEATO context . . ."

What does that mean? What secret document or understanding? And though the Senate is supposed to ratify such treaties, nobody on Capitol Hill seems to know about any secret understanding with India or Pakistan.

Even the President seems to be left in the dark at points under this system. For here is Kissinger, in the Dec. 4 meeting, saying that whoever was putting out "background" information on the Indo-Pakistani war was provoking Presidential wrath. "The President is under the 'illusion,'" Dr. Kissinger is quoted as saying, "that he is giving instructions; not that he is merely being kept apprised of affairs as they progress. Dr. Kissinger asks that this should be kept in mind."

Again from the Dec. 4 memo: "Dr. Kissinger said he did not care how third parties [countries] might react, so long as Ambassador Bush understands what he should say."

It is an interesting approach for a Government that came into office with the President's stated policy that along with his friends in Pakistan, would "bring us together"—and is

now going to Peking and Moscow to negotiate a "generation of peace."

Never mind what "third parties" think. Never mind the human consequences of the massacres in East Pakistan. Never mind the strategic implications of losing influence in India to the Russians. Never mind doing one thing and saying another. Just do as the President says!

# The World at Weekend

By CONRAD KOMOROWSKI

## Anderson Papers

STATINTL

The bloodhounds are baying on the tracks of Jack Anderson, who conducts a weekly news column, The Washington Merry-Go-Round, published in 700 newspapers at home and abroad.

Investigators for the FBI, State Department, Department of Justice and probably other agencies are hot on his trail. Rep. F. Edward Hebert (D-La.), anti-union, racist chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, announced Thursday a subcommittee will get into the act immediately when Congress opens on Jan. 18.

Anderson has published in his column excerpts from the minutes of the Washington Special Action Group (a subcommittee of the National Security Council, abbreviated as WSAG) and other documents and memoranda meant only for the inner circles of the Administration. They expose the double-dealing and lying of the Nixon Administration, particularly in relation to the Indian-Pakistani conflict. Anderson has also made some of this material available to the press generally.

Among the information Anderson disclosed is the revelation that Nixon's adviser on national security affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger, on the one hand publicly told the press that the Administration was friendly to India and on the other hand told the Washington Special Action Group behind the screen of official secrecy that Nixon "wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan" and that Nixon believed "we are not being tough enough on India."

It is quite possible, after the exposure of the governmental lying during five Administrations, Democratic and Republican, in the Pentagon papers, that some governmental figures may have begun to think twice about the questionable "wisdom" — from a pro-capitalist point of view — of Nixon's policies in the Bangla Desh situation and in Asia generally.

The differences in the ruling class and its collaborators on this score are useful to the people.

Besides the facts revealed by Anderson, there is an important issue involved in his disclosures. That is the right of the people to know. Anderson has not made this a major feature of his expose, but it is there anyway. It is also involved in the defense of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo, who are being prosecuted and persecuted for their part in tearing away the veil of secrecy in which the searing facts of the conspiracy which plunged the United States into barbaric aggression in Indochina had been buried.

8 JAN 1972

STATINTL

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# CAPITOL STUFF

By FRANK JACKMAN

Washington, Jan. 7—One of the local television stations has been showing old Marx Brothers movies on the late show this week—possibly as a sort of relief from the real-life zaniness that abounds here in the capital of the Free World.

Certainly, Groucho's role in "Horsefeathers" as Prof. Quincey Adams Wagstaff, president of Mythical Huxley U and head coach of its woefully inept football team, seems no more nutty than the flap over the so-called Pakistani tilt in the latest secret papers caper. Nor can it compare with those early-morning presidential phone calls to pro football coaches.

## Chico to Harpo To Groucho —To Henry?

(In fact, President Nixon's propensity for ringing up Washington's Redskins coach George Allen with play suggestions prompted one sportswriter to remark that the chief executive

actually wasn't interested in running for the presidency again, but rather was bidding for the opening as head coach of the Chicago Bears. "If he gets it," the wise guy added, "look for Martha Mitchell to work the phones.")

For those of you who may not remember, what plot there is in "Horsefeathers" revolves around the theft of Huxley U's secret foot-

ball signals. Of course, any team whose backfield includes Harpo Marx riding a horse-drawn sanitation cart certainly doesn't need any secret plays, right Mr. Prez—uh, Coach? In the end, Huxley wins and everybody exits singing. (In the case of Groucho, make that leering.) But what, you ask in wonderment, does this have to do with Washington.

Well, substitute secret papers for secret signals, fellows and girls, and you have a real-life "Horsefeathers," right down to a swinging Groucho like professor (guess who?).

In the beginning, there was columnist Jack Anderson charging that secret White House and Pentagon documents in his possession showed there was a sharp conflict between what the Nixon administration said in public and what it said in private during the India-Pakistan War. Anderson said that the President—whose suggestion of an end-around play to Coach Allen lost the Redskins 13 crucial yards during their playoff with San Francisco—wanted U.S. policy to "tilt in favor of Pakistan." You may recall that the Paks lost a lot more than 13 yards in their game, so the Nixon coaching record remains unblemished at .000.

Then Nixon's national security affairs adviser, Henry Kissinger, while flying out of the Western White House with the chief executive, did something he swore he wouldn't do again—he briefed the newsmen on board the plane, "not for attribution." He claimed that remarks attributed to him by Anderson were taken "out of context." This prompted Anderson to leak some of the confidential goodies he had to some of his newspaper clients before they got copies of his column, so they could get a running start on the story.



Harpo Marx  
*The hero of the white wings*

## Is Somebody Going Through the Garbage?

But this, in turn, roused other newspapers, so Anderson had to release the text of three secret memoranda of meetings of the hush-hush Washington Special Action Group. In the words of the immortal Kingfish, Anderson, who once was the leakee, thus become the leaker. And he didn't like it much. Pretty soon, he had to take his phone off the hook and go into seclusion to get any work done. Secrets-hungry reporters were calling him from everywhere, badgering his secretary and office staff for new revelations. There were reports that the FBI was going through his garbage.

Meanwhile, back at the White House, certain high officials were hinting that maybe the administration wasn't going to look too closely into who did the leaking because maybe they sort of wanted this stuff leaked. It would take the likes of the late Harpo, complete with ever-tooting bicycle horn, to figure that one out, friends, so don't try.

## There's No Substitute for Henry K

One thing becomes clear upon closer reading of the top-secret memos, however, and that is that Central Intelligence Director Richard M. Helms and Kissinger apparently are the only senior biggies who go to all the meetings they're scheduled to go to. The other members of the Washington Special Action Group all send substitutes, even such relatively obscure types as the head of the Agency for International Development. In Kissinger's case, it's easy to see why he was at all the meetings; after all, it's his club, so to speak.

## Down the Pike From Appomattox

One of the faithful WSAG attendees was the Hon. Armistead I. Selden Jr., who now rejoices in the title of principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. A Democratic congressman from Alabama for 16 years, Selden was involuntarily retired from elective politics in 1968 after he was defeated in a bid for his party's Senate nomination. At that time, his colleagues were predictably effusive in their praise of his service. "The greatest hour of Robert E. Lee came not when he was commanding the great army of the Confederacy, but after he had met military defeat and surrendered his sword to Grant at Appomattox," said the late Rep. George Andrews (D-Ala.).

How right Andrews was proved out a few months later when Selden took his last congressional junket, a taxpayer-financed tour of Latin America. Just to make sure that there would be no communications gap, Selden's office thoughtfully provided a full span of pre-dated handouts and statements from the lawmakers for use during the first week of the trip.

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JAN 8 1972

# FBI Probes Leak of Secret

## U.S. Papers on India War

BY JOHN MACLEAN

(Chicago Tribune Press Service)

WASHINGTON, Jan. 5—The Federal Bureau of Investigation today investigated leaks of secret memoranda of high-level White House consultations during the India-Pakistan War.

Jack Anderson, whose syndicated column Washington Merry-Go-Round appears in 700 newspapers, released the text of the secret papers.

Anderson has been writing columns from the material and has concluded "that Presidential braintruster Henry Kissinger lied to reporters when he told them the Nixon administration wasn't anti-India."

### Why Papers Released

Anderson released the papers because Kissinger, President Nixon's chief adviser on national security affairs, said Anderson "took out of context" remarks indicating the administration was against India in its recent war with Pakistan.

The FBI investigation reportedly has narrowed down to the National Security Council after checks in the Departments of State and Defense.

Spokesman for the White House, State Department, and Pentagon used nearly identical phrases as they declined to answer all questions on the subject. The response of Charles Bray, State Department spokesman, was typical when he told reporters: "I won't discuss the issue." Asked why he wouldn't, he said, "because I won't."

The documents are minutes of three meetings of a special action group of high level officials of the National Security Council.

### Some of Highlights

Excerpted from the text, here are some of the highlights:

"Kissinger: I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise."

"Dr. Kissinger said that whoever was putting out background information relative to the current situation is provoking Presidential wrath. The President is under the 'illusion' that he is giving instructions; not that he is merely being kept appraised of affairs as they progress. Dr. Kissinger asked that this be kept in mind."

"Dr. Kissinger said . . . 'it is quite obvious that the President is not inclined to let the Paks be defeated.'"

"Dr. Kissinger then asked whether we have the right to authorize Jordan or Saudi Arabia to transfer military equipment to Pakistan." [Anderson said this morning on the television program Today that he has additional memos which show that fighter planes were among the things being considered in a scheme to "sneak" aid to the Pakistanis. A cutoff of military aid to Pakistan was ordered early last year].

"Dr. Kissinger also directed that henceforth we show a certain coolness to the Indians. The Indian ambassador is not to be treated at too high a level."

### From High Sources

Anderson indicated the documents came from high sources within the Nixon administration.

"If the sources were identified, it would embarrass the

administration more than it would me," he said. "It would make a very funny story." Anderson said his sources for the story consider United States handling of the Indian-Pakistan affairs a "colossal blunder."

Anderson released the documents to newsmen with the urging that they compare them with Kissinger's remarks during a briefing of newsmen on Dec. 7.

Kissinger held a lengthy and unusual briefing on that day detailing what he said were the Nixon administration's actions regarding the India-Pakistan conflict.

He disclosed that India had attacked Pakistan even though the United States has informed India that Pakistan was willing to make concessions.

### 'India a Great Country'

"There have been some comments that the administration is anti-Indian," Kissinger said. "This is totally inaccurate."

"India is a great country . . . when we have differed with India, as we have in recent weeks, we do so with great sadness."

The memoranda released by Anderson deal with meetings held before this briefing, the last one on the day before the briefing, Dec. 6.

The sessions were attended by heads of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, and representatives of the Defense and State Departments.

Kissinger was chairman of the meetings, which typically involved an appraisal of the situation in the India-Pakistan conflict followed by discussion of U. S. policy and possible actions.

All the Anderson documents were marked "secret/sensitive," but it is doubted the federal government will take any action to stop publication.

The Supreme Court's decision last June in the Pentagon Papers dispute ruled in favor of newspapers publishing the secret Pentagon study. The high court cited a 1963 decision that "any system of prior restraint of expression comes to this court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."

The Supreme Court said then that government had failed to meet the "heavy burden" needed to justify such a move.

A typical exchange involved Kissinger and Maurice Williams, of the State Department staff.

During the Dec. 6 meeting, Kissinger asked if there already had been a massacre of Bihari people living in East Pakistan. Williams said he expected there would be killing of these people in reprisal for their support of West Pakistan.

"Mr. Williams states that perhaps an international humanitarian effort could be launched on their behalf. Dr. Kissinger asked whether we should be calling attention to the plight of these people now. Mr. Williams said that most of these people were centered around the rail centers . . . and that some efforts on their behalf might now well be started thru the United Nations.

"Dr. Kissinger suggested that this be done quickly to prevent a bloodbath. Mr. Sisco [Joseph Sisco] Eastern af-

continued

STATINTL

# White House Hunts a Leak

Washington, Jan. 5 (NEWS Bureau) — Disturbed Nixon administration officials admitted today, after a two-week intensive manhunt, that they have failed to uncover the source of the most sensational leak of White House secrets in modern history.

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The secrets, revealing in now painful detail the inner debates of the National Security Council's Washington Special Action Group at the peak of the Indo-Pakistan war, were wrapped up in three long memoranda for the record.

## White House Silent

Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson released texts of the memos to the press generally today. He has been quoting segments of them in occasional columns for two weeks.

The White House, which is directing the search for the leak,

refused comment on the case. But in private officials expressed grave concern that sensitive government information distributed only on a "need to know" basis could become public so swiftly.

There was no denial of the authenticity of the documents.

Anderson, amused at the administration's discomfort, said the papers came from high sources, and added, "If the sources were identified, it would embarrass the administration more than it would me."

## FBI Makes Check

An official close to the manhunt denied that a "high source" was involved with the leak but would not amplify the statement.

The FBI, asked to assist the search, has made a cursory check but because of the small number

of top level officials who were present at the Special Action Group meetings, has not launched an intensive investigation — yet.

The case is considered of vastly greater importance than that of Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon papers, because it is undeniable evidence that someone with a pipeline to innermost White House consultations has other than the interests of President Nixon at heart.

However, because of the nature of the documents, and despite their super-sensitivity, it was suggested by some officials that the individual concerned probably would not be prosecuted, but merely fired, if his identity became known.

The memos were records of notes of the Special Action Group meetings on Dec. 3, 4 and 6, not official transcripts. While the papers were stamped "secret sensitive," they did not include, as did the Pentagon papers, cop-

ies of cables, orders, directives and official recommendations.

The administration was caught flat-footed with no warning of a leak on Dec. 14 when the first Anderson column appeared, quoting notes about meetings held barely a week earlier. The quotes were authenticated quickly and the hunt for the source was begun.

One official said that to date, the case has been regarded as an "administrative" affair and not a cause for criminal action.

There were 11 officials at the first meeting and 19 at each of the next two. Henry Kissinger, foreign affairs adviser to the President, presided at all three meetings, and Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms was present at all of them, but representatives from the State Department and the Pentagon varied.



**WASHINGTON, Jan. 5**—Following are the texts of three secret documents made public today by the columnist Jack Anderson describing meetings of the National Security Council's Washington Special Action Group on the crisis between India and Pakistan:

## Memo on Dec. 3 Meeting

KISSINGER: I am getting hell every half-hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants us to be tougher on Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise.

Continued

# U.S. ENVOY IN INDIA DISPUTED POLICIES BACKING PAKISTAN

Keating Said Explanation of  
Nixon's Stand Was Hurting  
Americans' Credibility

FACTS ALSO QUESTIONED

Ambassador's Cable Bared  
by Columnist, Who Also  
Replies to Kissinger

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 5—Kenneth B. Keating, United States Ambassador to India, complained in a secret cablegram to Washington during the Indian-Pakistani war that the Nixon Administration's justification for its pro-Pakistan policy detracted from American credibility and was inconsistent with his knowledge of events.

The secret message to the State Department was made available to The New York Times at its request by the syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, who says he has received from unidentified United States Government informants "scores" of highly classified documents relating to the conflict last month.

Today Mr. Anderson—asserting that he was irked by a comment from Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser on national security disputing the accuracy of some of his recent columns—released the Defense Department's record of three top-level White House strategy sessions held at the start of the two-week war.

'Secret Sensitive' Reports

The reports of the meetings of Dec. 3, 4 and 6, were classified "secret sensitive." A low-key investigation is underway to ascertain who leaked the documents to Mr. Anderson. He said today that he was ready, if necessary, to reveal the Government. [Details on Page 17.]

The documents provide an unusual look into the thinking and actions of Mr. Nixon and his advisers on national security affairs at the start of the crisis, which eventually led to the Indian capture of East Pakistan and the establishment of a breakaway state there under the name Bangladesh.

Because the White House Security Action Group, known here as WSAG, did not have a formal structure, the language of Mr. Kissinger and the other participants was often looser, more piquant and franker than that in public statements by Mr. Kissinger and other Administration spokesmen at the time.

On Dec. 3, the day that full-scale fighting broke out, Mr. Kissinger told the White House strategy session, according to one document:

"I am getting hell every half-hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise."

The group included John N. Irwin, under secretary of state; Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, and Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The next day, Dec. 4, the United States called for a meeting of the United Nations Security Council to discuss the war and to press India for a withdrawal. Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, told newsmen that the United States believed that India bore "the major responsibility" for the fighting.

The decision by the Administration to attach blame to India came as something of a surprise in Washington since most diplomats and officials had expected a more neutral stance.

Disagreed With 'Tilt'

Critics of the Administration such as Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, had been complaining about Mr. Nixon's failure to criticize Pakistan for her bloody repression of the East Pakistani autonomy movement and the arrest of its leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

Mr. Anderson has indicated that the documents in his possession were leaked by officials of the Administration's "tilt" toward

Pakistan. Ambassador Keating is also understood to have argued since March, when the repression began, for a state ment against Pakistan.

Mr. Keating's cable, dated Dec. 8, was in response to the United States Information Agency's account of a briefing given by Mr. Kissinger at the White House on Dec. 7, setting forth the Administration's justification for its policy.

That briefing also became a source of contention between Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Anderson. In it Mr. Kissinger said that the United States was not "anti-Indian" but was opposed to India's recent actions. Mr. Anderson, seizing on the denial, sought to prove that the Administration was "anti-Indian," and therefore lying.

Dispute Over Relief

In his briefing Mr. Kissinger said, among other things, that the United States had allocated \$155-million to avert famine in East Pakistan at India's "specific request."

Mr. Keating said that his recollection from a conversation with Foreign Minister Swaran Singh was that India "was reluctant to see a relief program started in East Pakistan prior to a political settlement on grounds such an effort might serve to bail out" Gen. Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, then President of Pakistan, who was displaced after the loss of East Pakistan.

The Ambassador noted that the briefing said that the Indian Ambassador in Washington, L. K. Jha, was informed on Nov. 19 that the United States and Pakistan were prepared to discuss a precise schedule for political autonomy in East Pakistan but that India had sabotaged the efforts by starting the war.

"The only message I have on record of this conversation makes no reference to this critical fact," Mr. Keating said.

Mr. Kissinger said at the briefing, that when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was in Washington in early November, "we had no reason to believe that military action was that imminent and that we did not have time to begin to work on a peaceful resolution."

"With vast and voluminous efforts of intelligence community, reporting from both Delhi and Islamabad, and my own decisions in Washington, I do not understand statement that Washington was not given the slightest inkling that any military operation was in any way imminent," Mr. Keating responded. He said that on Nov. 12 he sent a cable "stating specifically that war is quite

The record of the White House strategy sessions indi-

cated that intelligence information on the situation in South Asia was quite thin, at least in the early stages.

Mr. Helms and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—while agreeing that India would win in East Pakistan—disagreed on the time it would take. Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, came close by saying it would take one to two weeks, but there is no sign yet that he was correct in predicting that the Russians would push for permanent use of a base at Visag, on India's east coast.

Often Mr. Helms simply read rival claims by Pakistan and India, without making any judgment on their accuracy—indicating that the United States had no independent information.

Fears for West Pakistan

By Dec. 6, when it was clear that the Indians would win in East Pakistan, Mr. Sisco said that "from a political point of view our efforts would have to be directed at keeping the Indians from extinguishing West Pakistan."

After the war was over Mr. Nixon said in an interview in Time magazine that the American intelligence community had reason to believe that there were forces in India pushing for total victory but that under pressure from the United States the Soviet Union convinced India to order a cease-fire once East Pakistan surrendered.

This version of events has been officially denied by New Delhi, which said it had no plans to invade West Pakistan.

But in the period covered by the documents made public by Mr. Anderson there seemed considerable confusion in the Administration. At one point Mr. Kissinger said that Mr. Nixon might want to honor any requests from Pakistan for American arms—despite an American embargo on arms to India or Pakistan.

It was decided at the Dec. 6 session to look into the possibility of shipping arms quietly to Pakistan. But the State Department said today that no action was taken.

Carrier Sent to Rejoin

"It is quite obvious that the President is not inclined to let the Paks be defeated," Mr. Kissinger said, apparently referring to the possibility of the loss of West Pakistan.

Later on in the crisis the United States sent the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise into the Indian Ocean, apparently as a show of force to deter any attack on West Pakistan.

continued

STATINTL

# House Committee Will Probe Classification of Documents

By Sanford J. Ungar

Washington Post Staff Writer

Rep. F. Edward Hebert (D-La.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, yesterday announced "a major inquiry into the problem of proper classification and handling of government information involving the national security."

He said it was "a coincidence" that the investigation would come on the heels of the release by syndicated columnist Jack Anderson of secret government documents concerning American policy in the Indo-Pakistani war.

Nonetheless, the disclosure of the top-secret Pentagon papers on the history of Vietnam war last summer, and now Anderson's release of current documents, appeared to have focused new concern throughout the government over the troubled security classification system.

Hebert assigned the new probe, which will begin shortly after Congress reconvenes Jan. 18, to a subcommittee headed by Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), a critic of the Pentagon and of administration policy in Vietnam.

In a telephone interview last night, Nedzi said that "it is not my intent to investigate the leak" of documents to Anderson.

"What we want to go into are the general problems of classification and security, how much is required and how it is handled and what kind of new legislation may be necessary," Nedzi said.

He acknowledged, however, that the Anderson documents, three of which appeared in full in The Washington Post yesterday, would "almost necessarily" come up during the probe.

Meanwhile, government investigators pressed their efforts to locate the source of Anderson's documents.

A report circulated yesterday among high-level administration sources that the investigation had already pinpointed offices in the Pentagon as the probable source of

memoranda describing meetings of the National Security Council's Washington Special Action Group.

The sources stressed that the memoranda, prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and for G. Warren Nutter, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, had been circulated only within the Pentagon.

They said they were especially surprised by the leak of the memoranda, because it would be relatively easy to trace their limited distribution.

Other government officials, however, pointed their fingers elsewhere.

One White House official said he suspected that the State Department was the source of the security breach. "You know that place leaks like a sieve," he said, especially in instances that might make Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser, look bad.

At the Pentagon, on the other hand, attention was diverted to the National Security Council.

The Justice Department continued to decline comment on the continuing FBI investigation.

Anderson continues his battle against government secrecy today, switching from the Indo-Pakistani war to secret White House documents used by President Nixon in preparation for meetings at San Clemente with Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato.

In a column distributed to 700 newspapers, including The Washington Post, Anderson discloses the contents of briefing papers prepared for the President.

Those papers, Anderson says, indicate that Sato has been dismayed with American policy in the Far East and is considering an independent Japanese approach to China.

Anderson quotes a cable from Armin Meyer, U. S. Ambassador to Japan, which said that "whereas heretofore anti-Americanism was pretty position parties and Japan's tendentious press, developments of past few months have

fostered seeds of doubt within normally American-oriented community."

Meyer also told Washington that the Japanese have the "impression that Japan is being asked to maintain cold-war confrontation posture while President's mission to Peking gives (the U.S. government) advantage of appearing to be more progressive and peace-minded."

In San Clemente, one Japanese diplomat in the Sato party told Washington Post reporter Stanley Karnow that it was "alarming" to learn the content of the secret American papers.

"I must pay my compliments to the White House," he added, however. "They understand Japanese attitudes very well." The diplomat said he was especially concerned by references in today's Anderson column to growing interest in Japan in a revision of the American-Japanese security treaty.

Assistant White House press secretary Gerald Warren continued to refuse comment on any of the disclosures in the Anderson columns, and Kissinger, who is in San Clemente with the President, refused to discuss them.

In response to a question about Kissinger's earlier comment to reporters that Anderson had taken comments about India and Pakistan "out of context," Warren said, "I am sure Dr. Kissinger stands by what he said. . . . The President is aware of the matter."

Anderson said Tuesday that he was releasing the full texts of the three documents to refute Kissinger's claim.

There was a run on Anderson's Washington office yesterday for copies of the secret documents which had appeared in The Washington Post.

By day's end, a member of his staff said, 18 news organizations had picked up copies of the three memoranda and another nine had asked that they be sent in the mail.

The New York Times, The Chicago Sun-Times, The San Francisco Chronicle and The

Boston Globe all published the texts of the memoranda in yesterday's editions after they received them from the Los Angeles Times-Washington Post News Service.

The widespread appearance of the documents in newspapers throughout the country appeared to obviate the possibility of any action in court by the Justice Department, as in the case of the Pentagon papers.

The New York Times said it would publish the documents in today's editions.

Responding to Anderson's suggestion Tuesday that the secret documents and others in his possession could be made available to Congress as the basis for an investigation of American policy toward India and Pakistan, a high-

ranking aide for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said, "I think that's fine."

Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), chairman of the committee, was in the Caribbean on vacation and could not be reached for comment.

Fulbright staff aides directed attention, however, to a report issued by the Foreign Relations Committee on Dec. 16, which said, "The problem for Congress in the foreign affairs field . . . goes beyond reducing unnecessary classification."

The report added, "It involves finding a way for Congress to make certain that it receives the full information necessary for exercising its war and foreign policy powers, including information which most people would agree should be kept secret from potential enemies."

"It may also involve finding a way for Congress to share, in determining what information is classified and thus kept secret from the American people."

That appeared to be the focus of the upcoming investigation by the House Armed Services Subcommittee. Nedzi said that it might not be "appropriate" to look into Kissinger's activities, but said the probe would focus on the way information is handled within the government.

Continued

6 JAN 1972

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# U.S. Stance on India Baffled Diplomats

By Laurence Stern  
Washington Post Staff Writer

In mid-April last year a "secret" cable from New Delhi dropped into the incoming traffic of Secretary of State William P. Rogers.

"Pakistan is probably finished as a unified state," said the message from U.S. Ambassador Kenneth B. Keating. "India is clearly the predominant actual and potential power in this area of the world. Bangladesh, with limited potential and massive problems, is probably emerging as an independent country."

"There is much the United States can do . . ."

The classified cable was the first attempt by the U.S. embassy in New Delhi to set out in comprehensive terms a policy for meeting the oncoming holocaust in the subcontinent.

Its substance was to be repeated at least a dozen times, in varying form, as the pattern of armed confrontation between India and Pakistan hardened into a full-scale military conflict.

But, as events unfolded, the Washington view of how to deal with the threat of war on the subcontinent began to diverge ever more sharply from the course that was being propounded by the U.S. officials "on the ground" in India and East Bengal.

Initial puzzlement at the responses of Washington gave way, among the diplomats in the field, to incredulity and privately expressed anger at America's increasingly isolated position on the subcontinent, except in West Pakistan.

The only top-ranking American diplomat in the region who seemed to be in phase with the Nixon administration's evolving policy of partiality to Pakistan was Ambassador Joseph S. Farland, who heads the U.S. embassy in the West Pakistani capital of Islamabad.

The cardinal points of disagreement between Washington and the officials in

the field were anticipated in the first Keating cable last April. One was the question of whether the United States should forcefully tell Pakistani President Yahya Khan to end the policy of military repression against the Bengali majority in East Pakistan, as well as to insist upon the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the pre-eminent political leader of the Bengali state.

Keating advised Rogers that the United States should "encourage the GOP (Government of Pakistan) to change its policy of military repression . . ." as well as to make a clear statement of "displeasure at the use of American arms and matériel" in East Bengal.

Keating also proposed that the United States voice its concern to Yahya over the fate of the sheikh, who was imprisoned in West Pakistan after having been arrested March 25 at his home in Dacca.

Only three months earlier the sheikh and his Awami League had won 167 of the 169 seats allotted to East Bengal in the Pakistan National Assembly.

In addition the U.S. ambassador said an American expression of hope for an early political settlement in East Bengal would, "if coupled with termination of American military supplies and suspension of economic assistance, have a sobering effect" on Yahya's government.

"Moreover," the Keating cable said, "such a course of U.S. action would be consistent with the realities of Pakistan's deterioration, India's predominance and of Bangladesh's emergence . . ."

The secret message went on to say it was of questionable value to American interests to "continue to refer in official communication and public statements to events in East Pakistan as an internal affair."

affair" in this context has become a code phrase in India and Pakistan for acquiescence in the military repressions.

"In short," Keating concluded, "the United States has interests in India, West Pakistan and Bangladesh which probably cannot be equally well served."

"Where the necessity for choice arises, we should be guided by the new power realities in South Asia, which fortunately, in the present case, largely parallel the moral realities as well."

The military repression to which Keating referred was the systematic slaughter, starting on the night of March 25, of Bengali civilians by the Pakistani army and its local paramilitary forces in the former Province of East Pakistan.

Just how many Bengalis were slaughtered in the ensuing eight months is subject to a wider range of conjecture. "I would not seriously consider any estimate of less than 250,000," said an American official who served in Dacca during the reign of terror.

Most Western estimates are in the range of 300,000 to 500,000. The Bangladesh government puts the toll of victims at closer to 2 million. There is no ready way to count because of the absence of accurate census figures or burial markers and the speed of decomposition in the warm, loamy and bone-scattered soil of East Bengal.

But American eyewitnesses and other western newsmen who were whisked out of Dacca at the beginning of the terror spoke of thousands of killings in the first week after Pakistani troops surged out of their garrisons. They reported the continuous clatter of machine-gun and small-arms fire and the sight of flames rising throughout the city as student buildings, Hindu districts and residential strongholds of the sheikh's Awami League organization were razed and their inhabitants incinerated or machine-gunned.

The civilian slaughters became another point of contention between the administration in Washington and the American officials who were in the field in the subcontinent.

Archer K. Blood, former U.S. consul-general in Dacca, cabled detailed reports on the killings to the embassy in Pakistan. But government sources in Washington said the reports on the magnitude of the killing were disbelieved at the time in Washington. The dispatches, it was said here, were considered "alarmist."

A petition was circulated at the Dacca consulate by Blood's subordinates. It took issue with the administration's policy of silence at the civilian massacres in East Bengal. As chief of the consulate Blood declined to sign the document, but passed it on to Islamabad and Washington with appropriate classification.

On June 5, Blood returned to the United States. Although he had been scheduled for another 18-month tour in Pakistan after home leave, he never returned to his post. He was assigned to the personnel department at the State Department in Washington.

The administration chose not to make an issue of the repressive tactics employed against the Bengalis, and particularly Awami League supporters, on grounds that the United States would have lost diplomatic leverage with Yahya's government. At the time, the Nixon administration said it was pursuing a course of "quiet diplomacy" to avert war.

But it has been acidly observed by U.S. officials in the field that "quiet diplomacy" was widely construed in India and Bangladesh to mean American acquiescence in one of the bloodiest repressions in recent times of a largely unarmed civilian population by a modern army using American weapons.

Some 10 million Bengalis, about 13 per cent of East Bengal's population, fled across the borders into the surrounding states of India, already among the most overpopulated and destitute areas of the world.

From the standpoint of the American diplomat in the field, the administration's assertion of a quiet and even-handed style of diplomacy in the subcontinent strained credulity with the dispatch of the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengal in the midst of the war.

STATINTL

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Continued



**Tilt**

The "Anderson papers" — secret summaries of the White House meetings of Dec. 3, 4 and 6 on the Indo-Pakistani crisis, made public by columnist Jack Anderson — confirm the starkly anti-India aspect of American policy and illuminate its sceming cynicism as well. For, although Mr. Nixon insists the United States acted for "the principle that any nation has a right to its integrity," nowhere in the Anderson papers is there a single reference to any purpose except to "tilt toward Pakistan." "I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India," Henry Kissinger, his leading aide, said at one point. "He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan."

Mr. Nixon succeeded, too. For months, the United States had avoided condemning Pakistan for murdering tens of thousands of Bengalis and for expelling millions of others into India. But now, with some Biharis threatened by Bengalis, "Dr. Kissinger suggested that [an international appeal] be done quickly in order to prevent a bloodbath." Impartial observers had long believed that a political settlement required release of the imprisoned Bengali leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Now, according to a paraphrase by the author of these reports, Dr. Kissinger said "we will go along in general terms with reference to political accommodation in East Pakistan but we will certainly not imply or suggest any specifics, such as the release of Mujib."

Advised that Security Council action against India was unlikely, Dr. Kissinger said, according to the documents, "Everyone knows how all this will come out and everyone knows that India will ultimately occupy East Pakistan. We must, therefore, make clear our position, table our resolution." Administration statements on the war, its steps on aid cutoffs: all had to show "tilt." Among the decisions: "Dr. Kissinger also directed that henceforth we show a certain coolness to the Indians; the Indian Ambassador is not to be treated at too high a level." Told that the law prevented transfer of Jordanian or Saudi Arabian military equipment

to Pakistan, Dr. Kissinger "indicated he would like a paper by tomorrow."

Now, we are aware that the material revealed in the Anderson papers is not inconsistent with a policy dedicated to the principle of national territorial integrity. India did invade Pakistan: its violation was extremely serious. We continue to believe, however, that the best chance of preserving Pakistan lay in much early, heavy and sustained American pressure on President Yahya Khan—such pressure was never applied—and that once Pakistan had dumped 10 million refugees into India, India had a provocation and a pretext that probably no country could have withstood. In those conditions, an American tilt toward Pakistan, in the name of Pakistani integrity, seemed to us at the time—and seems to us even more now, with publication of the Anderson papers—as a baffling flight into geopolitical fantasy.

Or is it so baffling? Could it not be that Mr. Nixon's endlessly trumpeted invitation to Peking is almost enough to explain the gratuitous fervor of American support for Islamabad? It is all very well to talk about respecting the principle of territorial integrity. But it could not have been far from the President's mind that if he went to Peking having just let a client go down the drain, or having seemed to, his position might have been considerably undermined. If this is so, then the long lead-time of the Peking trip—seven months from announcement to scheduled arrival—did in fact put Mr. Nixon in hock to a Pakistani regime that he otherwise could have treated with the coolness it deserved. A similar observation might be made about Mr. Nixon's trip to Moscow, although there other complicating factors obtain.

We cannot know for sure. But we know a lot more than we did, and for that we can all be grateful to Jack Anderson, who has brought to the public's attention material essential to the public's understanding. If the Anderson papers do not solve every riddle of American policy in the Indo-Pakistani crisis, they are an undoubted contribution to the public's right to know.



STATINTL

Jack Anderson: A funny story

## FBI probes policy leak

By TED KNAF

Scripps Howard Staff Writer

The Justice Department has directed the FBI to investigate who leaked highly embarrassing classified documents detailing White House policy meetings on the India-Pakistan war to columnist Jack Anderson, administration sources said today.

A Justice Department spokesman ended several days of "no comment" by admitting for the first time that the matter was "under investigation."

Earlier reports were that a search for the source of the leak was being conducted only within each of the departments which had officials at the secret meetings. Government sources said the probe now has moved to a higher level with the calling in of the FBI and also the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department, which would handle any prosecution.

## NO MUZZLE

But the government has not tried to suppress further publication of the Anderson columns, as it did after initial publication of the Pentagon papers last year.

The Washington Post today said Mr. Anderson gave it the full texts of three of the secret documents. The Post, which carries Mr. Anderson's column, said the three documents were on the letterhead of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of Warren G. Nutter, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.


The Post quoted Mr. Anderson as saying his sources for the papers hold high positions in the Nixon administration.

"If the sources were identified," the Post quoted Mr. Anderson, "it would embarrass the administration more than it would me. It would make a very funny story."

Mr. Anderson said the documents show that, contrary to the administration's professions of strict neutrality, Mr. Nixon sided strongly with the military dictatorship in West Pakistan against the world's largest democracy in India.

## 'GETTING HELL'

Dr. Henry Kissinger, Mr. Nixon's chief adviser on national security, was quoted as saying in a Dec. 3 strategy session, "I am getting



Jack Anderson, left, and Henry Kissinger.

hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India."

Mr. Anderson said the documents disclose that Dr. Kissinger sought to get around the ban on U.S. arms shipments to Pakistan by having them sneaked in thru Jordan or Saudi Arabia.

"Dr. Kissinger asked whether we have the right to authorize Jordan or Saudi Arabia to transfer military equipment to Pakistan," Mr. Anderson quoted from the Dec. 6 minutes. "Mr. (Christopher) Van Hollen (State Department Asia expert) stated that the United States cannot permit a third country to transfer arms which we have provided them when we, ourselves, do not authorize the sale direct to the ultimate recipient."

## 'OUT OF CONTEXT'

Dr. Kissinger said yesterday in San Clemente, Calif., that Mr. Anderson quoted "out of context" from the documents, but refused to elaborate. In response, Mr. Anderson told Scripps-Howard newspapers he would make the full memoranda available to the public.

Mr. Anderson wrote that a cable from Kenneth Keating, U.S. ambassador to India, warned that "any action other than rejection (of the plan to ship planes to Pakistan by way of Jordan) would pose enormous further difficulties in Indo-U.S. relations."

The documents indicated the United States was considering sending eight F104s via Jordan to resupply the Pakistan air force, which

had been crippled by initial Indian attacks. The war was over in two weeks, before any such shipment was made. Mr. Anderson said the documents indicate that a final decision had not been reached.

Mr. Anderson said the President overrode the advice of State Department senior officials to appeal to the West Pakistan government to stop persecuting Bengalis in East Pakistan, and to remain neutral between West Pakistan and India. One of those participating in the secret meetings wrote this report, according to Mr. Anderson:

Dr. Kissinger said that we are not trying to be even-handed. The President does not want to be even-handed. The President believes that India is the attacker. . . .

"Dr. Kissinger said that we cannot afford to ease India's state of mind. 'The Lady' (Mrs. Indira Gandhi, India's prime minister) is cold-blooded and tough and will not turn into a Soviet satellite merely because of pique. We should not ease her mind. He invited anyone who objected to this approach to take his case to the President."

## STATE LEAK

Speculation here is that the leak came from the State Department, which has had its ego bruised lately by Dr. Kissinger's emergence as the dominant foreign policy figure in the administration. Mr. Anderson refused to pinpoint his source.

The minutes described meetings in early December of the Special Action Group, comprised of State, Defense, CIA, and White House officials. The papers were variously classified, including "secret sensitive." Mr. Anderson said he has received two calls from "friends" in the government warning that he could be indicted.

Government officials said that altho classifications were violated, the substance of the reports indicates they would not be covered by laws against sabotage or espionage.

When several newspapers published excerpts of the secret Pentagon papers last year, Atty. Gen. John Mitchell asked the courts to suppress further publication. His request was rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. Following an FBI investigation, the government is prosecuting Daniel Ellsberg for having leaked the papers to the press.

# Kissinger: 'I Am Getting Hell... From the President'

Following is a typescript of the secret documents turned over to The Washington Post yesterday by Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson.

**SECRET SENSITIVE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF DEFENSE**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Refer to: 1-29643/71

**DOWNGRADED AT 12**

**YEARS INTERVALS**

(Illegible)

Not Automatically

Declassified

**INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
MEMORANDUM FOR  
RECORD**

**SUBJECT: WSAG Meeting  
on India/Pakistan**

Participants: Assistant to  
the President for National  
Security Affairs—

Henry A. Kissinger

Under Secretary of State—  
John N. Irwin

Deputy Secretary of Defense  
—David Packard

Director, Central Intelligence  
Agency—Richard  
M. Helms

Deputy Administrator (AID)  
Maurice J. Williams II

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of  
Staff—Admiral Thomas  
Moorer

Assistant Secretary of State  
(NEA)—Joseph J. Sisco

Assistant Secretary of De-  
fense (ISA)—G. Warren  
Nutter

Assistant Secretary of State  
(IO)—Samuel DePalma

Principal Deputy Assistant  
Secretary of Defense  
(ISA)—Armistead I. Sel-

den Jr.

Assistant Administrator  
(AIDINESA)—Donald G.  
MacDonald

Time and Place: 3 December  
1971, 1100 hours, Situation  
Room, White House.

## SUMMARY:

Reviewed conflicting re-  
ports about major action in  
the West Wing. CIA agreed  
to produce map showing  
areas of East Pakistan oc-  
cupied by India. The Presi-  
dent orders hold on issuance  
of additional irrevocable  
letters of credit involving  
\$99 million.

further action implementing  
the \$72 million PL 480 cred-  
it. Convening of Security  
Council meeting planned  
contingent on discussion  
with Pak Ambassador this  
afternoon plus further clar-  
ification of actual situation  
in West Pakistan. Kissinger  
asked for clarification of  
secret special interpretation  
of March 1959 bilateral U.S.  
agreement with Pakistan.

KISSINGER: I am getting  
hell every half hour from  
the President that we are  
not being tough enough on  
India. He has just called  
me again. He does not be-  
lieve we are carrying out  
his wishes. He wants to tilt  
in favor of Pakistan. He  
feels everything we do  
comes out otherwise.

HELMS: Concerning the  
reported action in the West  
Wing, there are conflicting  
reports from both sides and  
the only common ground is  
the Pak attacks on the Am-  
ritsar, Pathankat, and Srin-  
agar airports. The Paks say  
the Indians are attacking all  
along the border; but the  
Indian officials says this is  
a lie. In the East Wing, the  
action is becoming larger  
and the Paks claim there are  
now seven separate fronts  
involved.

KISSINGER: Are the In-  
dians seizing territory?

HELMS: Yes; small bits of  
territory, definitely.

SISCO: It would help if  
you could provide a map  
with a shading of the areas  
occupied by India. What is  
happening in the West—is a  
full-scale attack likely?

MOORER: The present  
pattern is puzzling in that  
the Paks have only struck at  
three small airfields which  
do not house significant  
numbers of Indian combat  
aircraft

HELMS: Mrs. Gandhi's  
speech at 1:30 may well an-  
nounce recognition of Bang-  
la Desh.

MOORER: The Pak attack  
is not credible. It has been  
made during late afternoon,  
which doesn't make sense.  
We do not seem to have suf-

KISSINGER: Is it possible  
that the Indians attacked  
first, and the Paks simply  
did what they could before  
dark in response?

MOORER: This is certain-  
ly possible.

KISSINGER: The Presi-  
dent wants no more irrev-  
ocable letters of credit issued  
under the \$99 million credit.  
He wants the \$72 million  
PL 480 credit also held.

WILLIAMS: Word will  
soon get around when we  
do this. Does the President  
understand that?

KISSINGER: That is his  
order, but I will check with  
the President again. If  
asked, we can say we are  
reviewing our whole eco-  
nomic program and that the  
granting of fresh aid is being  
suspended in view of condi-  
tions on the Subcontinent.  
The next issue is the UN.

IRWIN: The Secretary is  
calling in the Pak Amba-  
sador this afternoon, and  
the Secretary leans toward  
making a U.S. move in the  
U.N. soon.

KISSINGER: The Presi-  
dent is in favor of this as  
soon as we have some con-  
firmation of this large-  
scale new action. If the  
U.N. can't operate in this  
kind of situation effectively,  
its utility has come to an  
end and it is useless to  
think of U.N. guarantees in  
the Middle East.

SISCO: We will have a  
recommendation for you  
this afternoon, after the  
meeting with the Ambassa-  
dor. In order to give the  
Ambassador time to wire  
home, we could tentatively  
plan to convene the Secu-  
rity Council tomorrow.

KISSINGER: We have to  
take action. The President  
is blaming me, but you  
people are in the clear.

SISCO: That's ideal!

KISSINGER: The earlier  
draft statement for Bush is  
too evenhanded.

SISCO: To recapitulate,  
after we have seen the Pak  
Ambassador, the Secretary  
will report to you. We will  
update the draft speech for  
Bush.

KISSINGER: We can say  
we favor political accommo-  
dation but the real job of  
the Security Council is to  
prevent military action.

SISCO: We have never  
had a reply either from Ko-  
sygin or Mrs. Gandhi.

WILLIAMS: Are we to  
take economic steps with  
Pakistan also?

KISSINGER: Wait until  
I talk with the President.  
He hasn't addressed this  
problem in connection with  
Pakistan yet.

SISCO: If we act on the  
Indian side, we can say we  
are keeping the Pakistan sit-  
uation "under review."

KISSINGER: It's hard to  
tilt toward Pakistan if we  
have to match every Indian  
step with a Pakistan step.  
If you wait until Monday, I  
can get a Presidential de-  
cision.

PACKARD: It should be  
easy for us to inform the  
banks involved to defer ac-  
tion inasmuch as we are so  
near the weekend.

KISSINGER: We need a  
WSAG in the morning. We  
need to think about our  
treaty obligations. I remem-  
ber a letter or memo inter-  
preting our existing treaty  
with a special India tilt.  
When I visited Pakistan in  
January 1962, I was briefed  
on a secret document or oral  
understanding about contin-  
gencies arising in other than  
the SEATO context. Perhaps  
it was a Presidential letter.  
This was a special interpre-  
tation of the March 1959  
bilateral agreement.

Prepared by:

/s/initials

James H. Noyes

Deputy Assistant Secretary  
for Near Eastern, African  
and South Asian Affairs

Approved:

Illegible signature  
for G. Warren Nutter  
Assistant Secretary of De-  
fense for International Se-  
curity affairs

STATINT

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# Secret U.S. Papers Bared

By Sanford J. Ungar  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, in a major challenge to the secrecy surrounding U.S. policy in the Indo-Pakistani war, last night gave The Washington Post the full texts of three secret documents describing meetings of the National Security Council's Washington Special Action Group (WSAG).

The documents indicate that Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser, instructed government agencies to take a hard line with India in public statements and private actions during last month's war on the Indian subcontinent.

Anderson released the documents after Kissinger told reporters Monday during an airborne conversation en route to the Western White House in San Clemente that the columnist, in stories based on the materials, had taken "out of context" remarks indicating that the administration was against India.

Among the significant statements bearing on U.S. policy in the documents were the following:

- "KISSINGER: I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise."

- "Dr. Kissinger said that whoever was putting out background information relative to the current situation is provoking presidential wrath. The President is under the 'illusion' that he is giving instructions; not that he is merely being kept apprised of affairs as they progress. Dr. Kissinger asked that this be kept in mind."

- "Dr. Kissinger also directed that henceforth we show a certain coolness to the Indians; the Indian Ambassador is not to be treated at too high a level."

- "Dr. Kissinger . . . asked whether we have the right to authorize Jordan or Saudi Arabia to transfer military equipment to Pakistan. Mr. (Christopher) Van Hollen (deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs) stated the United States cannot permit a third country to transfer arms which we have provided them when we, ourselves, do not authorize sale direct to the ultimate recipient, such as Pakistan."

- "Mr. (Joseph) Sisco (assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs) suggested that what we are really interested in are what supplies and equipment could be made available, and the modes of delivery of this equipment. He stated from a political point of view our efforts would have to be directed at keeping the Indians from 'extinguishing' West Pakistan."

- "Mr. Sisco went on to say that as the Paks increasingly feel the heat we will be getting emergency requests from them . . . Dr. Kissinger said that the President may

want to honor those requests. The matter has not been brought to Presidential attention but it is quite obvious that the President is not inclined to let the Paks be defeated."

After getting the documents from Anderson, The Post decided to print the full texts in today's editions.

Anderson said he would make the documents available to other members of the press today, and he invited Sen. J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to use them as the basis for an investigation of U.S. policy in South Asia.

Fulbright, out of Washington during the congressional recess, could not be reached for comment.

The columnist also suggested that other members of Congress might wish to investigate government security classification policy.

Most of the significant statements in the three documents released last night had already appeared in Anderson's column, which is distributed to 700 newspapers, including The Washington Post.

The Justice Department acknowledged yesterday that the FBI is investigating the nature of the security leak that led to the disclosures.

But Anderson, who said he will write several more columns based on the documents, pointed out that no government agent had visited him and that he had received no request to halt publication. The Post has not received any such request either.

Pentagon sources said another investigation is underway by military security agents. They said the scope of their investigation would be narrow because "very few people" have access to minutes of the meetings.

Anderson said in an interview with The Post, said he also had copies of cables to Washington from the U.S. ambassa-

dors to India and Pakistan, as well as numerous other documents bearing on American policy.

He showed this reporter a briefcase with about 20 file folders, each containing some of the documents.

Anderson declined to name his sources, but suggested that they occupy high positions in the Nixon administration.

"If the sources were identified," he said "it would embarrass the administration more than it would me. It would make a very funny story."

Since the controversy last year over release of the Pentagon Papers, a top-secret history of U.S. policy in Vietnam, Anderson said, his sources had become more, rather than less, willing to disclose classified material.

The texts obtained by The Post provide substantial details of the back-and-forth at Special Action Group meetings among representatives of the White House, State and Defense departments, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Agency for International Development.

The three texts are:

- A "memorandum for record" about a WSAG meeting in the Situation Room of the White House on Dec. 3, by James H. Noyes, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Near Eastern, African and South Asian affairs. It was approved by G. Warren Nutter, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, and was printed on his stationery.

- A memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on their stationery, concerning a meeting on Dec. 4, by Navy Capt. Howard N. Kay, a JCS staffer.

- Another memorandum by Kay on JCS stationery about a meeting on Dec. 6. The first of the three meetings was held on the opening day of full-scale hostilities be-

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# Anderson Releases Papers On Secret U.S. Policy Sessions

By ORR KELLY  
Star Staff Writer

Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson has made public "SECRET SENSITIVE" minutes of three White House meetings dealing with the India-Pakistan War.

The documents show the government was secretly favoring Pakistan in the war while saying publicly that it was not taking sides.

Anderson used extensive quotations from the documents in recent columns and then released the full text as a deliberate challenge to the government's system of classifying information.

After the Anderson columns appeared, the White House began coordinating a broad-scale investigation to learn who leaked the documents to him.

## Material Confirmed

The White House today refused to say whether the published material is authentic. But a State Department official who asked not to be identified said there is no question of the authenticity of the documents.

Anderson released the documents after Henry A. Kissinger, presidential adviser for national security affairs, told newsmen yesterday he was quoted out of context in excerpts from the documents printed earlier by Anderson.

Anderson gave the documents to the Washington Post last night, and the paper printed them today. The Star obtained its own copies of the documents.

Anderson said in an interview last night that his column prepared for release tomorrow would carry excerpts from secret documents dealing with relations between the United States and Japan. The column will appear on the same day President Nixon meets with Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in San Clemente, Calif.

## "I Am . . . Getting Hell"

One of the documents released by Anderson said Kissinger was telling a White House meeting on Dec. 3 that:

"I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out other wise."

The documents provide more detail on the meetings than had been made public previously, but many of the essential details had already been used by Anderson in his syndicated column.

He did not release what he said were "dozens" of other documents giving what he called a complete picture of the government's decision-making process during the India-Pakistan War.

## Meetings of WSAG

The papers released by Anderson covered meetings of the Washington Special Action Group at the White House on Dec. 3, 4 and 6. The WSAG is a top advisory committee to the National Security Council.

All the documents are marked "SECRET SENSITIVE" and one paper, covering the Dec. 4 meeting, says: "In view of the sensitivity of information in the NSC (National Security Council) system and the detailed nature of this memorandum, it is requested that access to it be limited to a strict need-to-know basis."

The documents appeared to have come from two different offices in the Pentagon—although it is quite possible that copies of the minutes also would be available in the other areas of the government.

Anderson says he has even more such documents. The disclosures amount to a major leak of sensitive government papers—in some way even more disturbing to high government officials than the release of the Pentagon Papers earlier this year.

In that case, the documents of history ending about 1965.

The papers published by Anderson, on the other hand, cover a current international crisis.

The minutes of the meeting of Dec. 3 were made by James H. Noyes, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs, and approved by his boss, G. Warren Nutter, assistant defense secretary for international security affairs.

The minutes of the Dec. 4 and 6 meetings were prepared by Navy Captain H.N. Kay, who works in the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon.

Government sources said an investigation of the source of the apparent leak to Anderson was being coordinated from the White House and involved security agencies at the State and Defense Departments as well as the Secret Service. Contrary to earlier reports, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has not been called into the case so far.

Officials at the State and Defense Departments seemed to be most concerned about two aspects of the case.

## The Concern

Several officials called attention to a column published by Anderson on Dec. 23 describing a secret intelligence report in which Emory Swank, U.S. ambassador to Cambodia, gave an unflattering assessment of top Cambodian officials. Publication of the report, the U.S. officials said, will greatly complicate Swank's task in dealing with the Cambodian government.

Anderson acknowledged that an argument could be made that the cables of an ambassador to his government should be classified.

"But I think I had a duty to report his warning that the country (Cambodia) is about to collapse," he said.

## Two Key Discrepancies

The other concern, raised about the Anderson papers is

that a pattern of leaks now may make government officials reluctant, in the future, to offer proposals that might be embarrassing if they were published, or to be candid in their comments on policies under consideration.

The Anderson documents reveal what appear to be two major discrepancies between what the administration was doing — or thinking about doing — at the height of the India-Pakistan crisis and what it was telling the public.

Anderson suggested a comparison be made between the minutes of the sessions — particularly Kissinger's comment that he was getting hell from the President for not being tough enough on India — and a Kissinger "background" briefing for the press on Dec. 7. Anderson said the comparison would show the government "lied" to the public.

In that background, Kissinger denied the administration was "anti-Indian."

## Arms Transfer Suggested

The other major discrepancy noted by Anderson arises from the minutes of the Dec. 6 meeting in which Kissinger is said to have asked whether the United States could authorize Jordan or Saudi Arabia to transfer American military equipment to Pakistan.

Two State Department officials responded that such a transfer would be illegal and that the Jordanians would probably be grateful if the United States "could get them off the hook" by denying authority for such a transfer.

The government said publicly at that time that it was not providing aid to either country.

Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco said that "as the Paks increasingly feel the heat we will be getting emergency requests from them."

"Dr. Kissinger said that the President may want to honor the request," Sisco said. "The matter has not

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# Columnist Says Nixon Pressed Policy Against India

By TERENCE SMITH  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 3—President Nixon was "furious" with his subordinates during the recent India-Pakistan war for not taking a stronger stand against India, the syndicated columnist Jack Anderson reported today.

Mr. Anderson quoted Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security, as having told a meeting of senior Administration officials: "I'm getting hell every half-hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India."

According to Mr. Anderson, Mr. Kissinger directed that all United States officials "show a certain coolness" to the Indians. "The Indian Ambassador is not to be treated at too high a level," he is quoted as having said.

The quotations in Mr. Anderson's column today were the latest in a series of verbatim reports of secret White House strategy sessions dealing with the crisis that the columnist has published during the last several days.

His column is syndicated to 700 newspapers, 100 of them overseas. Mr. Anderson took over the column on the death of his colleague Drew Pearson in September, 1969.

The publication of the reports, which Mr. Anderson says are classified "secret sensitive," has infuriated the White House and unsettled national security officials.

Government sources confirmed today that an investigation had been started by the White House to determine who leaked the classified documents.

The sources said the new investigation, reportedly being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is directed at individuals in the State and Defense Departments, and on the National Security Council staff who have had access to the notes quoted by Mr. Anderson.

The quotations published by the columnist are not official minutes of the meetings, but rather notes prepared by representatives of the various departments attending.

In a telephone interview today, Mr. Anderson said he had been given two complete sets of notes of the meetings of the Washington Special Action Group, a high-level strategy committee assembled during

crises, that dealt with the India-Pakistan conflict. The meetings were held in early December.

## Notes by Pentagon Aides

The notes he has published so far, the columnist said, are from those taken for the Defense Department and are signed by two Pentagon officials.

Mr. Anderson said he had received scores of other classified documents, including secret intelligence reports and cablegrams, that he intended to publish during the next two weeks.

"I am trying to force a showdown with the Administration over their classification system," the columnist said. "Everything Kissinger does—even the toilet paper he uses—is being stamped 'secret.' That's not in the public interest in a democracy."

Mr. Anderson said neither he nor members of his staff had yet been questioned by Government investigators, but that he had "positive" information that the F.B.I. had already interrogated individuals at the White House and State and Defense departments in an effort to discover who had provided him with the documents.

## Aide Declines Comment

Gerald L. Warren, the acting Press Secretary at the White House, declined today to say whether an investigation had been ordered. He also declined all comment on the Anderson columns.

In the column published today, Mr. Anderson quotes from notes taken during the Washington Special Action Group's meetings of Dec. 3, Dec. 4 and Dec. 8.

In the first session, he quotes Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence, as saying the Indians were "currently engaged in a no-holds-barred attack on East Pakistan and that they had crossed the border on all sides."

"Dr. Kissinger remarked that if the Indians have announced a full-scale invasion," the column continues, "this fact must be reflected in our U.N. statement."

On Dec. 4, Mr. Kissinger is quoted as having said, "On AID matters the President wants to be against India only." He was referring to the Agency for International Development.

This instruction was amplified on Dec. 8, when, according to the column, "Dr. Kissinger stated that current orders are not to put anything in the budget for India. It was also not to be leaked that AID had put money in the budget only to have the 'wicked' White House take it out."

On Dec. 4, the Administration suspended its aid program in India.

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## THE CIA AND DECISION-MAKING

*By Chester L. Cooper*

"The most fundamental method of work . . . is to determine our working policies according to the actual conditions. When we study the causes of the mistakes we have made we find that they all arose because we departed from the actual situation . . . and were subjective in determining our working policies."—"The Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung."

IN bucolic McLean, Virginia, screened by trees and surrounded by a high fence, squats a vast expanse of concrete and glass known familiarly as the "Pickle Factory," and more formally as "Headquarters, Central Intelligence Agency." Chiselled into the marble which is the only relieving feature of the building's sterile main entrance are the words, "The Truth Shall Make You Free." The quotation from St. John was personally chosen for the new building by Allen W. Dulles over the objection of several subordinates who felt that the Agency, then still reeling from the Bay of Pigs débâcle, should adopt a somewhat less lofty motto. (In those dark days of late 1961, some suggested that a more appropriate choice would be "Look Before You Leap.") But Dulles had a deeper sense of history than most. Although he was a casualty of the Bay of Pigs and never sat in the Director's office with its view over the Potomac, he left a permanent mark not only on the Agency which he had fashioned but on its building which he had planned.

Allen Dulles was famous among many and notorious among some for his consummate skill as an intelligence operative ("spook" in current parlance), but one of his greatest contributions in nurturing the frail arrangements he helped to create to provide intelligence support to Washington's top-level foreign-policy-makers.

Harry Truman, whose Administration gave birth to both the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, recalls that, "Each time the National Security Council is about to consider a certain policy—let us say a policy having to do with Southeast Asia—it immediately calls upon the CIA to present an estimate of the effects such a policy is likely to have. . . .<sup>1</sup> President Truman painted a somewhat more cozy relationship between the NSC and the CIA than probably existed during, and certainly since, his Administration. None the less, it is fair to say that the intelligence community, and especially the CIA, played an important advisory role in high-level policy deliberations during the 1950s and early 1960s.

To provide the most informed intelligence judgments on the effects a contemplated policy might have on American national security interests, a group especially tailored for the task was organized in 1950 within the CIA. While this step would probably have been taken sooner or later, the communist victory

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**The Washington Merry-Go-Round****U.S., U.N. Damaged by Indian Blitz****By Jack Anderson**

Pakistan wasn't the only loser of the bloody, two-week war over Bangladesh. The Indian blitz also badly damaged two bigger victims.

We have already shown from the secret White House Papers that the United States suffered a strategic defeat. Thanks to President Nixon's bungling, Russia has emerged as India's partner, and the United States is out in the cold on the Indian subcontinent.

The other big loser is the United Nations, which failed dismally to keep the peace between India and Pakistan. The U.N.'s impotence, as it groped for an international consensus to end the struggle, caused President Nixon's foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, to blurt at a secret White House meeting:

"If the U.N. can't operate in this kind of situation effectively, its utility has come to an end, and it is useless to think of U.N. guarantees in the Middle East."

America's U.N. Ambassador, George Bush, suggested in one secret report that Secretary General U Thant's ineffectiveness might be attributed to "physical strain due to his recent illness." But Kissinger put the matter more bluntly by calling the U.N. wrangle a "farce."

Kissinger made clear his contempt for the U.N. at a

White House strategy session on Dec. 4.

"We will have difficulty in the U.N.," suggested Samuel DePalma, the State Department's specialist in international organizations, "because most of the countries who might go with us do not want to tilt toward Pakistan to the extent we do."

"We have told the Paks we would make our statement," replied Kissinger. "Let's go ahead and put in our own statement anyway regardless of what other countries want to do. We need now to make our stand clear even though it has taken us two weeks of fiddling."

**Kissinger's Comments**

The secret minutes continue: "Dr. Kissinger (said) it was important that we register our position. The exercise in the U.N. is likely to be an exercise in futility, inasmuch as the Soviets can be expected to veto. The U.N. itself, will in all probability do little to terminate the war."

At this point, Kissinger declared: "Nothing will happen at the Security Council because of Soviet vetoes. The whole thing is a farce."

"The Soviet tactic will be to stall, as they do not want a cease-fire yet," agreed Christopher Van Hollen, another State Department expert.

DePalma said the Indians "could shilly-shally for three or four days"—long enough,

chimed in CIA director Richard Helms, "for them to occupy East Pakistan."

Footnote: When Indian troops threatened Dacca, Secretary General U Thant's first reaction was to evacuate the U.N. mission.

This brought stern, secret instructions from State Secretary Bill Rogers to Ambassador Bush: "Request U.S.U.N. (U.S. delegation) to convey to SYG (Secretary General) or appropriate senior official our deep concern regarding decision of SYG to withdraw all U.N. officials from East Pakistan as demanded by Indian government."

"In earlier message from Dacca, U.N. group in East Pakistan was cited as having been instructed by U.N.N.Y. (U.N. headquarters) to defer evacuation of U.N. officials so they may be in place for possible assistance in arranging cease-fire..."

"Suggest in course of discussion you stress critical role which U.N. can play in protecting human rights and seeking peace during current crisis."

**Washington Whirl**

Reverse Justice—We reported earlier that the Justice Department was trying to reduce a U.S. Court of Claims commissioner's damage recommendation to a Miami Herald photographer named Doug Kennedy who was wounded by American Marines in the Dominican Republic six years

ago. The court recommended Kennedy receive \$100,000. Subsequently, however, he was stricken with cancer. So the Justice Department promptly sought to cut down his award on the ground that cancer had reduced his life expectancy. Now Kennedy has died and his wife and child need the award more than ever.

PX Blues—Three separate surveys taken by the Pentagon, a civilian research firm and the Army itself have turned up widespread dissatisfaction with the multibillion-dollar commissary system. The Pentagon study found "customers rated commissary service unsatisfactory." The civilian survey showed 76.9 per cent of commissary customers wanted a better selection. The Army discovered that, out of eight aspects of military life, the commissaries and post exchanges ranked seventh. Meanwhile, despite revelations of waste and corruption in the system, the generals in charge continue to assure Defense Secretary Mel Laird that all is well.

Dole's Dunning—Sen. Bob Dole (R-Kan.), the brassy Republican National Chairman, has sent out letters soliciting \$50 and \$75 contributions for the Senate campaign of his old pal, Sen. Bob Griffin (R-Mich.). But the letters were sent to non-Michigan money men, thus angering other GOP candidates who see the dunning as poaching on their homestate preserves.

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